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Numerous questions arise in the effort adequately to accommodate and serve minority 
students in public education, not the least of which are questions concerning how 
education decisions are made, by individuals, groups, or the state itself.  This 
dissertation begins with the broadest, most far-reaching kinds of decisions, those 
made by groups (or representatives of groups) during the process of education policy 
formation.  It then moves closer to home (and school), to the narrower kinds of 
decisions made by individual parents, school officials, and school-age children.   
 
The first essay engages in a broad theoretical discussion, applicable beyond education 
policy, and then applies this perspective to indigenous education.  It asks:  How might 
we evaluate the degree of self-determination that indigenous peoples exercise in 
decisions that affect them?  In order to answer this question, this chapter suggests a 
theoretical framework for evaluating public participation and applies it to Sámi 
education policy-making in Norway.  The second essay engages in a similarly broad 
theoretical discussion, though in this case it is motivated by an education policy 
problem.  It asks:  What ought to be the role of parental consent in education 
decisions that affect their children?  It takes as its jumping-off point three European 
 
 
Court of Human Rights cases of educational discrimination against members of the 
Roma population, Europe’s largest, poorest, and fastest-growing minority group.  The 
final, and most applied, essay proceeds in the reverse order, beginning with an 
empirical question, and concluding with a discussion of the theoretical implications of 
the results.  This essay uses quantitative methods to test whether Roma students do, in 
fact, have a higher drop-out rate than similarly situated non-Roma students and, 
finding that they do, asks why. This chapter goes on to investigate the labor market 
for Roma and subsequently to delve into the role of adaptive preference formation in 
schooling decisions (Do Roma really not “value” education, as is so often 
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It is the integrity of the inner worlds of peoples—their rectitude 
systems or their sense of spirituality—that is their distinctive humanity. 
Without an opportunity to determine, sustain, and develop that 
integrity, their humanity—and ours—is denied.  ~George Steiner1 
 
This dissertation investigates several ways in which individuals and groups 
make (or do not make) education decisions for themselves and the normative, legal, 
and political questions that arise in the process.  States often struggle to 
accommodate, and adequately serve, minority students in national education systems.  
Sometimes these struggles arise from the desire of cultural minorities to retain some 
control over their children’s education (a desire that is backed up in various ways and 
to varying degrees by international human rights law).  Other times, the struggles 
arise from the difficulty of ensuring the success of minority students who often come 
from disadvantaged backgrounds, speak a different language in the home, or face 
other barriers to attendance and achievement.  Where such struggles are thought to 
stem at least in part from cultural differences, one possible—and increasingly 
common—response is to develop creative social policies aimed at protecting the well-
being and cultural freedom of vulnerable minorities.  Call these “multicultural 
policies,” policies that, in Will Kymlicka’s words, are “designed to provide some 
level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural 
groups” (Kymlicka 2007, 16). 
 
                                                          
1




The recognition that “people are unique, self-creating, and creative 
individuals”—in contrast to the archetypal, universal citizens in pursuit of a common 
good—goes back (famously) at least as far John Stuart Mill and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (Gutmann 1994).  Under this conception, people aspire to something like 
Rob Reich’s ideal of the autonomous agent, where autonomy refers to “a person’s 
ability to reflect independently and critically upon basic commitments, values, 
desires, and beliefs, be they chosen or unchosen, and to enjoy a range of meaningful 
life options from which to choose, upon which to act, and around which to orient and 
pursue one’s life projects” (Reich 2002, 92).  Recognition of this individuality and 
autonomy (what I refer to as “agency” in the chapters that follow) is at the heart of 
the concept of “multiculturalism.”  Charles Taylor, one of today’s most well-known 
identity theorists (and not the Liberian tyrant), explains the political incarnation of 
this philosophy simply as the demand many people make that public institutions 
recognize their identity or identities (Taylor 1994).  These demands are particularly 
strong within minority rights movements. Christine Inglis tells us that 
“multiculturalism” (in the “programmatic-political,” as opposed to the normative, 
sense) refers “to specific types of programs and policy initiatives designed to respond 
to and manage ethnic diversity” (Inglis 1996, 16).  Education programs figure 
prominently among such policy initiatives. 
 
The right to education is enshrined in numerous international, regional, and 
state laws.  It is also one of the surest ways for individuals to expand their own set of 




valuable.  Specifically, education may be one of the most powerful weapons available 
to combat exclusion, poverty, and abuse.  It is also crucial to developing the critical 
agency necessary to recognize and pursue the things in life that one values and has 
reason to value, whether that be through individual pursuits or through one form or 
another of collective public participation.  The role of education in encouraging such 
civic participation is well established.  Education can increase the likelihood of 
individuals to vote (Blais 2000); it can help instill in individuals a sense of civic duty 
(Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980); and it can be used to teach the skills of civic 
participation (Levine and Higgins-D’Alessandro 2010, Verba, Brady and Schlozman 
1995). 
 
Education also plays a pivotal role in identity formation. Control over the 
content, structure, and aims of one’s education is, moreover, a powerful tool for 
ensuring cultural autonomy and survival.  It is also an important symbolic gesture, a 
recognition of the value to individuals and groups of having some control over the 
preservation of their past, the dignity of their present, and the guiding of their future. 
Indigenous peoples and minorities around the world have struggled to protect, 
preserve, and develop their own education systems, sometimes parallel to, sometimes 
within the bounds of, existing (majority) education systems.  They often do so against 
an historical backdrop of abuse, exclusion, and forced assimilation in which national 
education policies long have been complicit.
2
   This is as true in Europe, with its 
robust human rights system, as it is elsewhere.   
                                                          
2
 By “assimilation,” I am referring to a policy of diluting or erasing certain characteristics (culture, 





In implementing adequate systems of minority education, whether as part of 
national curricula and schooling systems or as autonomous or semi-autonomous 
systems, policy makers run up against many difficult normative and practical 
questions.  How does one balance the aim of building an inclusive and diverse 
national curriculum with that of respecting minority cultures (which might include a 
language, religion, or set of traditions that differ from the majority population)?  How 
does one ensure that all children receive a rich, full education that will adequately 
prepare them to be active players in their country’s society and economy, while also 
allowing minorities the freedom to pursue traditional modes of education?  In the case 
of Europe, how does one uphold the legal obligation to allow minority groups to set 
up and run their own schools with the equally binding legal obligation to ensure that 
the human rights of all individuals—including schoolchildren and their guardians—
are respected?  How does one ensure equal access to the avenues for, and benefits of, 
education for marginalized groups?  Can a single national education system ever be 
equally valuable to all segments of society?  What is the role of the state in enforcing 
compulsory schooling when that schooling is resisted by certain groups as irrelevant, 
inappropriate, or financially impossible?  These are just a few of the questions with 
which education policy makers must wrestle. 
 
I cannot hope to do justice to all of these questions at this time.  In this 
collection of three essays, I aim to answer, through both normative and quantitative 
                                                                                                                                                                     
counterparts.  The goal of assimilation, in this sense, is ultimately to make members of a cultural 




inquiry, three questions that arise in the effort adequately to accommodate and serve 
minority students in public education. Two essays forward a theoretical argument 
which I then apply to a specific case of minority education; a third essay begins with 
empirical work and concludes with a theoretical discussion.  The large pan-European 
Roma population (typically considered an “ethnic minority” or “national minority”), 
and the Sámi (typically considered an “indigenous” people) in the Nordic countries 
and Russia, are two examples of peoples who have struggled with education systems 
that have, for different reasons at different times, failed to meet their needs, with 
consequences for individual and collective agency.  Thus, two of the essays take the 





The first essay (“Agency Vulnerability and Self Determination:  An 
Application to Indigenous Participation”) engages in a broad theoretical discussion, 
applicable beyond education policy, and then applies this perspective to indigenous 
education.  I ask:  How might we evaluate the degree of self-determination that 
indigenous peoples actually exercise in decisions that affect them?  In order to answer 
this question, I suggest a theoretical framework for evaluating public participation 
and apply it to Sámi education policy-making in Norway.  In the second essay 
(“Parental Consent and Children’s Rights in Europe:  A Balancing Act”), I engage in 
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The first essay was published in 2010 and has been presented at three international conferences and in 
the Maryland School of Public Policy Tuesday Forum between 2009 and 2010.  The second has also 
been accepted for publication in 2012 and, between 2008 and 2010, was presented at one international 
conference and in two PhD courses and was evaluated for a comprehensive exam in quantitative 
methods.  The third, and most recent, has not been submitted to any journals at this time but in 
September, 2011, it was presented at an international conference and at the Maryland School of Public 




a similarly broad theoretical discussion, although in this case it is motivated by an 
education policy problem.  I ask:  What ought to be the role of parental consent in 
education decisions that affect their children?  I take as my jumping-off point three 
European Court of Human Rights cases of educational discrimination against Roma.  
The final, and most applied, essay (“Educational Attainment and School-to-Work 
Conversion of Roma in Romania:  Adapting to Feasible Means or Ends?”) proceeds 
in the reverse order, beginning with an empirical question, and concluding with a 
discussion of the theoretical implications of the results.  This essay uses quantitative 
methods to test whether Roma students do, in fact, have a higher drop-out rate than 
similarly situated non-Roma students and, finding that they do, asks why. This second 
question leads me to investigate the labor market for Roma and subsequently to delve 
into the role of adaptive preference formation in schooling decisions (Do Roma really 
not “value” education, as is so often suggested?).  In the introductory pages that 
follow, I briefly introduce these two minority groups before offering a short overview 
of each chapter. 
 
1. The Roma 
 
The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority, with about 10-12 million 
individuals dispersed throughout the region.
4
  They are also one of its poorest and 
fastest growing populations.  Centuries of discrimination and marginalization have 
                                                          
4
 The “Roma” are a diverse people.  There is controversy over the term but I follow convention by 
including under this umbrella Roma, Sinti, Ashkali and others.  Most official estimates put the Roma 
population at around 10-12 million, but many estimates are much higher, since reporting problems and 
a reluctance on the part of many Roma to self-identify make it unlikely that all Roma are counted as 




left the Roma in a vicious cycle of poverty and unemployment, furthering their 
exclusion as both ethnic and economic personae non grata.  For much of the 
twentieth century, Roma engagement in national education systems was characterized 
by either assimilation or exclusion.  In more recent years, the European Union has 
been expanding to include areas with larger Roma populations (the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe), putting the Roma on the agendas of accession countries 
required to meet certain standards for development, human rights, and anti-
discrimination policy. 
 
Still, large numbers of Roma youth are not completing even primary school, 
let alone secondary school (Kosko forthcoming 2012, Open Society Institute 2007).  
Roma complete significantly fewer years of schooling (measured as “educational 
attainment”) than non-Roma, and an endless stream of government and non-profit 
publications report that educational outcomes for Roma remain stagnant or, at best, 
are improving very slowly.  Moreover, these improvement rates tend to be measured 
mostly in terms of declining rates of failure rather than in learning outcomes 
(“achievement”) (Open Society Institute, 2007).  Compounding both the 
attainment/achievement and measurement problems, Romani children continue in 
many countries to be segregated into separate schools or programs for the learning 
disabled.  This practice continues despite European Court of Human Rights rulings 
and, in some countries, legislation prohibiting it (Greenberg 2010, Kosko 2004, 
United Nations Development Programme 2002, Organization for Security and 





There remains a great deal of debate about the precise reasons why Roma 
leave school at such an alarmingly high rate.  It is likely that segregated schools are a 
factor in perpetuating the high drop-out rate, though no reliable statistics exist at the 
national level that disaggregate the Roma educational attainment rate by type of 
school.  Connections between poor employment outcomes and educational 
attainment—and the preferences young people develop as a result—also remain 
speculative.  Meanwhile, legal and ethical questions persist about the role of school 
officials and parents in making life-changing schooling decisions for young Roma 
students. 
  
2. The Sámi 
 
The Sámi, once (and now pejoratively) referred to as “Lapps” or 
“Lapplanders,” see themselves as a single people spread across the territory of four 
nation-states (Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden).  Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
in different ways, have all publicly recognized the Sámi as an indigenous people with 
a right of self-determination.  But Norway, home to the world's largest Sámi 
population, is the only country with a sizeable Sámi population to have ratified 
International Labor Organization Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries (“ILO 169”) and thus for many years was viewed 




recognized, legally binding way.
5
  For more than a century prior to this development, 
from about 1869 to 1970, the Government of Norway maintained an overtly 
assimilationist policy toward the Sámi, using the schools as a policy tool in the effort 
to erase cultural and linguistic differences between the Sámi and mainstream society 
(Todal 2003, Corson 1995). 
 
In 1969, the Comprehensive School Act guaranteed the right to be taught the 
Sámi language in school and the government began a trial program of allowing 
beginning instruction in the Sámi language in primary and lower secondary schools, 
for those Sámi students who spoke the language at home.  In 1985, the Sámi won the 
right to be instructed in other subjects in the Sámi language (Balto and Hirvonen 
2008, Todal 2003, 186-90).
6
  Two institutions had primary responsibility for the 
development of Sámi education during this time:  the Sámi Education Council 
(started in 1975) and the Sámi College (started in 1989).  However, the Sámi 
Education Council remained until 2000 under the jurisdiction of the Norwegian 
Department of Education.  The Sámi Parliament, the Sámediggi, was established by 
the 1987 Sámi Act and formally launched by the King in 1989, initially with a 
consultative purpose, to be expanded later to include decision-making authority 
(Smith 1995).  By 1997, the government had formally adopted a separate Sámi 
                                                          
5
 Recognizing a group as indigenous through ratification of an international treaty concerning those 
peoples makes the state accountable for upholding the treaty’s provisions, whereas other forms of 
public recognition—for example constitutional acknowledgment or official policy statements—carry 
rhetorical and symbolic, but not necessarily legal, weight. 
6
  As of 1995, Norway was home to about 25,000 Sámi speakers, a number that has presumably 
increased since the passing of the Sámi Language Act in 1992 (Corson 1995, 495).  “In large towns 
like Kautokeino and Karasjok, a Sámi language is used as the everyday language by almost all Sámi.  
Its status and use are increasing, while the use of Norwegian by Sámi is decreasing” (Corson 1995, 
449).  More recent estimates are hard to come by.  The CIA World Factbook 2011 lists simply “small 




curriculum that applied to all elementary and lower secondary school subjects in six 
predominantly Sámi counties in Northern Norway.  In 2000, the Norwegian 
government turned over some of the control of the Sámi education system to the Sámi 
Parliament, at the same time transferring the Sámi Education Council to the 
jurisdiction of the Sámi Parliament (Todal 2003, 187-90).   
 
There is some sense that these developments represent the “state of the art” in 
indigenous accommodation in education policy, but much debate remains about 
whether the nature and scope of Sámi participation in education decisions that affect 
them is in fact sufficient, and what “sufficient” even means.  It is unclear whether the 
Sámi actually enjoy significant self-determination in education, as the government of 
Norway claims they do and as the Sámi appear to desire.  Of course, if self-
determination is a matter of degree, they might enjoy trivial or modest self-
determination but not significant or sufficient self-determination. 
 
With the above background on the Roma and Sámi, and on related issues in 
national educational policies to accommodate these minority communities, I turn now 







3. Essay I7 
 
Development, understood as a process of social and economic change, can be 
a source of great freedom.  But when individuals and groups have little or no control 
over that process, it can be a source of vulnerability as well.  In this chapter, I focus 
on what I call “agency vulnerability,” the risk of being limited in our ability to control 
the social and economic forces that affect us.  Minority individuals and groups are 
often the most susceptible to harm, including those forms that arise from agency 
vulnerability.  In particular, indigenous peoples struggle against both individual and 
societal vulnerabilities and often have the least control over circumstances and 
changes that affect them.  The language of human rights is frequently used to justify 
policies aimed at reducing vulnerability.  For indigenous peoples, this often takes the 
form of a right to self-determination, a right in part intended to reduce “agency 
vulnerability.”  Participation, I argue, constitutes a key component of the process 
(which I distinguish from substantive) aspect of self-determination.  With this is 
mind, I propose a framework for evaluating the extent of participation of indigenous 
peoples in decisions that affect them.   
 
My analytical framework combines the work of Denis Goulet and David A. 
Crocker.  I first situate the principle of self-determination as the legal and political 
expression of Amartya Sen’s development-as-freedom paradigm (Sen 1999), in 
particular Crocker’s “agency-oriented” understanding of it.  Homing in on the 
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importance of participatory development for self-determination, I then deploy 
Goulet’s concept of “entry points” into participatory processes (Goulet 1989), 
followed by Crocker’s delineation of “thin” versus “thick” “modes of participation” 
(Crocker 2008), in order to establish the extent to which an indigenous people is in 
fact able to ensure for itself the development and sustainability of a society that 
allows its members to “lead the kind of lives they value—and have reason to value” 
(Sen 1999, 18).  In the second part of this chapter, I apply this framework to the case 
of the Sámi people in Norway. 
 
The Kingdom of Norway is often lauded as a leader in its efforts to 
accommodate its indigenous Sámi population.  Particularly notable is its 
establishment of specific mechanisms for the exercise of collective agency on the part 
of this group.  But do these mechanisms—and the way they operate in practice—
actually permit the Sámi to participate significantly, if not fully, in decisions that 
affect them?  The answer to this question goes a substantial part of the way toward 
answering another timely question:  Do the Sámi in Norway actually enjoy significant 
self-determination?   Here, I focus on their control of the Sámi education system, an 
area crucial for self-determination and one that the Sámi have identified as central to 






4. Essay II8 
 
This second essay moves the discussion from questions of group participation 
in education policy decisions, to questions of individual participation in private 
education decisions (with public policy implications).  For many Europeans, the 
promise of an adequate—let alone rich—education remains unfulfilled.  In particular, 
a large number of Europe’s ten to twelve million Roma citizens (“Gypsies”) never 
complete primary school, let alone high school (Kosko forthcoming 2012, Open 
Society Institute 2007).  This crisis arises in part from, and also reinforces, the severe 
social, economic and political marginalization of the Roma people. 
 
The European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
protects rights to education and freedom from discrimination, yet governments 
charged with discrimination in the provision of education have argued before the 
European Court of Human Rights that the consent of a student’s parents can be proof 
that an action was not discriminatory.  Three recent European Court of Human Rights 
cases of discrimination in education against Roma raise the question of what 
conditions must be present for parents to give “meaningful” consent in decisions 
pertaining to their children and whether such consent can be meaningful when a 
fundamental freedom is at stake. The chapter investigates the nature and limits of 
parental consent and makes the case for a “threshold” above which respect for the 
dignity of the parents requires meaningful consent for any decision pertaining to their 
                                                          
8
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children and below which respect for the human rights of the child prohibits 
interference with the exercise of a right.  Identifying the exact location of the 
threshold in any specific case requires local‐level public deliberation; insisting that 
decisions meet those threshold conditions, and enforcing their recognition, is a job for 
the Court.  
 
 
5. Essay III9 
 
The final essay delves into the conditions and mechanisms in the context of 
which individual education decisions are made in the first place.  It is no secret that 
Roma are among the least educated individuals in Europe, partly arising from, and 
with disastrous consequences for, Roma exclusion.  But why do Roma complete so 
much less formal schooling than non-Roma?  Despite the political prominence of the 
Roma education crisis, few empirical studies have sought to answer this question.  
This essay does just that and, in doing so, questions the assumption that education is 
something that all “have reason to value” if it is unlikely to bring clear benefits—for 
example future income or access to gratifying careers—especially if it also interrupts 
the pursuit of other valuable opportunities, such as those for present income.  This is a 
particularly salient trade-off for many desperately impoverished Roma.  
 
                                                          
9
 “Educational Attainment and School-to-Work Conversion of Roma in Romania:  Adapting to 
Feasible Means or Ends?”  This chapter is a revised version of a paper that is forthcoming in the 




This essay explores two questions that aim to assist the Romanian government 
in identifying the most effective policies for increasing educational attainment among 
its most disadvantaged group.  Relying on 2002 census data from Romania—the 
country with the largest Roma population in Europe—I first test whether Romanian 
Roma complete primary education at the same rate as non-Roma and find that, ceteris 
paribus, Roma have 77 percent lower odds of finishing eighth grade. Next, this study 
seeks to explain this difference:  Do Roma simply not “value” formal education?  I 
hypothesize that the high opportunity cost of education (due to the extreme poverty 
many Roma face) combined with perceptions of low returns to education (due to 
comparatively high unemployment levels and low average wages) decreases the 
incentive to stay in school and can result in a rational calculus to drop out.  Put 
another way, Roma may have less reason to value education in the face of immediate 
deprivation, resulting in possible preference adaptation.  Logistic regressions reveal 
that, regardless of education, they have 57 percent lower odds of employment and 
two and a half times the odds of winding up in unskilled labor.  I hypothesize that one 
omitted variable that could be driving these results might be discrimination in hiring.  
Another might be differences in the quality of education, with many Roma being sent 
to “special schools” for children with learning disabilities. 
 
This study reveals that not only are Roma completing fewer years of 
schooling than non-Roma, they are less able to convert that schooling into gainful 
employment, forcing us to ask whether Roma might be exhibiting adaptive 




ends of that effort.  This chapter distinguishes between adaptation to available means 
and adaptation to perceived ends in order to arrive at a more nuanced account of the 
possible psychological drivers of school-leaving, with different implications of each 
explanation for public policy.  I first conclude that if the government wishes to 
increase educational attainment of Roma, it should take into account the problem of 
disrupted or diluted school-to-work conversion—not a controversial view but one that 
has not yet been backed up by rigorous empirical work.  Further, my findings provide 
an alternative to the often heard explanation that Roma do not “value” education and 
instead force us to ask instead whether the education they are receiving is something 
that they should “have reason to value” if it does not result in an expanded capability 
set (including access to better job opportunities), especially given the high 






II. Agency Vulnerability and Self Determination:  An 
Application to Indigenous Participation 
 
Eamiálbmogiin lea vuoigatvuohta iešmearrideapmái. Dán vuoigatvuođa 
vuođul sii mearridit friddja iežaset politihkalaš sajádaga ja ovddidit 
friddja iežaset ekonomalaš, sosiála ja kultuvrralaš gárggiideami.  
~Artihkal 3, 




Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
~Article 3, 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
  
  
Denis Goulet argues that vulnerability is a characteristic of both individuals 
and societies.  “An individual is vulnerable when he is exposed to injury, societies 
when they have no adequate defenses against the social forces which propel them 
into processes of change” (Goulet 1971, 38).
11
  Development, understood as a 
process of social and economic change, can be a source of great freedom.  David A. 
Crocker has something like this in mind when he describes development as 
“beneficial social change” (Crocker 2008).  But when individuals and groups have 
little or no control over that process, it can be a source of vulnerability as well.   
 
Vulnerability, or “susceptibility to harm” (Camacho 2010, 142), has many 
forms.  Its sources are multifaceted and intersecting.  Human beings face countless 
threats, for example to their physical security and wellbeing, including vulnerabilities 
                                                          
10
 Translation by the Finnish Sámi Parliament into the North Sámi language, submitted to the United 
Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples:  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html. 
11
 I will elaborate on this thesis—as well as its corollary, a lack of defenses that enable a society to 




to poverty, violence, and disease.  Individual identity (whether simple or complex), 
intimately bound up with (often multiple) group identities, is also vulnerable, 
threatened by linguistic marginalization, cultural oppression, religious intolerance, 
and worse.  These threats also have implications for individual agency, including that 
which is exercised in concert with one’s peers.
12
  Individual security, wellbeing, 
identity, and agency on the one hand, and group identity on the other, are connected 
and interdependent.  A reduction in or restriction of one can greatly impact the other. 
 
All individuals and groups are susceptible to harm, but minority groups often 
face the gravest constellation of such threats.  Of these, indigenous groups, or 
“peoples,” are among history’s greatest losers in the processes of social and 
economic change—development—that have transformed the geo-political landscape 
in the last half-millennium.  They struggle against both individual and societal 
vulnerabilities and often have the least control over circumstances and processes of 
change that affect them.  The language of human rights is frequently used to justify 
or promote policies aimed at reducing vulnerability.  Where indigenous peoples are 
                                                          
12
 Here, following Amartya Sen and David A. Crocker, I use the term “agency” to refer to one’s ability 
to reflect critically upon the options one faces, to choose deliberately between them, to act on those 
choices, and possibly to make a difference in the world, or at least in one’s own life.   In his most 
recent book, Crocker characterizes agency this way: “Persons are agents to the extent that they are able 
to scrutinize critically their options, themselves decide (rather than have the decision made by someone 
else or external or internal force), act to realize their purposes, and have an impact on the world” 
(Crocker 2008, 219-220).  This is very different from the use of the term in economics to distinguish a 
principal from an agent, in which the agent is (supposed to be) an instrument of the principal and to do 
the principal’s bidding.  Also, Crocker (like Rob Reich) describes agency (in Reich’s terms, 
“autonomy”) as a “scalar concept”:  one can have more or less agency (be more or less autonomous).  
For a useful discussion of the concept in Sen’s work, see Part II of the Crocker and Robeyns chapter 
“Capability and Agency” in Amartya Sen, Christopher Morris, ed. (Crocker and Robeyns 2009).  For a 
discussion of the role of one’s “highest values or moral principles” in the exercise of agency, as well as 
its relationship to Adela Cortina’s, Flavio Comim’s, and Rob Reich’s concepts of autonomy, see 
Crocker 2008, Chapter 7, especially footnote 12, page 249-50.  See also Rob Reich (2002), Chapter 4, 




concerned, this most often takes the form of a right of self-determination.  James 
Anaya, scholar and former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
People, explains that “[u]nderstood as a human right, the essential idea of self-
determination is that human beings, individually and as groups, are equally entitled 
to be in control of their own destinies, and to live within a governing institutional 
order that is devised accordingly” (Anaya 2008, 49-50).   
 
Often assumed to imply that every group that considers itself a “people” has a 
right to its own state, the concept of self-determination has not always enjoyed broad 
acceptance in the post-Westphalian club of sovereign states.  The “self-determination 
bomb” (Buchanan 2004, 332) has only recently begun to be defused by legal and 
political scholars and indigenous leaders who have worked to decouple the principle 
from the idea of a universal right of secession.  Buchanan rejects as unhelpful at best 
and counterproductive at worst “loose talk” of a generally applicable “right of self-
determination of all peoples” (Buchanan 2004, 333).  He views the concept as 
potentially counterproductive because states continue to perceive a secession threat in 
any group's call for self-determination, thus squelching possibly useful discussions 
about other remedies for the group's concerns.  He views the concept as unhelpful 
because there are so many ways to specify self-government arrangements made 
possible by the generally stated right.  Instead, he prefers the term “autonomy,” 
which, although he admits it suffers from the same indeterminacy problem as “self-
determination,” at least does not come with the secession baggage.  Buchanan’s 




system [that] would uncouple secession from other forms of autonomy and deny that 
recognition of a group’s right to autonomy within the state entitles it to opt for full 
independence if it chooses.”  Meanwhile, although he prefers the term “autonomy,” 
he nevertheless argues that “misleading talk of the right to autonomy and the right to 
self-determination should be avoided” and replaced by language that recognizes “a 
broad range of intra-state autonomy regimes” (Buchanan 2004, 343). 
 
Anaya recognizes the “secession” problem, but rather than scrapping what has 
proven to be a powerful legal and rhetorical tool for political mobilization, he simply 
seeks to explain the concept of self-determination more clearly, offering a conception 
that neither includes a universal right of succession nor seeks to prescribe specific 
institutional arrangements.  Simply put, “self-determination means that peoples are 
entitled to participate equally in the constitution and development of the governing 
institutional order under which they live and, further, to have that governing order be 
one in which they may live and develop freely on a continuous basis” (Anaya 2008, 
51).  Thus, according to Anaya, the emphasis today is not on statehood—a claim that 
few contemporary indigenous groups make
13
—but on participation and freedom, twin 
entitlements hard won in the global indigenous movement. 
 
                                                          
13
 According to Siegfried Wiessner, “no indigenous nation seriously raises a claim for secession other 
than the conditional claim by the James Bay Cree Indians, who have threatened to secede from Québec 
if Québec manages to secede from Canada" (Wiessner 2008, 1160).  Wiessner seems to use the term 
“indigenous” here to refer to something like the non-European, colonized peoples that the term implies 





If we understand societal vulnerability as Goulet does, as arising in part from 
a lack of control over the social processes that propel us to into change (or keep us 
from changing)
 14
, then self-determination can be understood as one way to reduce 
(certain aspects of) the vulnerability of indigenous societies.  However, indigenous 
peoples have struggled to have their right of self-determination recognized as the 
same right that “all peoples” enjoy, as per Common Article 1 of the 1966 UN Human 
Rights Covenants:  “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”  Today, the accepted norm of self-determination 
requires governments to be set up in a way that allows “individuals and groups [to] 
live and develop freely on a continuous basis” (Anaya 1993, 133).  Some 
governments have established specific mechanisms for the exercise of indigenous 
collective agency, but do these mechanisms—and the way they operate in practice—
actually permit the people in question to participate fully in decisions that affect 
them?
15




                                                          
14
In my discussion on vulnerability below, I will return to this other aspect of Goulet’s idea, the 
recognition that societies can also be vulnerable when they are prevented from seeking to make 
changes they might desire. 
15
 Jay Drydyk, in responding to an early presentation of this paper, asked whether the meaning of 
“participation” for indigenous peoples ought to reflect their cultural traditions of governance, for 
instance the value they may or may not place on consensus, on the role of elders, etc.  This paper 
proceeds from the assumption that, regardless of their traditional understanding of participation for 
internal decision-making, indigenous peoples—or any other non-elite group that desires a role in 
decisions made by a powerful elite—have reason to value participatory processes that privilege thicker 
forms of participation, that begin earlier in the decision making process, that seek consensus, and that 
include mechanisms for the exercise of real power by all involved.  This assumption might be incorrect 
and it is worth pursuing this question in further research, but for now it is the basis of the discussion 
that follows. 
16
 In the discussion that follows I will defend my linkage of participation and self-determination, 




We can try to answer this question by taking, as an illustrative example, one 
policy area in which self-determination is particularly important and assessing not 
just the structural opportunity for, but the actual enjoyment of, self-determination in 
this area.  But we need a framework that allows us to do this.  In the first part of this 
chapter, I attempt to develop such a framework, taking as a starting point Anaya’s 
widely accepted conception of self-determination (above), with its focus on 
participation and freedom (Anaya 2008, 51).  I then situate the principle of self-
determination as the legal and political expression of Amartya Sen’s development-as-
freedom paradigm (Sen 1999), in particular Crocker’s “agency-oriented” 
understanding of it (Crocker 2008).  Distinguishing between the substance and the 
process of self-determination, I next home in on the importance of participatory 
development as the key process aspect of self-determination.  Finally, I build a 
modest evaluative framework, deploying Goulet’s concept of “entry points” into 
participatory processes (Goulet 1989), followed by Crocker’s delineation of “thin” 
versus “thick” “modes of participation” (Crocker 2008).  This framework allows us to 
evaluate whether a given group is, in fact, able to ensure for itself the development 
and sustainability of a society that allows its members to “lead the kind of lives they 
value—and have reason to value” (Sen 1999, 18).  That is, it offers one possible way 
to determine whether a people enjoy significant self-determination with its powerful 
implications for their particular societal vulnerability, an existential concern for many 





In the second part of this chapter I apply the proposed framework to a specific 
case of indigenous participation:  that of Sámi involvement in education policy-
making in Norway.  The Kingdom of Norway—the only Nordic state to have ratified 
International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) 169 Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries—is often lauded as a leader in its efforts to 
accommodate its indigenous population.  Particularly notable are its language and 
human rights laws, and its establishment of specific mechanisms for the exercise of 
collective agency on the part of the Sámi.  But do the Sámi in Norway participate 
meaningfully in policy decisions that affect them?  Do they enjoy significant self-
determination or exercise meaningful agency in the area of education? 
 
1. Vulnerability and Self-Determination 
 
The word “vulnerability” comes from the Latin for wound, or vulnus, and 
translates roughly to “the inability to defend oneself against wounds” (Goulet 1971, 
38).  In the literature, the term is commonly associated with susceptibility to 
environmental hazards, and increasingly to poverty or ill health, but here we can 
retain its original, context-sensitive meaning and define it more broadly, as Luis 
Camacho does, as simply “susceptibility to harm.”  As Goulet points out, both 
individuals and societies can be susceptible to harm.  Development—understood as 
human-induced social change intended to be beneficial—can bring great freedom and 
help to reduce both individual and societal vulnerability, but if individuals and groups 




vulnerability as well.  This is especially true when development processes leave some 
behind or prevent them from getting ahead or preserving what they value.   
 
Camacho, following Goulet, makes explicit the link between poverty and this 
conception of vulnerability, arguing that “[p]oor people experience 
underdevelopment as vulnerability” (Camacho 2010, 144).17  But this is also true 
when individual (physical, economic) well-being is improving but one lacks any 
meaningful control over the ends and means of those improvements.  Vulnerability, 
then, is a concept that can be applied equally to economic and physical security and to 
agency.  What we might call agency vulnerability—the risk of being limited in our 
ability to control the social and economic forces that affect us—can remain, perhaps 
acutely so, even as physical or economic vulnerability is greatly reduced.18   
 
This is true of both individuals and societies and is a limitation on what 
Crocker, following Adela Cortina, refers to as being the “master of one’s own life… 
to be self-determining not only with respect to one’s conduct but also with respect to 
one’s moral commitments and beliefs” (Crocker 2008, 219).  One can imagine “well-
                                                          
17
 There is an extensive body of literature that attempts to define economic vulnerability.  Economic 
vulnerability, for example, might be understood as an inability to respond to economic shocks or as the 
condition of living for a prolonged period below a certain poverty line.  The World Bank defines it as 
“the probability or risk today of being in poverty or to fall into deeper poverty in the future” (World 
Bank 2011).  I will not attempt to define economic vulnerability here, as even the vague or intuitive 
conception is illustrative enough for our purposes.  However one defines it, it constitutes one form of 
vulnerability among many.   
18
 Clearly no person or group has total control over the future or over processes of change that affect 
us.  The point is that neither should someone else.  According to Rob Reich, “[t]he sovereign or self-
determined life is one in which no outside person or force controls a person’s destiny” (Reich 2002, 
98, emphasis mine).  In this sense, then, I am referring to the control that might be reasonably expected 
of autonomous actors, what the Arctic Human Development Report, in its discussion of “critical 
aspects of human development” for Arctic peoples, calls “fate control—guiding one’s destiny” (Arctic 




kept” slaves who enjoy outstanding health and modest material security but who are 
nevertheless not the authors of their own lives.  They may even enjoy significant 
agency within limited domains (e.g, they control other slaves or make independent 
decisions about certain aspects of their day-to-day labor).  However, they do not have 
control over their being bought and sold and over many aspects of how they are 
treated.  They are not “the masters of their own lives.”  The Sámi people, while 
nothing like slaves, nevertheless illustrate the importance of recognizing this aspect of 
vulnerability. The vulnerability of the Sámi to ill health, long considered their greatest 
source of “demographic vulnerability,” is now about the same as that of the majority 
population (Axelsson and Sköld 2006, 118), but evidence suggests that their agency 
vulnerability as a people remains. 
 
In advancing the idea of the agency vulnerability of societies, I rely on 
Goulet’s useful concept of “societal vulnerability,” occurring “when [societies] have 
no adequate defenses against the social forces which propel them into processes of 
change” (Goulet 1971, 38).  This might occur, for example, when an indigenous 
group is forced by circumstance or law to give up a valued form of livelihood.  
Joseph Nye points out the importance of “conservative leadership” in helping to 
reduce this type of vulnerability and reminds us that “preserving a group’s valued 
way of life can be an important form of leadership” (Nye 2008, 66-7).19 
                                                          
19
We cannot ignore, of course, that such conservatism could be opposed to genuine progress (however 
understood) or could be used to maintain internal forms of domination (for example to “keep women in 
their place”).  At the same time, it might, for example, help to conserve egalitarian values against the 
inegalitarian forces of free-market capitalism.  Certain such forms of “progress” might in fact be anti-
development, at least for societies that value socio-economic equality.  David A. Crocker has argued 





There is, however, a corollary to Goulet’s idea of societal vulnerability that is 
relevant for the concept of agency vulnerability:  societal vulnerability can also arise 
when societies are blocked from pursuing desired change.  This would be the case, for 
example, when an indigenous society is constrained by well-meaning national 
legislation intended to “preserve” traditions and culture, but which in fact excludes 
the group from important means of social or economic development.  Agency is 
compromised by conditions that block change as well as by conditions that bring 
about change over which the agents have no or little control.  This is the essence of 
agency vulnerability.  In either case, agents are the tools of others or the victims of 
circumstance.  I am therefore using Goulet’s concept of societal vulnerability as 
shorthand for any situation in which a society finds itself unable to exercise 
reasonable control over its social and economic future, whether that future be one in 
which traditions are maintained, discarded, or—more likely—some combination of 
the two. 
 
The legal and political space of human rights is one place where we might 
seek remedies to vulnerability.  Bryan S. Turner argues that vulnerability “defines our 
humanity” and is “the common basis of human rights” (Turner 2006, 1).  Thus, if 
human rights are a response to human vulnerability then, in a legal sense, we can 
understand serious vulnerability as a rights deprivation.  James W. Nickel situates the 
concept in this way, placing vulnerability together with rights deprivation on a sliding 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Goulet places on a society’s ability to resist forces of change ought to be understood in this light, albeit 




scale.  “Let’s say that the holder of a legal right is exceptionally vulnerable when that 
person’s condition or circumstances make it unusually difficult and expensive to 
respect or implement his or her right… Claims about exceptional vulnerability are 
comparative; they say that exceptionally vulnerable people are far more likely than 
average people to experience the violation, inadequate implementation, or 
nonimplementation of some right” (Nickel 2008, 258).  The extent of one’s 
vulnerability, then, can be evaluated according to the likelihood of experiencing a 
rights deprivation.   
 
While Goulet sees vulnerability as a trait of both individuals and societies, 
Turner sees it also as a trait of institutions (though he uses a different term, 
institutional “precariousness”).  The link between institutional precariousness and 
individual (and communal) vulnerability requires us to “explore the complex 
interaction between our human frailty, institution building, and political or state 
power” (Turner 2006, 1).  We might then evaluate the role of our institutions in 
shoring up—or perhaps worsening—that vulnerability, particularly when those 
institutions claim to be fulfilling the responsibilities of the state in protecting human 
rights, as is the case with some governments’ institutional responses to indigenous 
issues. 
 
1.1. Vulnerability of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 
 
Quite often, it is minorities who experience the most severe, frequent, or 




of rights), and thus might be said to be “exceptionally vulnerable.”  Ethno-cultural 
minorities, in addition to a host of socio-economic deprivations, often face an 
additional, collective vulnerability:  threats to their cultures, traditions, or ways of 
life.  In Goulet’s terms, this may be understood as societal vulnerability.  Will 
Kymlicka calls this cultural vulnerability of minorities their “particular disadvantage” 
and, along with Nickel, argues that minorities ought to (and sometimes do) have 
different rights than members of the majority in order to “overcome vastly different 
kinds of disadvantages” (Kymlicka 1992, 141).   Certain types of rights are designed 
to target these threats.  “[M]any countries give language rights or political autonomy 
to those who are members of vulnerable minority cultures, since these policies help 
rectify their particular disadvantage (i.e., their cultural vulnerability).  We match the 
rights to the kinds of disadvantage being compensated for” (Kymlicka 1992, 141). 
 
Such rights are sometimes formulated as group rights, those that aim to 
protect the range of opportunities and possible ways of being and doing that are 
bound up in some way with group affiliation.  Language use and worship are two 
such rights (Nickel 2007).  These rights, Nickel argues, respond to actual, not 
hypothetical, threats.  A specific human right protects against the possibility that a 
specific harm will be done to an individual or group, but that harm has been identified 
and a corresponding right articulated because the violation has previously (frequently, 
preventably) occurred and because it continues to occur.  In this sense, therefore, 
rights have a remedial character.  To say that rights are at their core remedial is not to 




presented by certain kinds of threats.  In Henry Shue’s terms, in order to generate a 
“right,” such threats must be shown to be ordinary, severe, yet remediable; in 
Nickel’s terms the threats must be “substantial and recurrent” and the corresponding 
rights “feasible [to implement] in a majority of countries” (Nickel 2007, 70-79).  
Henry Shue calls this “the notion of a standard threat” (Shue 1980, 17, 29-34).20  Both 
Nickel and Kymlicka argue persuasively that many of the kinds of rights mentioned 
above address precisely such standard threats.  Group rights are a direct response to 
the particular, ordinary, and severe, but remediable threats that minority individuals 
face.   
 
In the case of indigenous peoples, whose “particular disadvantage” is 
intimately connected to an historic loss of sovereignty and traditional territory that 
continues today, the prescribed “right” is typically self-determination.  Collective in 
nature, it responds to the societal vulnerability of certain peoples, fitting Kymlicka’s, 
Nickel’s, and Shue’s requirements.  A remedial right in the sense that it addresses a 
particular violation (the infringement of sovereignty at some earlier period), it is not a 
sui generis right, different (or narrower or lesser) somehow when applied to 
indigenous peoples than when applied to other “peoples.”  As Anaya, Buchanan, 
Stavenhagen and others argue, indigenous peoples are not a distinct category of 
peoples somehow possessing different rights than the rest of humanity.  It is the 
recognition that they possess the same rights as all human beings, and that these 
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 Shue says that identifying such threats is a “largely empirical question” (Shue 1980, 33).  For a 
thorough discussion of, and framework for, justifying certain rights to protect against those threats, see 




rights have been and continue to be violated, which underpins the strong claim of 
indigenous peoples to a right of self-determination.21 
 
Nevertheless, the bearers of the right of self-determination are understood to 
be only those collections of individuals that might be deemed “peoples.”  Anaya 
argues that the precise meaning of the term “peoples” thus becomes one of “threshold 
importance” for determining whether this right can be claimed by a particular group 
(Anaya 1993, 138).  However, the international community lacks consensus on the 
meaning of the term.  According to Anaya, some argue that a “people” can be 
identified using criteria such as ethnicity and a history of some kind of sovereignty.  
Others consider only the aggregate population of a state to be a “people” (Anaya 
2008, 49).   
 
Anaya contends, however, that if “self-determination” is to be understood as a 
human right, in contrast with a “sovereign right,” then its attribution to “peoples” 
must refer to something other than a statist or quasi-statist corporate entity.  It must 
refer to a collection of human beings. 
More in keeping with the human rights character of self-determination 
is to see the reference to ‘peoples’ as designating rights that human 
beings hold and exercise collectively in relation to the bonds of 
community or solidarity that typify human existence. Because human 
beings develop diverse and often overlapping identities and spheres of 
community—especially in today’s world of enhanced communications 
and interaction on a global scale—the term  ‘peoples’ should be 
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 Any discussion of the violation of individual or group liberty and its connection with the political 
legitimacy of states inevitably runs into the substantial literature on social contract theory.  Such a 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, however.  For now I will limit my argument to the claim-





understood in a flexible manner, as encompassing all relevant spheres 
of community and identity (Anaya 2008, 49).   
 
While rejecting its application to a corporate entity like a state, this elucidation of the 
term still leaves open its application not only to ethnic groups or “nations” but also to 
groups of people bound by political affiliation (with or without shared citizenship).  
In an earlier work, Anaya highlights the possibility, but not necessity, of invoking 
statehood in the identification of a “people”:  
‘Peoples’ is appropriately understood as simply denoting the collective 
character of the human impulse toward self-determination and as 
affirming the value of community bonds, notwithstanding traditional 
categories of human organization associated with statehood or 
sovereignty (Anaya 1993, 162).   
 
 
John B. Henriksen understands the term “peoples” as denoting those who fit 
specific criteria, “e.g. that they have an economic community, territorial affiliation, 
common history, traditions, ethnic identity, language and culture" (Henriksen 2009, 
10).  Former Norwegian State Secretary Raimo Valle makes a broader claim: “[w]hat 
constitutes a people is not defined by territorial borders, but by commonly shared 
history, language, culture and institutions” (Valle 2008, 39).  Henriksen’s and Valle’s 
use of the term seems to exclude groups bound by political affiliation if they are not 
also bound by some kind of ethnic or cultural ties, an interpretation that I find too 
narrow.  My own sense is that a group’s designation as a “people” requires the 
flexibility present in Anaya’s discussion, although a full defense of this position must 
await further consideration.22  Nevertheless, whatever other groups might fit one or 
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 Sorting out the issue of which groups constitute “peoples” for the purposes of self-determination or 
autonomy rights raises complex questions that are beyond the scope of this discussion.  It is an issue to 




the other of these understandings, indigenous groups clearly fit them both.  Moreover, 
the collective essence of Henriksen’s and Valle’s rendering of the concept of 
“peoples” appears to be in concert with a growing international consensus that is 
moving toward including indigenous groups among the “peoples” of the world.  This 
has implications for the application of the several international human rights 
instruments that establish the right of all “peoples” to self-determination.23 
 
To summarize, minorities and indigenous peoples experience a “particular 
disadvantage” when striving to protect themselves against a range of vulnerabilities.  
These include not only individual physical and economic vulnerabilities but also 
collective cultural and “societal” vulnerabilities.  Broadly speaking, lack of control 
over the present and future exposes societies to what I call “agency vulnerability.”  
Indigenous societies feel this threat acutely.  If human rights can be understood as a 
way to guard against certain forms of human vulnerability, then the right of self-
determination can be understood as a protection against agency vulnerability.  If 
rights are at their core remedial, as argued above, then the case for the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination is clear.  The right responds to the violation, 
becoming a “hedge” against the “particular disadvantage” that that violation likely 
will or has created.  If the precariousness of political institutions is intimately 
connected to our human frailty, and these are themselves the locus of the state’s duty 
to protect and repair, then we might start by evaluating the effectiveness of state 
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 The first to establish a right of all peoples to self-determination are the two 1966 UN Human Rights 
Covenants (United Nations 1966[c], United Nations 1966[b]): the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 




institutions in shoring up indigenous vulnerability, that is, its mechanisms through 
which an indigenous people can exercise self-determination.  And if participation and 
freedom are the essence of self-determination (an argument I will develop further 
below), then we might start with an evaluation of the extent of indigenous 
participation in political processes that affect them.  Before I propose and apply a 
framework for such an evaluation, I will first attempt to flesh out more clearly the 
content of the norm of self-determination, and in so doing locate the foundation for 
public participation in that norm. 
 
2. Self-Determination:  Substance and Process 
 
The norm of self-determination can be understood as consisting of two 
distinct (though inseparable) components:  what I refer to as the “substantive aspect” 
and the “process aspect” of self-determination.  To avoid confusion, let me 
distinguish my use of the term “substantive” from a few others.  Anaya understands 
the “substance of the norm” of self-determination as “the precepts that define a 
standard of governmental legitimacy” (Anaya 1993, 144).  He distinguishes these 
from remedial measures, or responses to violations of the norm, such as those that 
accompanied the mid-twentieth century wave of de-colonization (Anaya 1993, 133-
4).  The substance of the norm, in his sense, can be found in the “nexus of opinion 
and behavior about the minimum conditions of human freedom and equality for the 
constitution and functioning of government” that are shared by relevant international 




international treaty and customary law and state and institutional practice, and refers 
to the organization and continuation of governing structures.24  I use the term 
differently. 
 
My term also differs from that which is used broadly to refer to the normative 
principles underlying or embodied in certain institutions, processes, or laws.  Such is 
the meaning of “substance” that John Rawls (1971) and Robert Nozick (1974), for 
example, have in mind when distinguishing process from substance in procedural 
justice.  A procedure is “substantive” when it is structured to some extent by free-
standing normative principles.  Perfect and imperfect procedural justice identify a 
“just” outcome (the substantive principle that we know—or believe—is just), and we 
identify a procedure that will unquestionably (perfect), or at least hopefully 
(imperfectly), achieve that outcome.  Like the procedural justice theorists, I refer to 
the substance of self-determination in order to distinguish it from the process of 
exercising self-determination, but my use of the term is nevertheless different than 
theirs.  It does not refer to norms but instead to something more like the “range” of 
issues over which self-determination is exercised.   
 
Crocker identifies four key dimensions of democracy along which we might 
evaluate a system or a set of practices:  breadth, depth, range, and control.25  The 
“substantive aspect” of self-determination, in my sense, is akin to Crocker’s idea of 
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 For Anaya, the organization and continuation of the governing institutional order—what he calls the 
“constitutive” and “on-going” elements—together make up the substance of the norm of self-
determination. 
25




“range” in democratic decision-making, or “the range of questions that citizens 
should democratically decide” (Crocker 2008, 299).  The self-determination of 
peoples is typically summarized as covering a “range” of questions that focus on 
political status and on economic, social and cultural development.  These broad 
substantive categories translate in practice into a variety of policy areas in which 
participants must make decisions.  In the case of indigenous peoples, these might 
include policies for cultural protection, support of traditional economic activities, 
natural resource management, education and schooling, and governance.  In Henry 
Shue’s words, “the substance of a right is whatever the right is a right to.  A right is 
not a right to enjoy a right—it is a right to enjoy something else, like food or liberty” 
(Shue 1980, 15).  The “substantive aspect” of self-determination, then, covers the 
“What?” 
 
The “process aspect,” on the other hand, covers the “How?”  What I refer to 
as the “process aspect” of self-determination does not map onto a specific policy area 
and can be applied to a variety of political or social goals.  It refers to the avenues 
through and processes by which collective decisions are made, avenues and 
procedures that might take any one of a number of forms in accordance with the 
traditions and needs of a given people at a given time.  The processes and venues 
through which the Haudenosaunee people make collective decisions about their 
political future and policy aspirations might differ markedly from those through 
which the Sámi make their decisions.  These decision-making systems might be 




ones (or, as in the case of the Haudenosaunee, Western democracies might be 
modeled on theirs!).  The point is not to offer a prescription for how that process 
ought to look, but to draw attention to the fact that there are processes at work in the 
exercise of self-determination and that the quality of these processes is important for 
the extent of self-determination a people enjoys.  As in Sen’s “process aspect” of 
development, the processes by which self-determination unfolds “cannot be seen as 
being—at best—among the means to development [or self-determination]…, but have 
to be understood as constitutive parts of the ends of development [or self-
determination] in themselves” (Sen 1999, 291).  In the language of Common Article 1 
of the 1966 UN Human Rights Covenants, and Article 3 of the UN Indigenous 
Declaration, this process aspect is captured simply by the terms “freely determine” 
and “freely pursue” (United Nations 1966[b], 1966[c], 2007). 
 
In addition to Common Article 1 of the Covenants and its twin in the UN 
Indigenous Declaration (Article 3), Declaration Articles 18 and 19, on participation 
and consent, address the process aspect.26  Other articles laying out specific rights 
also allude to processes by which these rights must be fulfilled, using phrases like “in 
conjunction with…” and “in consultation and cooperation with the indigenous 
peoples concerned.”  These requirements have also found their way into the operating 
procedures of major multilateral development organizations.  The World Bank, for 
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 “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect 
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as 
well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions” (Article 18); and 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting 





example, requires borrowing countries and Bank staff to engage in “free, prior, and 
informed consultation” with indigenous peoples who stand to be affected by a project 
(World Bank 2005).  Thus, it is not that international treaties—or development 
institutions—fail to recognize the need for indigenous participation, but rather that 
this process aspect has not been explicitly articulated as a key component of the right 
of self-determination itself.  As a result, while the substantive aspect gets much 
attention in academic and policy circles, and is most often the touchstone by which 
national indigenous policies are judged, the process aspect is often neglected, and 
with it the importance of indigenous participation in policy-making. 
 
2.1. Participation as the Key Process Aspect of Self-Determination 
 
If we take self-determination as the freedom of a people to do and be what 
they choose, then Sen’s concept of development as freedom, captured by the 
Capability Approach, seems promising as a freedom-centered and arguably 
“universalizable” (Nussbaum 2000) way of thinking about the norm of self-
determination since “[f]or Sen, groups as well as individual persons can and should 
be the authors of their own lives” (Crocker 2008, 15).  We might then think of self-
determination as the legal and political expression of the development-as-freedom 
paradigm applied to groups.  According to Anaya, “self-determination entitles 
individuals and groups to meaningful participation, commensurate with their 
interests, in episodic procedures leading to the development of or change in the 
governing institutional order” (Anaya 1993, 133).  Thus, Crocker’s “agency-focused 




emphasis on agency freedom and achievement and its practical emphasis on public 
participation, becomes especially relevant, encouraging us to concentrate not only on 
the substantive (policy-specific) aspect of self-determination but on the process 
aspect as well. 
 
Both Goulet and Crocker argue that participation is a crucial component of 
any development project or approach, a view echoed in the two main international 
instruments for the protection of indigenous peoples—ILO 169 and the UN 
Indigenous Declaration—and in Anaya’s and others’ understanding of the meaning of 
“self-determination.”  Crocker argues that development policies should be evaluated 
based on how much they promote, protect and restore human agency and not only on 
the concrete results they produce (sufficient food, higher income, etc.).  A challenge 
for this perspective, of course, is to give an account of mechanisms for collective 
agency (Crocker 2008).  Public deliberation, Crocker argues, can meet that challenge.  
According to Goulet,  
[w]hen people are oppressed or reduced to the culture of silence, they 
do not participate in their own humanization.  Conversely, when they 
participate, thereby becoming active subjects of knowledge and action, 
they begin to construct their properly human history and engage in 
processes of authentic development. (Goulet 1989, 165) 
   
Crocker goes a step further, making the very concept of “authentic development” 
dependent on participation.  “Authentic development occurs when groups at whatever 
level become subjects who deliberate, decide, and act in the world rather than being 




someone else’s designs” (Crocker 2008, 339).  Participation, we might say, is the 
very essence of the process aspect of self-determination.27 
 
3. Participation:  Building a Framework for Evaluation 
 
Like Crocker’s concept of participation and Rob Reich’s concept of 
autonomy, self-determination is a “scalar” concept.  Just as Reich argues that an 
individual might be more or less autonomous, it is also possible for a people to enjoy 
more or less self-determination.  Importantly, Reich distinguishes between the 
exercise of and the respect for autonomy.  “While the extent to which people exercise 
autonomy may vary, respecting autonomy is a different matter… Governments (or 
people) either respect the autonomy of an individual or not” (Reich 2002, 93-4).  This 
chapter seeks to illustrate this point as it applies to groups:  while a government might 
on paper respect the autonomy of a minority group, the real autonomy that that group 
is able to exercise in practice can vary along any number of dimensions as well as 
over time.  Thus, it is possible to evaluate the key dimensions of self-determination 
on scales of their own in order to arrive at a sense of how much, or what degree of, 
self-determination a people really enjoys.  My project here is to choose but one of 
those key dimensions.  I begin with participation.28 
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 The role of “participation” in development has been the subject of much debate, with critics rightly 
arguing that its implementation can easily reproduce inter- and intra-group inequalities and structures 
of domination and can thus be detrimental to or at least unhelpful for the interests of women, 
minorities, children, and others.  Crocker (2008) attempts to answer a number of these challenges in 
his discussion on the value of public deliberation for democracy and development.  See Chapter 10, 
particularly his responses to the “indeterminancy” and “autonomy” criticisms. 
28
 Future research might examine dimensions such as depth or control and build upon the framework 




Evaluating the space for indigenous peoples’ participation in political 
processes that affect them requires a framework.  Goulet offers several ways in which 
“nonelite participation” might be classified.  One of these is according to the moment 
at which it is introduced.  “At any point in the sequence, a nonexpert populace may 
‘enter in’ and begin to share in its dynamics.”  In order from earliest to latest, these 
moments, or “points of entry,” are: “initial diagnosis of the problem or condition; a 
listing of possible responses to be taken; selecting one possibility to enact; 
organizing, or otherwise preparing oneself, to implement the course of action chosen; 
the several specific steps entailed in implementing the chosen course; self-correction 
or evaluation in the course of implementation; and debating the merits of further 
mobilization or organization” (Goulet 1989, 167).  The quality of the participation, 
Goulet argues, depends upon the initial point of entry of non-elite participants.  
“Therefore, if one wishes to judge whether participation is authentic empowerment of 
the masses or merely a manipulation of them, it matters greatly when, in the overall 
sequence of steps, the participation begins” (Goulet 1989, 167). 
 
Although Crocker applauds Goulet's emphasis on non-elite participation, 
especially that which is not compromised by manipulation or co-optation, he argues 
that Goulet is not entirely correct in suggesting that “the quality of the participation 
depends on its initial point of entry” (Goulet 1989, 167)—though to be fair Goulet 
says that this “matters greatly,” not exclusively—and he criticizes Goulet for not 
adequately emphasizing other aspects of the “process” aspect of participation 




that could still exist in each, or at least the first six, of Goulet's seven categories.  
Whether these modes are thicker or thinner forms of participation, Crocker argues, 
also affects the quality of the process.  He adds to Goulet’s typology by 
distinguishing how a group’s non-elite members participate, especially in the group’s 
decision-making (Crocker 2008, 342).  Crocker's seven modes of participation are (i) 
nominal, (ii) passive, (iii) consultative, (iv) petitionary, (v) participatory, (vi) 
bargaining, and (vii) deliberative (Crocker 2008, 343-4).29  (See Appendix A for his 
explanations of each.)  “The further we go down the list, the 'thicker' is the 
participatory mode in the sense of more fully expressing individual or collective 
agency” (Crocker 2008, 344).   
 
Below I offer a framework for evaluating non-elite participation along both 
Goulet’s and Crocker’s dimensions.  Because of the centrality of participation to the 
process aspect of self-determination, this framework is particularly helpful for 
analyzing this aspect of the self-determination of indigenous peoples.  We begin by 
asking at which point or points the group (through its representatives or in some other 
way) enters the group decision-making process.  We then assess the “thinness” or 
“thickness” of their role in decisions affecting them.30  The later they enter the 
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 “Negotiation” is not a category Crocker uses, given its ambiguity:  there may be thinner and thicker 
forms of negotiations, with the thickest forms merging with deliberation. 
30
 There are, of course, other dimensions we might consider, such as the inclusiveness of the 
participatory arrangement with respect to the breadth of group membership (see Crocker 2008, 342), or 
the degree of control over resources necessary for implementation of decisions (see Gaventa and 
Valderrama 1999).  Crocker also highlights the importance of several other of Goulet’s dimensions of 
participation, including the “originating agent” (does non-elite participation originate from below, 
from above, or from the outside?) and the normative role and scale of participatory processes.  Also, 
both Crocker’s and Goulet’s scales might be challenged for having omissions (or requiring 




process, and the thinner their role, the less we are able to say with confidence that 
they exercise their agency and, thus, that they are able adequately to defend 
themselves against forces that propel their society into change.  That is, the less 
robust is indigenous participation in relevant policy decisions, the more vulnerable is 
their society.  Table 1 offers a visual representation of this framework.  On Crocker’s  
 
scale, the higher the number, the thicker is the participation.  For convenience (though 
somewhat counter-intuitively), I have also numbered Goulet’s sequence of entry 
points from one to seven:  the higher the number, the earlier the non-elite entered the 
process.  This way, on both scales, a higher number represents a higher “quality” of 
participation.  In the analysis below, I thus refer to these as “quality points.”31 
                                                                                                                                                                     
provide a helpful lens for evaluating public participation.  As a “buildable” framework, my proposal—
as with each of theirs—would benefit from the inclusion of additional dimensions. 
31
 Of course, neither of the two “scales” were ever meant to be used empirically to “measure” the 
quality of participation.  I use the numbers as an easy way to conceptualize where on each scale the 
various processes fall.  These judgments, while assigned numerical values for conceptual convenience, 
are qualitative, not quantitative. 






























































1 – debating the merits of further 
mobilization/organization  
2 – correcting/evaluating the course of 
implementation 
3 – taking specific implementation steps 
4 – organizing/preparing to implement the 
chosen course 
5 – selecting one course of action 
6 – listing possible responses 
7 – diagnosing the problem or need 
1 – nominal 
2 – passive 
3 – consultative 
4 – petitionary 
5 – participatory 
6 – bargaining 




Thickest mode of 
participation 
 




Together, these complementary tools offer a far more complex picture of the 
process aspect of indigenous self-determination than what we might achieve by 
simply asking whether or not a central government appears to have devised 
mechanisms for indigenous self-determination, or even by using one of these two 
metrics alone to evaluate those mechanisms.  This framework, of course, can be 
applied not only to indigenous participation in policy-making, but to any number of 
political processes in which we are interested in evaluating the degree of agency 
enjoyed by a non-elite population in decisions that affect them.  To illustrate how this 
framework might be applied in practice, I will now turn to the case of the Sámi, an 
indigenous population in Norway. 
 
4. Assessing Sámi Self-Determination in Norway 
 
The Sámi, once (and now only pejoratively) referred to as “Lapps” or 
“Lapplanders,” see themselves as a single people spread across the territory of four 
nation-states (Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden).  Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
in different ways, have all publicly recognized the Sámi as an indigenous people with 
a right of self-determination.  But Norway, home to the world's largest Sámi 
population, is the only country with a sizeable Sámi population to have ratified ILO 
169 and thus for many years was viewed as the only country to have accorded Sámi 
“indigenous status,” presumably with all of the rights associated therewith, in an 
internationally binding way.  Later, all three Nordic states signed the UN Declaration 




language and culture and for their way of life with its close connections to the land.  
As a declaration and not a convention, however, the document is not generally 
considered to be legally binding, though this is disputed.32  Moreover, the exact 
understanding of “self-determination” contained in the two documents varies, and 
with it, state practice. 
 
The UN Indigenous Declaration guarantees explicitly the right to self-
determination, as laid out in Article 3 and as captured by Common Article 1 of the 
1966 UN Human Rights Covenants.  Articles 4 and 5 of the UN Indigenous 
Declaration also capture aspects of the right of self-determination.  Specifically, 
Article 4 establishes the right “to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to 
their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions” (United Nations 2007).  According to Henriksen, “internal” 
self-government can be understood as pertaining exclusively to the Sámi and “local” 
as pertaining predominantly to the Sámi.  Buchanan argues that “[t]o be self-
governing, a group must exercise some independent political control over some 
significant aspects of its common life.  With regard to at least some matters of 
importance, it must wield political power in its own right, rather than merely power 
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 Although the official position of most states is that the declaration is not binding, this is not an 
uncontested view.  Though it deserves a much longer discussion, suffice to say here that many legal 
scholars argue that the UN Indigenous Declaration is an expression of existing international customary 
law and contains numerous statements understood as “general principles of international law,” both of 
which are considered binding on states that are not “persistent objectors” (Wiessner 2008, 1165) which 
insofar as the provisions in this Declaration are concerned, the Nordic countries are not.  See also 
Stavenhagen’s work on the role of the Declaration as a “binding” state action plan for implementing 
indigenous peoples’ human rights, and for examples of its use since 2007 as a reference document in 




delegated by a higher political unit and subject to being overridden or revoked by the 
latter” (Buchanan 2004, 333). 
 
By contrast, although ILO 169 has been interpreted by some as promising 
self-determination, the term never appears in the document itself.  Instead, the 
convention emphasizes a right to be consulted, which, as a weaker right, many 
scholars today interpret as something better described as “co-determination.”  So 
what does the Norwegian state understand to be its obligations? When Norway voted 
in favor of adopting the UN Indigenous Declaration, its explanation for its decision 
reveals the extent of Sámi self-determination it is willing to countenance.  Norway’s 
explanation of the vote that Ambassador Løvold cast at the UN Annual General 
Assembly on 13th of September, 2007, reads: 
The recognition of the right to self-determination referred to in this 
Declaration requires that indigenous peoples have full and effective 
participation in a democratic society and in decision-making processes 
relevant to the indigenous peoples’ concerns. Several articles in the 
Declaration specify how the right to self-determination may be 
exercised. The Declaration emphasises that the right to self-
determination shall be exercised in conformity with international law. 
Consultation with the peoples involved is one of the measures outlined 
in the Declaration. As a State party to International Labour 
Organisation’s Convention No 169, concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, Norway has implemented the 
consultation requirements specified in that Convention. Self-
determination is furthermore exercised through the Sámi Parliament, 
which is an elected body with decision-making and consultative 
functions within the framework of the applicable legislation. The 
Government has also signed an agreement with the Sámi Parliament in 
which it sets out procedures for consultations between the Government 






Norway, then, seems to understand Sámi self-determination to be exercised 
through consultations between the State and the Sámi Parliament, and limited to the 
understanding of applicable law in the ILO Convention.  In its 2007-2008 White 
Paper on Norwegian Sámi Policy (Report No. 28 to the Storting33), the government 
further clarifies its understanding of the content of the Sámi’s right of self-
determination “as a right to influence” and “the right to participation and 
empowerment.”  Sámi autonomy is explicitly limited to “cultural and linguistic 
autonomy” (Report No. 28, 2007-2008, to the Storting on Sámi policy, Chapter 2.3.6, 
quoted in Henriksen 2009, 16-7). 
 
 These statements are consistent with the views expressed by then Norwegian 
State Secretary Raimo Valle in his statement to the 2008 Gáldu conference on Sámi 
self-determination.  According to Valle, the UN Indigenous Declaration outlines 
measures for governments to “create conditions so that the Sámi people themselves 
can protect and maintain their own culture, their own language, and their own way of 
life,” and that one such measure is “consultations with the peoples concerned.”  This 
measure, he says, is implemented through “procedures for consultations between the 
state authorities and the Sámi Parliament” and the basis for these is ILO Convention 
169 (Valle 2008, 40).34  While he emphasizes “consultations,” he does point out that 
in certain matters “relevant exclusively to the Sámi,” powers are devolved completely 
to the Sámi Parliament.  For matters that the government does not deem pertain 
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 A 2005 Royal Decree formally established the Sámi’s right to be consulted, requiring the Sámi 
Parliament and the State to arrive at a negotiated agreement on Sámi issues.  As of 2005, the 
government of Norway has obligated itself to use this procedure, formulating its interaction with the 




exclusively to the Sámi, there are measures for “decision and co-decision powers.”  
He is also very clear that the government views these measures as ensuring 
“influence” on policy areas “important for the Sámi Society.”  Even in areas that 
many others argue ought fall exclusively under indigenous control—such as 
agriculture, reindeer husbandry, fisheries and resource management—he states the 
government position as agreeing that “Sámi influence is necessary” (Valle 2008, 41, 
emphasis mine). 
 
 We can surmise from these several official statements that the government 
understands self-determination to mean complete Sámi control over matters “relevant 
exclusively to the Sámi” and “consultation” with the Sámi to ensure “influence” over 
other matters that affect them.  But who decides which matters warrant Sámi control 
versus mere influence?  Numerous statements by the Sámi Council and the Sámi 
Parliament (the Sámediggi) indicate that the Sámi feel that full self-determination 
requires, among other things, complete control over the Sámi educational system, 
sometimes referred to simply as the Sámi School.35  Does the Norwegian 
government’s emphasis on “influence” meet that standard?  How strong should we 
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 The Sámediggi is the name of the Sámi Parliament in Northern Sámi, the most widely spoken of all 





5. Education and Participation 
 
The Sámi, through formal and informal channels, have highlighted the 
importance of many of the policy areas discussed above as being among those that 
constitute the substance (or “range,” in Crocker’s terms) of self-determination (such 
as cultural protection, support of traditional economic activities, natural resource 
management, education and schooling, and governance).  In particular, the political 
goal of full self-determination in education has been stated by all of the Sámi 
institutions within and across borders, including the Nordic Sámi conferences, the 
Sámi Parliamentary Council, the Sámi Council (which includes organizations from 
Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden and was the voice of the Sámi people until the 
establishment of the joint Parliamentary Council, a role that it to some extent 
maintains), and each of the Sámi Parliaments (Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 106).  The 
“Sáminization of education”—the integration of Sámi culture and traditions into 
schools—has been a central objective of Sámi political efforts for much of the last 
century, according to Sámi scholars Asta Balto and Vuokko Hirvonen (Balto and 
Hirvonen 2008, 104).  In the Norwegian Sámi Parliament’s 2002-2005 Plan of 
Action, it states “In the development of Sámi society, it is important for the Sámi to 
have the right to decide for themselves about the content and form of education at all 
levels” (Sámediggeplána 2002-2005, in Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 112).  As with 
Drèze and Sen’s understanding of democracy (Drèze and Sen 2002, 24-5), education 
has intrinsic, instrumental, and constructive value for Sámi self-determination.  





The intrinsic value of education—that aspect that is valuable in its own right 
and not simply for what other ends it might bring about—is difficult to separate from 
the kind of instrumental value captured by the comments of the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) on Article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):  “a well-educated, 
enlightened and active mind, able to wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and 
rewards of human existence” (Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
1999).  While joy is certainly an important possible consequence of an educated 
mind, there is an argument to be made that even if education is painful to acquire and 
the rewards of an enlightened mind go unnoticed by us, it is nevertheless valuable in 
some way.  (I will not try to argue whether something can be intrinsically valuable if 
its positive consequences go unrecognized, or if there are none.  Suffice to say there 
is substantial support for the view that education is inherently valuable.)  Also, as a 
right unto itself, regardless of its ability to forward other objectives, educational 
freedom is protected under international law in instruments such as the ICESCR 
(United Nations 1966[c]), ILO 169 (International Labour Organisation 1989), the 
European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council 
of Europe 1995), and the UN Indigenous Declaration (United Nations 2007), among 
others.   
 
Education also has extraordinary instrumental value to both individuals and 
society, as a means to good ends.  Broadly speaking, in the wording of ICESCR 




and the sense of its dignity” (United Nations 1966[c]).  It is also instrumentally 
valuable to society as a whole.  Education can “strengthen the respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms… [and] enable all persons to participate effectively 
in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations 
and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further… the maintenance of peace” 
(United Nations 1966[c]).  Its ability to enable and encourage public participation is 
especially important for self-determination.  It can create a better informed population 
and enhance an individual’s ability to reason critically, part of Reich’s criteria for 
individual autonomy, which he argues a liberal state much teach “for, like the 
political virtues, autonomy is not inborn and is not supported by all reasonable ways 
of life” (Reich 2002, 48).  Finally, it has also been shown empirically not only to 
increase the likelihood of voting (Blais 2000), but also to engender a sense of civic 
duty (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980), and to teach the skills of civic participation 
(Verba, Brady and Schlozman 1995, Levine and Higgins-D’Alessandro 2010). 
 
Moreover, education plays a constructive role in the enjoyment or exercise of 
self-determination, much in the same way that democracy, by Sen’s account, plays a 
constructive role in value formation.  Sen (1999) uses this term to highlight the 
importance of a “good” (democracy) in creating or shaping other valuable goods (the 
values and priorities of the society).  Rob Reich argues that his concept of 
minimalist autonomy understood as self-determination 
encompasses both evaluative capacities and a real ability to act on 
one’s evaluations, if necessary adopting new commitments, 
changing one’s values, altering previous desires, or revising old 
beliefs from a spectrum of meaningful possibilities. (Reich 2002, 




The constructive value of education lies in its ability to help us—individually as well 
as collectively—to accomplish these adoptions and revisions.  It enables members of 
a group to learn about, investigate, deliberate upon, and choose from among those 
elements of their history, traditions, language, and culture that they deem valuable 
and, therefore, worthy of preserving or developing.  It may contribute to the 
construction of altogether new values or priorities, or, more likely, it may contribute 
to the evolution of existing values and priorities, which in time can come to look quite 
different from those held by members of the same group a generation or more earlier.  
While similar in meaning to the instrumental value of a good (and perhaps even a 
form of it), it is useful to think of the constructive value of education in this more 
specific way, as potentially creating or developing (or establishing justifications for 
preserving) norms and social goods that a society has reason to value.  If by virtue of 
their right of self-determination indigenous peoples are to “freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” 
(United Nations 1966[b], 1966[c], 2007) then education can have important 
constructive value toward that end. 
 
Finally, and here I go beyond Sen, self-determination in education also has 
powerful symbolic value, as an expression of a people’s ability not only to capture 
and preserve its past, but to guide its destiny.  Politically speaking, as Henriksen 
argues, full Sámi control of their education system would help to demonstrate 
growing acceptance for the idea nominally accepted by the government and promoted 




Sámi self-determination in education is one way for the government of Norway to 
recognize and show its respect for that equality (Henriksen 2009, 22). 
 
Alhough my own research has been limited by language barriers, Balto and 
Hirvonen (2008), in their article on Sámi self-determination in education, point out 
that few rigorous analytical studies of Sámi self-determination in education have been 
done in any language.  The analysis I present in this section is based on several 
articles as well as a handful of reports by scholars, state and indigenous policy 
makers, and representatives of international rights bodies.  These reports were given 
at a series of workshops organized by Gáldu–The Resource Centre for the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and collected into two issues of Gáldu Čála—Journal of 
Indigenous People's Rights (No. 2/2008 and 2/2009).  However only one of these—
the report by Balto and Hirvonen—discusses in detail the decision-making processes 
(though it is actually the institutional arrangements that are the focus of their own 
analysis).  I will thus rely heavily on their research and reporting on one institutional 
reform (the reorganization of the Sámi Education Council) and several phases of two 
large education reforms (R97 and Knowledge Promotion 2006) to piece together the 
ways in which several far-reaching decisions on Sámi education have been made. 
 
In their report, Balto and Hirvonen also analyze the extent of self-
determination in Sámi education, devising a ranking system similar to Crocker’s, and 
drawing broadly similar (though in some cases harsher) conclusions than those I draw 




benefit from the addition of Goulet’s “entry-points” scale.  Also, they concentrate on 
the extent to which the legal-institutional set-up allows for Sámi participation, 
whereas I use their descriptions of the participatory processes in specific cases to 
assess the quality of Sámi participation in practice, legislation notwithstanding. 
 
Because this case study is meant to provide an illustrative example of how my 
proposed framework can be used to evaluate the process aspect of self-determination 
(and to reveal the added value of doing so), I will take the details offered in Balto and 
Hirvonen’s account at face value.  A definitive analysis of Sámi participation in 
education policy-making would require additional—and more diverse—resources.  
Likewise, an investigation into the full extent of Sámi self-determination in Norway 
would benefit from an extension of my analysis to other kinds decisions, policy areas, 
and processes.  Thus, the case study that follows should be viewed as an illustrative 
exercise only, laying foundations for future research, and not as offering a conclusive 
account of Sámi self-determination in Norway. 
 
6. Sámi Participation in Sámi Curriculum Development 
 
For more than a century, from about 1869 to 1970, the Government of 
Norway maintained an overtly assimilationist policy toward the Sámi, using the 
schools as an important policy tool to this end.  By “assimilation” I mean something 
like what sociologist Milton M. Gordon, in his seminal work on the assimilation of 




articulated movement to strip the immigrant of his native culture and attachments and 
make him over into an American along Anglo-Saxon lines… an attempt at ‘pressure-
cooking assimilation’” (Gordon 1961, 269).  Of course, such efforts can be and 
historically have been applied to indigenous and other homeland minorities as much 
as to immigrants.  Gordon does not use the term “assimilation” on its own, but rather 
notes that it “is a blanket term which in reality covers a multitude of sub processes,” 
including what he calls “behavioral assimilation” and “structural assimilation.” 
The first refers to the absorption of the cultural behavior patterns of the 
‘host’ society… There is a special term for this process of cultural 
modification or ‘behavioral assimilation,’ namely, ‘acculturation.’ 
‘Structural assimilation,’ on the other hand, refers to the entrance of 
the immigrants and their descendants into the social cliques, 
organizations, institutional activities, and general civic life of the 
receiving society.” (Gordon 1961, 279) 
 
While structural assimilation might have been one aim of Norway’s early Sámi 
policies, the education system was primarily used to accomplish acculturation, or 
“behavioral assimilation.”36  Of course, some degree of acculturation may be, and often is, 
sought by individuals themselves; not all acculturation is forced assimilation and much 
happens without state orchestration.  Some acculturation, however, is orchestrated by the 
state, and there are certain legitimate aims of the state that may be assisted by some form of 
acculturation (witness the French republican tradition which, while not without its flaws, has 
merit).  However, the type of acculturation that members of a dominant group force on 
members of a non-dominant group, a kind of forced behavioral assimilation directed toward 
diluting or eliminating difference, is another matter entirely.  Norway’s early Sámi policies 
                                                          
36
  Some argue that repression of ethnic and cultural minorities is simply the collateral damage of 
majoritarian democracy.  Robert Dahl, however, argues that assimilation is one strategy states 
consciously employ to manage “the potentially adverse political consequences of cultural diversity” on 
democratic governance (Dahl 1998, 149-153).  In this case, efforts to make the Sámi people more 
“Norwegian” might have been consistent with the “collateral damage” thesis or with Dahl’s 
“conditions that favor democracy” thesis.  Though evidence suggests the latter, this essay does not 




amounted to just such forced assimilation, and re-education strategies figured prominently 
among its tools. 
 
The tide began to turn in the late 1960s, however, and in 1969, the 
Comprehensive School Act guaranteed the right to be taught the Sámi language in 
school and the government began a trial program of allowing beginning instruction in 
the Sámi language in primary and lower secondary schools, for those Sámi students 
who spoke the language at home.  In 1985, the Sámi won the right to be instructed in 
other subjects in the Sámi language (Balto and Hirvonen 2008, Todal 2003, 186-90).  
Two institutions had primary responsibility for the development of Sámi education 
during this time:  the Sámi Education Council (started in 1975) and the Sámi College 
(started in 1989).  However, the Sámi Education Council remained throughout this 
period under the jurisdiction of the Norwegian Ministry of Education.  The Sámi 
Parliament, the Sámediggi, was established by the 1987 Sámi Act and officially 
inaugurated by the King in 1989 (initially granted only general “counseling powers,” 
it was expected that its decision-making authority would be developed in time) 
(Smith 1995).  By 1997, the government had formally adopted a separate Sámi 
curriculum that applied to all elementary and lower secondary school subjects in six 
predominantly Sámi counties in Northern Norway.  In 2000, the Norwegian 
government turned over some of the control of the Sámi education system to the Sámi 
Parliament, at the same time transferring the Sámi Education Council to the 






6.1. Reorganizing the Sámi Education Council 
 
A full account of the development of the Sámi education system is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but let us take as an example an effort by the Sámi Parliament, 
the Sámediggi, to influence the reorganization of one of the two institutions that had 
primary responsibility for the development of Sámi education during late twentieth 
century:  the Sámi Education Council, started in 1975 and remaining until 2000 under 
the jurisdiction of the Norwegian Department of Education. 
 
In 1993 the Sámediggi, undertook a study (Utredningomorganiseringav den 
Sámiskeutdannings-sektoren) with the aim of developing a proposal for a complete 
reorganization of the Sámi education system, including a new division of authority.   
In particular, the study examined how the tasks of the Sámi Education Council might 
be transferred to the Sámi Parliament.  The committee, whose chair was head of the 
Sámi Education Council, proposed a new administrative model to this end, giving the 
Sámi Parliament, among other things, power of attorney and supervisory authority.  
The goal was to confer real influence, not just administrative burden, on the 
representative Sámi body, which adopted the proposal a year later.  However the 
proposal was not taken up by the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting). When the 
matter arose again five years later, and the Norwegian Parliament voted to finally 
transfer the Sámi Education Council to the Sámi Parliament, the report of the 
committee was not included with the other relevant documents.  The suspicion was 
that the report had not been read or considered by the Norwegian Parliament (Balto 




proposals to increase Sámi self-determination were never promoted or even publicly 
discussed.   
 
At first glance, we might say that the Sámi “entered” the process, according to 
Balto and Hirvonen’s account, very early, somewhere around the “initial diagnosis of 
the need” or “a listing of possible responses.”  According to Goulet’s scale, this 
would mean that the “quality of the participation” was high; an Olympic judge might 
give it a 6 or 7 (out of 7).  However, the “participation” was entirely internal, taking 
place only within the Sámediggi.  Balto and Hirvonen speculate that the report that 
arose from the Sámi deliberations on the matter was never even read by the decision-
makers.  It would therefore be more accurate to say that this possible early entry point 
was closed, or at least that the would-be participants’ gestures for entry at this stage 
were ignored.  The Storting, meanwhile, engaged in its own process, on its own 
schedule, without any apparent involvement with or input from the Sámediggi.  Given 
that the decision-making power lay entirely with the Storing, we cannot argue that the 
Sámi really “entered” this process at any point before actual implementation of the 
transfer, and perhaps entered even later, at the self-correction/evaluation stage.  This, 
then, earns the process about 2.5 quality points on the Goulet scale.   
 
Turning to Crocker’s “modes of participation,” if we consider how the 
Sámediggi participated, we can classify this process as “consultative participation,” 
where “[n]onelites participate by giving information and their opinions (‘input,’ 




among themselves nor make decisions. It is the elite who are the ‘deciders,’ and while 
they may deign to listen to the nonelite, they have no obligation to do so” (Crocker 
2008, 343).  It is important to note that Crocker’s “consultative participation” is 
weaker than what is meant by “the right to consultation” in ILO 169 and the UN 
Indigenous Declaration.  That “right” is more akin to Crocker’s “petitionary 
participation,” in which “[a]lthough it is the prerogative of the elite to decide, the 
nonelite have a right to be heard and the elite have the duty receive, listen, and 
consider if not to heed” (Crocker 2008, 343).37  In the case of Sámi participation in 
efforts to reform the educational decision-making system, it does not appear that the 
Norwegian Parliament felt any duty to take the Sámi proposals into account.  This 
form of participation earns about 3 quality points out of 7 on the Crocker scale.  
Although this is but one of what were undoubtedly numerous decision-making 
processes concerning the organization of the Sámi education system at the time, this 
episode nevertheless provides evidence of a limited role for the Sámi in at least some 
of the education policy-making that affects them.  It also provides an example of the 
usefulness of considering both Goulet’s entry-points and Crocker’s modes of 
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 Here, Crocker is indebted to James W. Nickel, who emphasizes the importance of a citizen right to 
petition the government, where the government has a corresponding duty to “receive and consider” 
those petitions.  This is distinct from consultative participation, in which citizens rely on the good will 
of the government to hear them out.  (Nickel 2005, 211) 
38
 As discussed above, there are other important dimensions of participation as well, highlighted by 




6.2. “Reform 97” Process 
 
While work was underway to determine the proper role and “home” for the 
Sámi Education Council, the Norwegian Ministry of Education also began a 
significant overhaul of the national curriculum.  Balto and Hirvonen (2008) report on 
two large curriculum reforms that the government of Norway undertook over a fifteen 
year period from 1992-2007:  Reform 97 and Knowledge Promotion 2006.  Each of 
these consists of a section on national curricular reforms and a section on reforms of 
the Sámi curriculum.  The Sámi sections are known, respectively, as the Sámi 
Curriculum for 10-year Compulsory Education (R97S) and the Sámi Curriculum for 
Knowledge Promotion in Primary and Secondary Education and Training 
(Knowledge Promotion 2006S).   
 
R97S was a major step forward for Sámi self-determination in education, as 
the first dedicated Sámi curriculum adopted in any Nordic country to have equal 
status with the national curriculum.  It is mandated for use in Sámi areas (in which the 
Sámi Language Act has force) but is also open to be used outside the Sámi 
administrative zone (Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 113).  While the final product does 
represent significant accommodation for Sámi needs, the Sámi can hardly be said to 
have enjoyed full participation in the process by which it was developed.  When the 
reform process was launched in 1992, then Minister of Education Gudmund Hernes 
intended the Sámi curriculum to be simply the Norwegian state curriculum, adapted 
to Sámi needs.  (This was so despite the fact that several separate syllabi for Sámi 




schooling.)  Because the Sámi School would remain subsumed under the Common 
School, with some adjustments, the Ministry did not perceive a role for the Sámi 
institutions in the curriculum reforms and thus did not inform the Sámi Parliament 
when the reform process began in 1992 and involved neither the Sámi Parliament nor 
the Sámi Education Council (despite the SEC’s still being under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Education at the time).  Asta Balto was the director of the SEC at the 
time, and reports having attended the Ministry’s reform planning conference and 
having lobbied for the creation of a separate Sámi curriculum.  Her call, made on 
behalf of the SEC, was dismissed, though she personally was appointed to the 
committee in charge of writing the statement of principles for the general curriculum 
(no such task was undertaken for a Sámi curriculum and the Sámediggi considered 
the result a setback from the M87 model).  Dissatisfied, the Sámediggi demanded an 
altogether separate Sámi curriculum, developed by Sámi institutions themselves, a 
demand grounded in the Sámi Act and Norway's signature of ILO 169 (Balto and 
Hirvonen 2008, 113).  Finally, in 1995, three years after the national reform process 
began, the Sámi Education Council (still under the auspices of the State) was invited 
to submit syllabi for a handful of subjects, based on the M87 model.   
 
Analyzing this reform process is complicated by its being comprised of 
multiple steps, each of which might be evaluated differently.  At the point at which 
the Sámi began participating in the decision-making, the course had already been 
chosen, the tasks identified; all that remained was for the substance to be fleshed out 




this process quite late, at the “implementation phase,” earning 3 out of 7 quality 
points on the Goulet scale.  Crocker, however, argues that any one of a number of 
“modes” of participation could exist in each of Goulet’s “sequential moments,” or at 
least in the earliest 6.  A group might nominally be invited to join a process quite 
early but not engage in any robust participation until much later.  Analyzing this 
reform process illustrates this point clearly.  From their point of entry forward, each 
of the several steps of the reform implementation can be evaluated as separate 
processes according to Crocker’s “modes of participation.”   
 
The first part of the implementation stage was the Sámi Education Council’s 
drafting of the Sámi syllabi.  The Ministry pre-selected the syllabi that the Sami were 
permitted to revise for the new curriculum, and the revisions were to be based on the 
existing M87 model.  It is unclear whether the Ministry of Education was obliged to 
accept the Sámi syllabi or whether it had veto power over these submissions, but the 
SEC did have the opportunity to deliberate and act (on the goals and within the means 
laid out by the Ministry, its supervisory agency).  Thus, assuming the Ministry did not 
have complete veto power over the Sámi proposals—or no such power that it was 
willing to exercise—we can tentatively describe the “mode” as “participatory 
implementation,” a 5 out of 7.39  “Elites determine the goals and main means, and 
nonelites implement the goals and decide, if at all, only tactics. In this mode nonelites 
do more than listen, comment, and express. Like soccer players they also make and 
enact decision, but the overall plan and marching orders belongs to the coach” 
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 I am making certain assumptions about this process in order to fill the gaps in the information 





(Crocker 2008, 343).  (That the SEC remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
at the time makes this a generous assumption.) 
 
In this example, the importance of using at least two measures to determine 
the quality of Sámi participation again is clear:  the mode by which the Sámi 
participated in developing the syllabi was moderately robust, but their actual 
influence was limited by the late stage at which they entered the process.  More 
robust Sámi participation at least would have given the Sámi a voice in the 
deliberations over the subject areas open to adaptation.  Full self-determination would 
have allowed the Sámi—through its own representative institution, the Sámediggi—
to determine at the outset which subjects required a separate Sámi curriculum. 
 
The next part of the implementation stage began that same year with an 
expansion of the Sámediggi’s role in drafting the curriculum for the Sámi School.  
Luckily for Sámi demands, a change of government in Norway brought State support 
for a wholly separate Sámi curriculum, and the Sámi role in the reforms was 
expanded to include shaping the “principles” (learning objectives) section of the 
curriculum (finished in late 1996) and writing most, but not all, of the subject syllabi 
to be used for Sámi schools (finished early the next year and ready for use by the start 
of the 1997 school year).  Though it is unclear from Balto and Hirvonen’s report 
whether this work was conducted by the SEC or by the Sámediggi, the Sámediggi 
nevertheless considered that through R97S they had obtained their goal of winning a 




the Norwegian curriculum, which also included some Sámi content developed by the 
Sámediggi itself.  It would apply to all pupils in the Sámi Administrative Area (not 
only to Sámi pupils and not only in schools where Sámi children were the majority).   
 
However, Balto and Hirvonen's account of the actual events reveals little 
about the nature of the Sámi participation in shaping the R97S under the new 
government.  Did the Sámediggi deliberate with the Ministry of Education over 
which additional syllabi ought to come under Sámi control or was this decision made 
ahead of time by the government and only the final implementation left to the Sámi?  
Was the government then obliged to accept the Sámi syllabi or the Sámi input into the 
statement of principles?  Did the Ministry have veto power, or was there a structure 
for arriving at consensus?  It is unclear, then, where this phase of the reform process 
falls on Crocker’s scale.  If we assume that the new government, with its strong 
support for a true “Sámi curriculum,” brought the Sámediggi on board from the start, 
and that its participation had genuine influence over the outcomes, then both steps—
drafting the Principles Section and writing additional syllabi—could have been fully 
deliberative, earning 7 quality points on Crocker’s scale.  The Sámi Parliament’s 
reported enthusiasm about the outcome of the reform process gives the impression 
that its influence was at least substantial. 
 
While the entire R97S process earns only 3 quality points on the Goulet scale 
due to the late stage at which the Sámi entered, Sámi participation at each of the 
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to average out the quality points at each of the three stages I evaluate here, we might 
give the process a 6.3.  Doing so would be misleading, however, as it would imply an 
over-all high quality of Sámi participation in R97S.  This evaluation must be 
tempered by an awareness of the limited influence the Sámi actually had, a limitation 
that arose from the fact that many of the important decisions were made by the 
Ministry of Education or the Storting before the SEC and the Sámediggi were ever 
brought into the process.  Prior to their entry, even Crocker’s weakest mode—
“nominal participation,” in which “someone is a member of a group but does not 
attend its meetings” (Crocker 2008, 343)—does not apply here because the decisions 
were made by Norwegian government bodies in which the Sámi people play no 
formal role.  The initial steps in the process therefore earn zeros on Crocker’s scale.  
Again, this highlights the importance of using at least two scales to evaluate non-elite 
participation.  A summary of this analysis is presented in Table 2. 
 
6.3. “Knowledge Promotion 2006” Process  
 
Another round of curriculum reforms began in 2004.  R97 had consisted of 
three main parts, a "general section," a section on "principles" (learning objectives), 
and the subject curriculum (course syllabi).  When it was reformed again with 
Knowledge Promotion 2006, the general section became known as the Core 
Curriculum and remained intact; the principles were replaced with a “learning 
poster,” which was then supplemented with a “Quality Framework”; and the 
individual subject syllabi were again reformed.  Both the learning poster (with its 




Promotion 2006) were ultimately—though not without negotiation—matched by a 
Sámi version in the Sámi curriculum (Knowledge Promotion 2006S).  As in R97, the 
Core Curriculum was shared by both the Common and Sámi Schools and contained 
some material on Sámi history and culture. 
 
If we take the decision to embark upon, and the actual implementation of, 
Knowledge Promotion 2006 (and 2006S) as a single (albeit lengthy, multi-step) 
process—as we did for R97—we might again say that the Sámi entered the process 
quite late.  Analyzed according to Goulet’s sequence, it was the Ministry of 
Education that initially diagnosed the need (i.e., that reform of R97 and R97S was 
needed).  The Ministry then listed possible responses (that the “principles” section—
considered by the Sámi to be an important advancement—and the subject syllabi 
ought to be supplemented and revised).  It next decided on the course of action (the 
principles ought to be replaced with a “learning poster,” approval of the final form of 
which would fall to the Ministry, and supplemented with a Quality Framework, and 
certain subject syllabi needed revision).  It then began organizing to implement the 
reforms (conceptualizing the new documents, including identifying their form and 
purpose, and distributing responsibility for drafting each part). The Sámi were finally 
able to enter the process in time to participate in “the several specific steps entailed in 
implementing the chosen course” (Goulet 1989, 167).  That is, they joined in time to 
implement a task laid out for them by others.  The whole KP2006S process earns 3 





As with R97S, while it is possible for us to identify a single “entry point” in 
this long process, the degree of Sámi participation varies from step to step, making it 
impossible to identify a single “mode” of participation that applies to the entire 
Knowledge Promotion 2006S reform process.  Thus, I break down the process, from 
their point of entry forward, into steps, and analyze them separately according to 
Crocker’s modes.  The steps that the Sámi Parliament engaged in were 1) drafting the 
Sámi learning poster, 2) writing a Quality Framework to supplement that learning 
poster, and 3) designing a handful of subject syllabi determined by the Ministry to be 
eligible for the Sámi School (these were limited to syllabi for the teaching of the Sámi 
language).   
 
By June 2004, the Storting had settled on the principles to be contained in the 
national learning poster.  It did so without inviting input from the Sámediggi, despite 
substantial Sámi involvement in the drafting of the principles section of R97S.  
Because it was the principles section of R97S that contained the Sámi learning 
objectives and ideological statements about the Sámi School, removing this section 
meant that its successor would need somehow to fill this role.  Thus, upon learning of 
the work underway in the Storting, the Sámediggi Council (the Sámi Parliament 
cabinet) decided to draw up its own set of principles in a Sámi learning poster (Balto 
and Hirvonen 2008, 115).  In November 2004, following negotiations with the 
Norwegian Ministry of Education, a working group of the Sámediggi, with the 




section in R97S just as the Norwegian learning poster would replace the principles 
section in R97.   
 
A year later, the proposed guidelines arrived for discussion in a plenary 
session of the Sámediggi, a year and a half after the Norwegian learning poster had 
been finalized.  However, the drafting progressed parallel to, not in cooperation with, 
the Ministry’s drafting of its own poster, and its discussion in the Sámediggi 
advanced parallel to, not in cooperation with, the discussions of its counterpart in the 
Storting.40  Sámi participation with the Norwegian decision-makers was thus very 
thin (for they had little impact and did not avoid nondomination), even if their 
internal deliberations may have been robust.  Moreover, the Ministry of Education 
ultimately rejected the finished Sámi learning poster, accepting instead only an initial 
“Sámi” clause: one sentence describing the Sámi School: "The Sámi School and 
enterprises offering training shall provide all pupils and apprentices/trainees with 
good education that is based on Sámi language, culture and society"  
(http://www.samediggi.no in Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 116).41  The Sámediggi thus 
submitted this version for deliberation in a plenary session, even though the real 
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 Given the danger that minority voices might be silenced or muffled in participatory processes with 
more numerous and powerful actors, one could argue that deliberation along two separate tracks was 
the only way to ensure that the outcome would take full account of the Sámi voice.  However, the 
process would then need to bring together the two tracks in a final, open-ended deliberation in which 
both groups enjoyed equal influence over the outcome.  This was not the case here. 
41
 By this time, the Royal Decree was in force (see footnote 34), however, the language Balto and 
Hirvonen use is one of “acceptance” and “approval,” not “negotiation.”  It is unclear whether the 
Ministry retained the power simply to accept or reject the Sámi proposals, as Balto and Hirvonen 
suggest.  However, their description of the scope and nature of the Sámediggi’s negotiations with the 
Ministry over syllabi content indicates that even when negotiations did take place, the Sámi’s real 
influence was limited.  In Crocker’s view, this lack of impact significantly reduces that group’s 
agency.  For this reason, among his four dimensions of democracy, he lists “control.”  “The dimension 
of control or influence is important, or the group that ‘rules’ may be inclusive, address many sorts of 
issues through many channels, and address them in a variety of ways, including discussion, and yet 




influence that the Sámi had had over its development was minimal, and the body 
accepted this “Sámi” learning poster on May 31, 2006, two years after the Norwegian 
learning poster had been finalized. 
 
Here, Crocker’s modes of participation add considerably to the analysis.  The 
Sámi and Norwegian working groups and Parliaments did engage in drafting their 
respective learning posters and both deliberated on the merits of those proposals, but 
not together, and while the Ministry did consider the Sámi proposal, the final decision 
appears to have been its own.  Given that the deliberations on the Sámi learning 
poster had taken place outside of the processes in which the real power operated, the 
Sámi deliberations not only had little consequence in the end, but, having taken place 
“out of earshot,” they were not even able to influence the deliberations of the 
Norwegian government.  It was these (Storting) deliberations that ultimately resulted 
in the Sámi learning poster, with the addition of the one-sentence Sámi clause. 
 
We could characterize this step as “petitionary participation” (worth 4 quality 
points) in which the “elites” did have an obligation to receive and consider input from 
the “nonelites” but it remained the prerogative of the elites to make the final decision.  
(In this case, it was to reject the Sámi proposal wholesale.)  Although “petitionary 
participation” is a step up from “consultative participation” (worth just 3 points), as 
long as the elites retain the ability to disregard the input they receive from the non-
elites—regardless of their obligation to consider it—then the real power this accords 




2005, 211) means little more than “deigning to listen” (Crocker 2008, 343) when the 
elites retain all of the actual decision-making power.  
 
Herein lies the importance of “control,” or influence, in participatory 
processes.  In outlining his Democratic-Functioning Approach, Jay Drydyk (2005) 
emphasizes the role that “degree of influence” ought to play in judging whether a 
process is in fact “more democratic.”  He helpfully breaks down political activity into 
the “input side” and the “output side.”  What is important on the input side, he argues, 
is whether these activities are available to individuals; what matters on the output side 
is how effective those activities actually are, their influence.  “Greater access to 
political activity makes political life more democratic, but it is yet more democratic if 
that activity influences decision-making” (Drydyk 2005, 256).  Of course, it is “more 
democratic still if the decision-making affected has a real impact on the capabilities 
that people value as building-blocks of a good life” (Drydyk 2005, 256).  Crocker 
formulates this idea as the ability to impact one’s world, presumably for the better, an 
important aspect of Crocker’s and Sen’s understanding of agency, which “is not just 
making (or influencing) a decision, even when the decision is the outcome of 
deliberation.  It is also effectively running one’s own individual or collective life and 
thereby making a difference in the world” (Crocker 2008, 344).  In this case, the 
Sámi’s own deliberative process, and even the subsequent bargaining with the 
Ministry of Education, failed to influence the final outcome.42  In the meantime, we 
can still say that this process earns 4 quality points on the Crocker scale (for 
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 In some cases, bargaining might actually be preferable to “deliberation” if the latter is marred by 





“petitionary participation”), but only on a technicality; the lack of influence over the 
actual decision-making highlights the importance of real influence in participation 
and provides an argument for building on this analytical framework in order to take 
this dimension more fully into account. 
  
Sámi exclusion in the learning poster process carried over into the next phase 
of the reform as well, when the Norwegian government opted to supplement the 
learning poster with a Quality Framework for Knowledge Promotion that outlined the 
responsibilities of school authorities under the new legislation, including a 
responsibility to adapt it to local conditions and individual student needs.  The 
Ministry undertook its drafting, circulating its version of the Quality Framework in 
March 2006; the Storting adopted it in September, but because the Sámediggi had not 
received the decision on its version of the learning poster until early summer, it was 
not able to begin work on its own Quality Framework for the Sámi curriculum until 
that fall (2006).  It was debated on and adopted by the Sámi Parliament in May of the 
following year, but implementation had to await approval by the Ministry of 
Education.  Faring better than its own version of the learning poster, the Sámediggi's 
Quality Framework was approved by the Ministry and implemented in fall 2007, a 
year after the national Quality Framework was implemented (Balto and Hirvonen 
2008, 116).  Balto and Hirvonen chalk up its approval as a success for the Sámi.  I 
question, however, whether the success of this endeavor may have had less to do with 
the Ministry's acceptance of the Sámi's educational vision and more to do with the 




the Norwegian learning poster with the Sámi clause.  Can it be said, then, to represent 
a Sámi vision of education? 
 
With respect to the genesis of the Quality Framework, Sámi participation 
echoes, and was affected by, the learning poster process.  The initial decision to 
develop a Quality Framework to supplement the learning poster was made by the 
government.  A year after the process began, the Sámediggi was able to offer their 
input in the form of their own Sámi Quality Framework.  However, this input was 
based on a learning poster that they had no part in creating (their own document 
having been rejected), the acceptance of which lay entirely with outside decision 
makers (the Ministry of Education).  On Crocker’s scale, this process could be a form 
of “participatory implementation” (worth 5 quality points) in which “Elites determine 
the goals and main means, and nonelites implement the goals and decide, if at all, 
only tactics” (Crocker 2008, 343) except that, as in both consultative and petitionary 
participation, the final decision still appears to have remained with the government.43  
Though this time around the decision went in their favor and the draft was accepted, it 
could easily have gone the other way, as happened with the Sámi draft of its learning 
poster.  We can do no better, therefore, than to award this process 4 out of 7 quality 
points on the Crocker scale.  However, since these deliberations were based not on 
the Sámi’s own learning poster, but on the national learning poster, which the Sámi 
had no part in drafting (apart from adding their clause and getting it passed in the 
                                                          
43
 Despite the Royal Decree (see footnotes 34 and 41), it is unclear whether the state’s obligation to 
consult with the Sámi conferred any real influence upon them, and whether the Sámi had any say over 
the range of issues that fall under the decree.  At any rate, it appears that the government nevertheless 
retained final decision-making power, whatever discussions it might have been obliged to engage in up 




Sámediggi), even this designation might be generous.  Again, this evaluation 
highlights the importance of non-elite involvement at a very early stage, and of those 
non-elites having genuine influence over the outcome of the process. 
 
After the learning poster and Quality Framework, the third major area of 
reform under Knowledge Promotion 2006 was the subject curriculum, the syllabi.  In 
summer 2004, following Parliamentary Notice No. 30 that such a reform was 
underway, the Sámediggi Council decided how the Sámi subject curriculum should 
be developed and work began in the fall 2004, a half a year after the national 
curriculum reform effort began (Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 116).   The Sámi 
Parliament's decision-making authority was limited to syllabi for the teaching of the 
Sámi language and the syllabi of three programs for upper secondary.  By the time the 
Sámi language course syllabi began circulating for comment in the summer 2005, the 
national syllabi were already approved.  The Sámi syllabi were not adopted until 
spring 2006.  The Sámi curriculum—along with policies for distribution of periods 
and students in compulsory schooling—then moved to negotiations with the Ministry 
of Education, a process that proved long and arduous, resulting in Ministry approval 
just before the 2006-2007 school year began, a year after the national syllabi had been 
approved (Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 116). 
  
During this implementation step, the scope of their participation was again 
limited by the authorities prior to their entry into the deliberations and the outcomes 




unclear from Balto and Hirvonen’s report whether these negotiations resulted in 
consensus or the final decision was made—their syllabi “approved”—by the 
Norwegian government.  Technically, as of 2005, the State was legally obliged to 
enter into good faith negotiations with the Sámediggi.44  As Crocker points out, 
though, there are thinner and thicker forms of negotiation, with the latter possibly 
merging with “deliberation” (a full “7”).  We might say that Sámi participation at this 
step earns 6 points (for “bargaining”) on Crocker's scale, but according to Balto and 
Hirvonen’s account, only on the micro level of words used in a predominantly 
Norwegian-written curriculum, not in the full development of a Sámi curriculum 
itself.  It is possible that the process remained at the level of petitionary or even 
consultative participation (worth 4 or 3 quality points).  Balto and Hirvonen seem to 
feel that one of these modes characterized much negotiation with the Ministry, 
especially when we consider the limited scope of the negotiations.  More information 
is needed on the degree of actual power wielded by the Sámi during this process.45  




                                                          
44
 This is a substantial departure from early processes in which the Sámi Parliament simply submitted 
its proposals for approval by the Ministry of Education.  However, Balto and Hirvonen admit that 
these negotiations, while apparently in good faith and between equals, tend to be restricted to word 
choices in the Sámi versions of the national curriculum, the syllabi of which are not developed by the 
Sámi but are "adapted" through these negotiations to Sámi purposes.  These negotiations will have real 
meaning when they are over substance, not merely word choice for content pre-determined by the 
government.  
45
Access to additional sources in an extended version of this analysis, one meant to be definitive and 
not mostly illustrative, would allow us to say with more certainty just how much power the Sámi in 
fact wielded in these negotiations.  Negotiations overshadowed by threat of a Ministry veto are a far 
cry from the kind of deliberation, or even bargaining, that Crocker has in mind.  Such additional 
information would make it possible to build on this framework, as I suggest above, with an additional 





2006S process reveals the need to use both Goulet’s and Crocker’s schema in 
evaluating Sámi participation.  Again, the process as a whole earns about 3 quality 
points due to the fairly late stage at which the Sámi meaningfully entered the game.  
Breaking down each of Goulet’s “sequential moments” and analyzing them according 
to Crocker’s “modes of participation” reveals, again, that there is no participation 
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or condition 




Listing of possible responses 
“Principles” section and subject syllabi 
ought to be supplemented and revised 
0 
 
Selecting one possibility to enact 
“Principles” ought to be replaced with a 
“learning poster”and supplemented with 
a Quality Framework; certain subject 
syllabi need revision 
0 
 Organizing/preparing to 
implement the course of action 
chosen 
 
Conceptualizing new documents (form, 















Specific steps of implementation 
 
(Quality Points: 3) 
1) drafting Sámi learning poster (late 
2004); deliberation and approval in 





2) drafting Sámi Quality Framework 
(mid 2007); submission to Ministry for 
approval (late 2007) 
3-4 
3) drafting subject syllabi for the Sámi 
School (late 2004); negotiation with 
Ministry for approval (late 2006) 
4-6 
 
Self-correction/evaluation in the 















whatsoever in the early stages of the process (earning zeros), but that once the Sámi 
do enter, the several specific steps involved in implementing the reform were 
characterized by varying degrees of participation, with the first step earning a 
questionable 4 quality points, the second earning a 3 or 4, and the final step landing 
somewhere between 4 and a 6.  A summary of this analysis appears in Table 3. 
 
To summarize, this analysis of several phases of each of three different reform 
initiatives (changes to the SEC, R97, and Knowledge Promotion 2006) reveals a 
Norwegian government that, particularly since negotiations became required by law 
in 2005, has recognized in spirit a thick right to Sámi participation in education, but 
has failed to fulfill its obligations in practice.  If the details of Balto and Hirvonen’s 
report are taken at face value, we can conclude that Sámi participation often begins 
 
Table 4.  Summary of Entry-Points and Modes of Participation, with Quality Points 
(1993-2007) 
 Entry-Point QPs Mode QPs 
Reform of the Sámi Education Council 2.5 3 
R97S Reform Process 3 -- 
 Drafting of R97S Syllabi -- 5 
 Drafting of R97S Principles Section -- 7 
 Drafting of additional R97S Syllabi -- 7 
KP2006SReform Process 3 -- 
 Drafting of KP2006S Learning Poster -- 4 
 Drafting of Quality Framework for KP2006S -- 3-4 
 Drafting of KP2006S syllabi -- 4-6 
 
late, once the biggest decisions have been made, and the nature of the participation is 
relatively thin, compromised by a limited scope and a threat of a government veto.  





In addition to a late entry and only moderate participation in these processes, 
the scope of Sámi decision-making power is typically limited to a few narrow interest 
areas, hardly broad enough to deem that the Sámi have anything like “autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs,” at least not 
sufficient to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United 
Nations 2007), as the elaboration of self-determination in UN Indigenous Declaration 
requires.  Balto and Hirvonen argue that “[e]ver since the work on the reforms and the 
new curricula began, the Sámi Parliament has had to defend forcefully the 
educational rights of the Sámi, as they are not an integral part of the Norwegian 
administrative system,” yet control of the Sámi schools remains within that same 
administrative system.  “This reform process shows that the right of the Sámi to a 
separate curriculum—not to mention self-determination—is not clear in the 
administrative and political system of Norway” (Balto and Hirvonen 2008, 116). 
  
While other scholars (see Fjellheim 2008, Vars 2008) echo the conclusions 
that Balto and Hirvonen draw—namely that the Sámi do not enjoy true self-
determination in education policy in Norway—a detailed case study, drawn from 
multiple sources and original documents, would enable us to apply this framework 
with greater certainty and to draw some more concrete conclusions about Sámi 
participation in education decisions that affect them.  It would also be useful, for 
example, to investigate Sámi control of financial resources.46  In the meantime, 
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assuming the details of Balto and Hirvonen’s report are accurate, I am able to 
conclude from my foregoing analysis that the Sámi, a people whose self-
determination is limited in at least one important area—education—remain 
vulnerable in an agency-oriented sense, unable to “freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development” (United Nations 1966[b], 1966[c], 2007) and with 
inadequate “defenses against the social forces which propel them into processes of 




The “spirit” of the norm of self-determination can best be understood as a 
legal and political expression of Amartya Sen's development-as-freedom paradigm, 
particularly David A. Crocker’s extended agency-oriented understanding of it.  In 
practice, however, this norm often remains thinly applied. If we understand self-
determination to mean “that human beings, individually and as groups, are equally 
entitled to be in control of their own destinies, and to live within a governing 
institutional order that is devised accordingly” (Anaya 2008, 49-50), then our 
assessment of its application in practice needs to be fleshed out.  I argue that the norm 
of self-determination would benefit from an elaboration of its core content, not only 
in a substantive sense, which already receives a fair amount of attention in the 
literature and in policy circles, but also in a process sense.   
 
Minorities, and in particular indigenous peoples, are particularly vulnerable in 




harm, and their societies face a “particular disadvantage” both in protecting 
themselves against unwanted change and in effecting change that they desire.  If 
human rights are a way to mitigate human vulnerability, then the right of self-
determination is a protection against a certain type of human vulnerability, what I call 
“agency vulnerability.”  The value in a process–focused analysis of self-
determination is in its ability to help better reveal the real opportunity that an 
indigenous people—or any other—have to be and do as they choose, independently to 
define and pursue a life they value and have reason to value, to reduce their agency 
vulnerability.   
 
The framework I outline above offers one way in which to evaluate this 
process aspect of self-determination:  by identifying the points at which indigenous 
peoples enter into the decision-making process and the modes of participation 
through which they engage the governments of their respective states.  With such a 
framework in hand, we can more easily put the onus on governments to demonstrate 
that a thick concept of participation is at work in their protection and promotion of 





III. Parental Consent and Children’s Rights in Europe:  A 
Balancing Act47 
 
“The pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation,” 
reads the founding document of the Council of Europe, “is vital for the preservation 
of human society and civilization” (Council of Europe 1949).  The Council of Europe 
(CoE) sees itself as a diverse family of states, enjoying the benefits of democracy and 
economic cooperation and the protections of human rights law and practice.  Yet in 
many respects and for many citizens, democracy remains thin; economic prosperity, 
selective; and human rights, at best a privilege of some, at worst, a fanciful 
hypothetical.  While perhaps not a silver bullet, education—more than just an 
inherently valuable right—may be one of the most powerful weapons available to 
combat injustices along all three dimensions.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, education plays an important role encouraging 
civic participation (Levine and Higgins-D’Alessandro 2010, Blais 2000, Rosenstone 
and Wolfinger 1980, Verba, Brady and Schlozman 1995), a fundamental condition 
(and outgrowth) of poverty alleviation and the protection of human rights.  
Educational attainment is also a factor in an individual’s success on the labor market, 
and while it is unclear whether an educated population is more likely to respect and 
protect human rights, at the very least, education is itself a “right” in some sense. Yet 
for large numbers of individuals living inside Europe today, the promise of a rich or 
even adequate education remains unrealized.  This crisis is especially acute for 
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Europe’s 10 to 12 million Roma citizens (“Gypsies”), a great many of whom never 
even finish eighth grade (Kosko forthcoming 2012, Open Society Institute 2007).  
This lack of education is both a cause and a consequence of the severe social, 
economic and political marginalization many Roma face.  Among other barriers is the 
relegation of many Romani students to “special” schools for the mentally 
handicapped (Greenberg 2010, Kosko 2004, United Nations Development 
Programme 2002, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2000).  
Adequately addressing the problem, however, raises not only political, but also legal 
and ethical questions; these questions are intimately connected. 
 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (henceforth “the European Convention”), by which all 
member states of the Council of Europe are legally bound, protects a right to 
education (Protocol 1, Article 2) and a right to freedom from discrimination (Article 
14).  In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights, which interprets the law, 
has begun hearing cases of alleged violations of these provisions.  Together with an 
assertion of state prerogative (the “margin of appreciation”), the governments charged 
with discrimination in the provision of education have claimed that the consent of a 
student’s parents can be proof that an action was not discriminatory.  This defense has 
met with inconsistent responses from the Court. 
 
 These inconsistencies—borne out by three recent Court rulings pertaining to 




clarification of the role and limits of parental consent in determining the level and 
quality of education received by their children.  The need for this clarification has 
implications beyond the segregation of Romani children, reaching into the wider 
realm of minority rights and the question of who controls the content and quality of 
education.  This, in turn, has a profound implication for who is able to become an 
active participant in European democracy and prosperity. 
 
In this chapter, I first examine the three European Court of Human Rights 
cases (one handed down in 2007 and two in 2008) in order to establish the position of 
the Court on the “parental consent” defense and the need for clarification of this 
principle.  I next set forth the position that domestic and international law should seek 
to protect parental control of a child’s upbringing.  This argument rests on 
international law, respect for the human dignity of the parents (which requires 
meaningful consent for any decision affecting their children), and the desirability of 
minority participation in public discussion.  Third, I explain the counter-argument 
that conceding absolute control to parents can have damaging consequences for a 
child’s welfare and future life prospects.  This counter-argument rests on respect for 
the human rights of the child and the desirability of that child’s developing into an 
autonomous and fully-functioning citizen, and prohibits interference by parents or 






Neither of these arguments, I contend, is absolute.  Hence, I fold both 
arguments into a case for a limited parental right, arguing for the need to identify a 
“threshold” for consent, one that balances parents’ and children’s claims while 
ensuring a minimal level of education, one necessary for the development of the 
child’s capabilities and agency.
48
  Above the threshold at which human rights are 
minimally satisfied, arguments in favor of parental consent are bound up in the ideas 
of cultural liberty
49
 (Kymlicka 2007, United Nations Development Programme 2004) 
and agency (Crocker 2008, Drèze and Sen 2002); below it, arguments take their force 
from the concept of human rights as “minimum” standards delimiting “where decent 
life starts” (Shue 1996, xi) and the need to protect basic capabilities (including future 
agency) without which a life might not be “fully human” (Nussbaum 2000, 74), an 
idea that Joel Feinberg sums up in the title of his article “The Child’s Right to an 
Open Future” (Feinberg 1980).  Determining the exact location of this threshold in 
each case is a matter for public deliberation; requiring that governments respect this 
threshold and encouraging this deliberation is a matter for the Court.  Before outlining 
the cases, however, I will offer a few words on the current academic debate about the 
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 Here I refer to “capabilities” in Amartya Sen’s sense, most simply stated as “the substantive 
freedoms… to choose a life one has reason to value” (Sen 1999, 74). 
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  “Cultural liberty is about expanding individual choices, not about preserving values and practices as 
an end in itself with blind allegiance to tradition… [It is] the capability of people to live and be what 




1. Children and Parents as Rights-Bearers 
 
This chapter begins from the assumption that children are rights-bearers.  
Whether this is in fact the case and, if so, what precisely is the nature of those rights, 
is not uncontested.
50
  Theorists such as James Griffin who subscribe to the “choice” 
theory of rights hold that human rights are “protections of our human standing, our 
personhood,” a personhood understood “by analysing agency” (Griffin 2002, 20).  
Griffin and others argue that very young children, as vulnerable and not yet fully 
autonomous agents, do not qualify as rights-bearers (though some older children do).  
Explaining this view of children’s rights, David Archard says that “[t]he primary and 
appropriate functions of rights are the recognition and protection of the person qua 
autonomous agent. Since children, at least infants, lack the capacities requisite for 
autonomy on which the very concept of a right is allegedly predicated, it makes no 
sense, however well-intentioned this might be, to ascribe rights to children” (Archard 
and Macleod 2002, 5).  Griffin nevertheless maintains that young children and infants 
have significant claims to care (Griffin 2002) which in some cases might amount to 
the same treatment.  Children might also possess a right to become autonomous 
agents, a right the fulfillment of which would almost certainly require some minimum 
standard of education, the contours and formality of which are open for debate. 
 
Other theorists, such as Harry Brighouse, apply to children the logic of the 
“interest” theory of rights, which says that the purpose of human rights is to protect 
fundamental interests or welfare, rather than to protect the freedom to make valuable 
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choices.  Brighouse argues that “it is generally illuminating to think of children as 
bearers of welfare rights, but not, usually, as bearers of agency rights” because they 
have not yet developed the capabilities necessary to exercise true agency (Brighouse 
2002, 32).  This position has implications not for whether we use rights language to 
protect children (we do!) but for the type of rights we ascribe to them.  Samantha 
Brennan finds a middle ground between the choice and the interest theories and 
advances an argument for a “gradualist approach” that ascribes rights to a being 
according to the nature of that particular being and its level of development, which, 
for children, means evolving from “the sort of creatures whose interests are protected 
by rights to being the sort of creatures whose rights protect their choices” (Brennan 
2002, 54).  Brennan’s argument might be the basis for the position that children, as 
potential agents, possess certain rights the aim of which is to protect their interest in 
being able to grow into autonomous adults (or older children).  A right to education—
perhaps to some types more than others—would certainly be one way to serve that 
interest. 
 
Similarly, there is much philosophical and legal debate about the nature and 
origin of parents' rights, a debate that has been particularly fierce with regard to 
religious freedom in the United States and the American practice of home-schooling.  
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark 1972 case Wisconsin v. Yoder, sided 
against the state of Wisconsin in favor of the rights of Amish and Mennonite parents 
to remove their children from school after grade eight (before the child ages out of 




individual religious freedom, in this case as exercised by the parents both on their 
own behalf and on behalf of their children whose religious upbringing and, in the 
respondents’ view, salvation, rests in their hands (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972).
51
  (This 
is, of course, not to say that the Amish community is without internal conflict about 




Some, however, reject the whole notion of a “parent’s right” as a kind of right 
one has over another human being.  James Dwyer argues that while parents do have 
justifiable permission to make certain decisions on behalf of their young children—in 
accordance with the rights of those children—there is no such thing as “parents' 
rights.”  He argues that the American legal “culture” embraces “an inherent 
limitation” on individual rights.  “This limitation on legal rights embodies the moral 
precept that no individual is entitled to control the life of another person, free from 
outside interference, no matter how intimate the relationship between them, and 
particularly not in ways inimical to the other person's temporal interests"  (Dwyer 
1994, 1373).  He makes the analogy to the outdated notion of a husband’s right to 
control his wife. 
 
Some scholars allow that parents have certain rights with respect to their 
children while maintaining that those rights have limits.  Samantha Brennan and 
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Robert Noggle apply a threshold concept to the problem of balancing the rights of 
parents and children.  They begin by arguing that parental rights are “stewardship 
rights,” or rights that arise from a parent's responsibility for—rather than ownership 
of—a child.  “Parental rights are necessary to allow the parents the freedom to 
effectively protect and nurture children” (Brennan and Noggle 1997, 11).  Those 
rights, therefore, are only legitimate to that end:  “[B]ecause those rights have 
thresholds, they can be infringed if this is necessary for preserving the rights of the 
child or for making sure that her needs are met” (Brennan and Noggle 1997, p. 10).  
Thus, Brennan and Noggle privilege the rights of the child over the rights of the 
parent; indeed the parental rights seem to exist only to serve the child’s.  But surely 
there are other reasons—such as cultural liberty—to protect certain rights of parents, 
though these are rights a parent holds by virtue of being a human being, not of being a 
parent.  What is useful in Brennan and Noggle’s account is the idea that there are 
limits to these rights:  the buck stops at the protection of the child’s current welfare 
and future agency.  Shelley Burtt also argues for limits on parents’ rights but doesn’t 
go as far, maintaining a “principle of parental deference” with regard to their right to 
educate their children in accordance with their own religious beliefs.  She makes a 
case for placing limits on parent’s rights only in very specific and exceptional cases 
such as those that would deprive the child of fundamental skills like literacy (Burtt 
1994).  
 
Following Brennan and Noggle and others, I start from the assumption that 




This chapter works from the position that children have welfare rights as well as what 
we might think of as “future” agency rights (though not agency rights in the standard 
sense, by which we would be required to allow them to vote, enter into binding 
contracts, and make other “adult” decisions).  With regard to education, those rights, 
in line with the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, are 
such as will direct the child toward “the full development of the human personality 
and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (United Nations 1966[c], Article 13) and, in line with 
Feinberg, will guarantee that child’s “right to an open future.”   
 
Such rights go beyond mere literacy and numeracy and should ensure, in 
practice, that no child is relegated to a sub-standard school in which the quality and 
scope of the education does not adequately prepare students to think critically, 
observe and assess the world around them, make important life decisions, and 
function as integral members not just of their social but also of their political and 
economic communities. A school that fails any child in these respects can be 
understood as failing to meet the threshold requirements for protecting the child’s 
basic human rights.  Parents’ rights, here, might be understood as having two 
components:  the human rights that parents have by virtue of their personhood plus a 
kind of stewardship right, again following Brennan and Noggle, which they have as 
parents.  Where those rights begin and end with regard to their children is a matter I 





2. The Cases 
 
Since 2007, the European Court of Human Rights has decided three cases on 
indirect discrimination in the provision of education to Romani children who were 
allegedly discriminated against when the authorities placed them in separate schools.  
These special schools, of which there are many in Europe (Greenberg 2010, Kosko 
2004, United Nations Development Programme 2002, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 2000), follow “a simplified curriculum and effectively [lead] 
to long-term disadvantage for the children who [attend] them because of the 
difficulties of progressing into secondary or tertiary education” (Hobcraft 2008, 246).  
These cases are important in three respects:  all three ruled on the admissibility of 
statistics in establishing a claim of discrimination (a departure from earlier 
jurisprudence); all three turned on whether the criteria used to separate the children 
was objective (and what objectivity entailed); and, most relevant here, all three made 
a judgment on the role of parental consent in separating a child from the mainstream 
school.  Because the first of the three cases was revolutionary in many respects and 
laid the groundwork for future decisions, I will spend more time on this case than the 
others. 
 
The first case is the landmark 2007 Grand Chamber ruling in D.H. and Others 
v. Czech Republic.  D.H. is the first case of racial discrimination in education ever to 
reach the Court (Open Society Justice Initiative 2008).  In this case, eighteen Romani 
students, represented by the European Romani Rights Centre (ERRC), brought to the 




Republic.  The events in question took place between 1996 and 1999, in Ostrava, 
Czech Republic, during which the eighteen applicants (plaintiffs) in the case—all 
local Romani children—were placed in a school intended for children with learning 
disabilities.  The applicants took their case to the local education authority and then to 
the Czech Constitutional Court, claiming that they had been discriminated against in 
the provision of public education.   
 
In Ostrava, the decision to remove a child from the mainstream school is made 
by the head teacher, based on psychological and aptitude testing done by a specialist, 
and requires the consent of a legal guardian.  This procedure was followed in each 
case (in several cases the parents requested that the student be moved) and the Czech 
courts found no violation of local law.  After their domestic appeals failed, the 
eighteen applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Second Section of which also ruled against them.  They appealed, and the case was 
heard by the Grand Chamber. 
 
In its 2007 decision, the Grand Chamber overruled the 2006 Second Section 
decision.  Although it also found no violation of local law, the Grand Chamber did 
find that indirect discrimination had taken place in the removal of the Romani 
children to a “special” school.  Specifically, it found a breach of Article 14 of the 
European Convention.  This prohibition against discrimination, reads: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 




social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status.  (Council of Europe 1950, Article 14) 
 
In traditional Court jurisprudence, however, this article is not “freestanding” and 
discrimination can only be pleaded in conjunction with another Convention right 
(Gilbert 2002).
53
  In D.H., as with the other two cases, this article was taken together 
with Article 2 of Protocol 1, the right to education (Council of Europe 1952): 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the 
State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.  (Council of Europe 1952, Protocol 1, Article 2) 
 
The Court’s decision in favor of the applicants marked the first time it had found 
discrimination (direct or otherwise) in the provision of public education.   
 
There are numerous details that make this case noteworthy.  These include the 
consideration of country-wide statistical evidence in establishing a prima facie case of 
indirect discrimination, the fact that the Court considered the “wider social context” in its 
deliberations and findings as opposed to the narrow context of the eighteen applicants 
(Hobcraft 2008), and—crucially—the decision to embrace the concept of indirect 
discrimination and uphold the principle that a prima facie allegation of discrimination shifts 
the burden to the respondent state to prove that any difference in treatment is not 
discriminatory.
54
  While all of these elements made the decision a revolutionary one, 
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into force in April 2005, after the alleged violations in these cases took place.  This Protocol grants a 
freestanding right not to be discriminated against (Gilbert 2002).  It is worth noting that several of 
Europe’s most powerful states, including France and the United Kingdom, have not ratified the 
Protocol. 
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 This decision was hailed as an important step forward in making European discrimination law 
consistent with policy.  “This ruling places interpretation of the European Convention in consonance 




the element most relevant to this discussion is the Court’s rejection of the parental 
consent defense.  But first, I will briefly lay out the other two cases, the first of which 
built on, and the second of which departed from, the Grand Chamber’s ruling in D.H. 
 
In the second case, Sampanis v. Greece, the court examined whether the 
Greek authorities had failed to provide education to the applicants—11 Greek 
nationals of Romani decent—and then when they did provide it, whether they did so 
in a discriminatory way (Sampanis v. Greece 2008).  In 2004, the applicants were 
denied permission to enroll in primary school.  Once admitted in 2005, a backlash by 
non-Romani parents ensued, with demonstrations outside the school.  The Romani 
students were harassed and intimidated.  The police got involved.  The students were 
then moved to a separate school building where they were to receive special 
preparatory classes.  The Romani families signed a written statement expressing their 
consent that their children be moved.  No children ever moved back to the ordinary 
classes after completing the “preparatory” classes.  The applicants brought their case 
to the European Court of Human Rights citing Article 14 together with Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 (as in D.H.) as well as Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy).  The 
Court ruled in their favor, upholding many of the principles established in D.H., 
including that “a presumption of discrimination can be supposed from a de facto 
situation and that such a presumption will shift the burden of proof to the respondent 
state” (EHRLR [a] 2008, 680).  The Court also took a position, as in D.H., on the role 
of parental consent, an issue to which I will return.  
                                                                                                                                                                     






In the third case, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, the Court’s decision at first 
departed from the two previous rulings.  The applicants also filed a more far-reaching 
claim.  The 14 applicants, Croatian nationals of Romani decent, had all attended 
separate Roma-only classes at some point in their primary schooling, ostensibly for 
linguistic reasons.  Five of them had only attended segregated classes while the 
remaining nine had attended both Roma-only and mixed classes (Oršuš and Others v. 
Croatia 2008, 1033).  In addition to Article 14 taken with Article 2 of Protocol 1 (as 
in the previous two cases), and Article 13 (as in Sampanis), their claim also cited 
Articles 3 (freedom from inhumane or degrading treatment) and 6 (the right to a fair 
trial).  However, the Court rejected the claims under Articles 3 and 13 and part of 
their claim under Article 6.
55
  It also found no violation of Article 2, Protocol 1 (taken 
with or without Article 14), holding that in this case, separating Romani children into 
different classes did not constitute discrimination.  The Court also departed from the 
D.H. precedent in rejecting the use of statistics in establishing indirect discrimination.  
Like D.H. and Sampanis, it relied on both the “objectivity” of the criteria for 
segregation as well as parental consent in making its judgment, though it applied 
different definitions of objectivity and consent and ultimately reached different 
conclusions (Oršuš and Others v. Croatia 2008, 1033).   
 
                                                          
55 The Court did find a violation of Article 6(1), namely, that everyone is “entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time” (Council of Europe 1950).  Given that what was at stake 
was the continuance of their education, the four years for which the proceedings under the 




In this chapter I am concerned with only one of the elements the Court used in 
determining whether separating Romani students is discriminatory:  parental consent.  
In D.H., the Czech Government argued that the parents’ signed consent for the 
removal of their children to a separate school was evidence that the act did not 
constitute unlawful discrimination.  This consent was the “essential decisive factor” 
in deciding to place the student in a special school (D.H. and Others v. Czech 
Republic 2007).  The applicants, however, argued “that ‘there could be no waiver of a 
child’s right not to be racially discriminated against in education’ and therefore any 
consent, construed as such a waiver, cannot be valid” (Hobcraft 2008, 253).  The 
Court agreed.  This normative argument, though, was not the only reason.  On 
practical grounds, the Court questioned whether the parents had consented at all, 
holding that there was reason to doubt whether the parents in question could have 
made a fully informed, meaningful decision.  It also held that restricting the education 
of any group—with or without parental consent—is against public interest.  These 
three justifications for rejecting the parental consent claim—the inalienability of the 
child’s right, the parents’ lack of meaningful agency, and the public interest—
demonstrate the need for the Court to clarify the nature, role and limit of parental 
consent (and, more broadly, agency) in education decisions, a point to which I shall 
return. 
 
In the second case, Sampanis v. Greece, the Court again ruled that the 
government had acted in a discriminatory way in segregating Romani children and 




discrimination.  As in D.H., the Court found three reasons for this.  First, though “the 
applicants signed a statement expressing their wish to transfer their children to a 
separate building annexed to the school,” they “claimed that they were pressurised 
[sic] to sign the statement by the Minister for Education, non-Roma parents and some 
leaders of the Roma community” (EHRLR [a] 2008, 678).  The Court also questioned 
whether the parents had adequate information and power to resist such pressure 
(again questioning the parents’ lack of meaningful agency).  Second, this decision 
followed D.H. in upholding that “it would be against an important public interest,” a 
pragmatic consideration, “to accept any waiver of the right not to be subjected to 
racial discrimination,” which itself rests on a third, normative consideration involving 
children’s rights (EHRLR [a] 2008, 679). 
 
The third case, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, deviated from the first two on the 
parental consent defense.  The Chamber of the Court’s First Section found that the 
fact that none of the parents had complained about the separation of their children 
implied consent, which amounted to a defense against a discrimination charge.  In 
Oršuš, the Court noted several times that the parents had not asked for their children 
to be transferred to a mixed class, or objected to their placement in a Roma-only 
class.  The Court made no reference in this regard to the decision in D.H., in which 
the Court said that the parents’ consent to their children’s segregation could not be 
decisive (EHRLR [b] 2008, 802).  It found no violation of Article 14 together with 





After the 2008 judgment was handed down, however, the applicants appealed 
and two years later the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights overturned 
the decision of the lower chamber, effectively bringing it in line with the two earlier decisions 
(Oršuš and Others v. Croatia 2010).  Yet the inconsistencies between the 2008 decision and 
the two previous decisions, and the disregard the Court showed in Oršuš 2008 for the 
precedents on the parental consent defense, point to the need for clarification of some of the 
principles (and laws) at stake.  Together, these cases also raise the question of what 
conditions must be present for a parent to give “meaningful” consent and whether 
such consent can be meaningful at all when what is at stake is a fundamental 
freedom:  the right to freedom from discrimination in education. 
 
The “parental consent defense” (as I am calling it) against a charge of 
discrimination rests on the view that a parent or legal guardian,
56
 as an autonomous 
agent, has the right to decide the type of education her child will get, even if it means 
that that education is different from that received by other children.  It assumes that 
parental control of children’s upbringing, in accordance with one’s religion or culture, 
is a right.
57
  This right underpins the legal defense which claims that differences in 
school placement or educational outcomes are not discriminatory if they are the result 
of parental choice.  Such a defense, however, is often merely an excuse governments 
                                                          
56
 For convenience, I will use the term “parent” as a catch-all that includes any legal guardian. 
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 Such control might be thought of as a kind of bargain between a government and parents:  a state’s 
survival (immigration notwithstanding) requires its citizens to provide children and to prepare those 
children for some level of economic and political participation and, in return, it protects parents’ 
freedom to raise their children more or less as they wish.  This bargain gives the state a reason to 
respect parents’ decisions regarding child rearing, their control.  The “consent” at issue in this paper 
follows from this broader idea of parental “control.”  What I mean throughout much of this paper is 
really “parental control,” as consent implies a more passive form of agency.  For consistency, and to 
capture the weaker sense of control—for example in actions such a signing waivers—I will use the 




use to avoid the appearance of impropriety—and with it a charge of discrimination—
in educational decisions and outcomes related to minorities.  This excuse is 
particularly offensive when the claim that parents have truly given their informed 
(and uncoerced) consent is spurious, as is too often the case in Roma (and other 
minority) education.  Such cases—where parents are coerced or unaware of the 
consequences of a decision—are fairly cut and dry when they can be identified.  But 
what should we make of the underlying assumption?  Is control of a child’s 
upbringing in fact a parental right? 
 
3. The Case for Parental Consent 
 
 Here I will discuss three justifications—predominantly legal and practical—
for respecting the right of parents to control a child’s education.  (There are also 
normative justifications to which I will return later.)  First, legal arguments that 
support this right can be found in both European and United Nations treaties, to 
which many European countries are party.  Rights of this sort, when they refer to such 
control in the context of minority individuals and traditions, might be classified, 
following James W. Nickel, as “universal rights applied to minorities” (Nickel 2007).  
Second, in addition to the legal arguments, multiculturalists such as Will Kymlicka 
have also forwarded a justification for such a right on the grounds that it is necessary 
to protect minority cultures.  Third, there is some support for the notion that a broader 
right—a right to democratic participation—is protected in European law, and that the 




practical prerequisite for the enjoyment of such a right and a natural extension of it.  
That is, I will make the argument that supporting the right of parents to be involved in 
decisions about their children’s education arises in part from the desire to promote the 
democratic participation of minority parents and, when that right results in a more 
robust education for their children, it raises the probability that those children will be 
more civically engaged as adults. 
 
First, the legal case:  the (European) Framework Convention for Protection of 
National Minorities recognizes the rights of minorities to “set up and to manage their 
own private educational and training establishments” (Council of Europe 1995, 
Article 13.1) and learn their own language (Council of Europe 1995, Article 14.1).  
Article 13.3 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) protects a similarly worded right (United Nations 1966[c], Article 13.3).  
With respect to the three cases considered in this chapter, it’s debatable whether 
removing Romani children to a different—substandard—school, managed by the 
Government without input from the Romani community, is what the framers of these 
conventions had in mind.  Nevertheless, these three cases notwithstanding, European 
law appears to provide legal grounds for, at the very least, a parent’s prerogative to 
send her child to a school of her choice. 
 
While the law lays out what types of decisions parents have a right to make 
for their children, Will Kymlicka offers a justification for the existence of such a law.  




Report, on which Kymlicka served as an advisor.  “Cultural liberty,” the report 
argues, is “about allowing people the freedom to choose their identities—and to lead 
the lives they value—without being excluded from other choices important to them” 
(United Nations Development Programme 2004, 6).  This liberty is seen as 
fundamental to the entire project of “human development,” the understanding of 
development so heavily influenced by Amartya Sen’s “Capability Approach.”  Under 
this rubric, “[h]uman development is first and foremost about allowing people to lead 
the kind of life they choose—and providing them with the tools and opportunities to 
make those choices” (United Nations Development Programme 2004, v).  Clearly, 
education is one of those tools.  “As an empowerment right,” the General Comment 
on Article 13 of the ICESCR states, “education is the primary vehicle by which 
economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of 
poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities” (Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1999, Article 13).  Most relevantly for a 
defense of parental consent, a parent’s decision about the kind of education her 
children will receive can also be one of those tools, offering an opportunity for her to 
transmit (elements of) her own culture to her children.  Education in one’s own 
language is one example of the application of the principle of cultural liberty to 
minority education.  But what if education is only offered in the majority (or state) 
language, as was the case in Oršuš?  This not only reduces the likelihood of academic 
success for minority children who speak their own language at home—thus 




the cultural right of all people, including minorities, to speak their own language 
(Council of Europe 1995).  
 
Kymlicka argues that the choice of an official state language and the language 
of school instruction is not a neutral one but, because it comes at the expense of other 
languages, is rather an assertion of the importance of a single dominant language (and 
thus culture) over others.  “Refusing to provide public schooling in a minority 
language… is almost inevitably condemning that language to ever-increasing 
marginalization” (Kymlicka 2006, 332).  It is not a far leap to argue that it also 
contributes to the marginalization of the minority culture and its people with 
damaging effects on individual dignity, capability, and self-respect.
58
  Thus, were the 
Croatian language proficiency of the Romani students and the express parental 
preference that they learn (at least at first, and even if not exclusively) in the Romani 
language the sole criteria on which the students in the Oršuš case were placed in a 
separate school, and were the quality and scope of instruction at the Romani school 
equal to that in the mainstream school, then there would be a strong justification for 
upholding such a decision.  This justification would rest on both the need to provide 
minority children with the most effective education possible as well as the right of 
minorities to choose their language of instruction.
59
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 Here I refer to “capabilities” in the sense that Amartya Sen and David A. Crocker mean them:  1) 
“the various combination of functionings (beings or doings) that the person can achieve… a set of 
vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another… to choose 
from possible livings” (Sen 1992); 2) a person’s “freedom or opportunities… to function in ways 
alternative to her current functioning” (Crocker 2008); 3) “the real opportunity that we have to 
accomplish what we value” (Sen 1999). 
59
 Though this was indeed what the Court found, the evidence suggests that this was unfortunately not 
the only criteria.  Domestic proceedings indicate that the “psychological fitness” of the children was 





It is sometimes the case that a Roma parent might prefer that her child be 
educated in her own language and among her peers, as in D.H., even if the quality of 
instruction is known to be inferior.  This is understandable and constitutes yet another 
argument in favor of parental consent.  However no parent should be forced to choose 
between educating her children in accordance with their own traditions and in their 
own language (again, with important caveats to which I will return), and ensuring that 
her children receive a quality education that will prepare them for civic and market 
participation and facilitate “the full development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity” (United Nations 1966[c], Article 13).  Recognizing and removing 
this terrible choice that many minorities face, and the evils (intrinsic and 




The answer, however, cannot be to remove the element of “choice” 
altogether—to allow the state to make that choice on the parents’ behalf—but should 
rather be to remove the necessity of making trade-offs between the enjoyment of 
one’s culture (and, by extension, identity) and one’s right to education.  While the 
Court’s decision in D.H. and Sampanis was made to protect the right of the children 
to an education free from discrimination, the basis of its decision reflects another 
danger, one that pertains directly to the desire to protect this right of individuals “to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
have difficulty in channeling their emotions… children of Roma origin do not have basic hygienic 
skills of washing, dressing, tying or buttoning…’” (EHRLR [a] 2008).  Also, the parents never 
explicitly consented—let alone requested—that their children be educated separately.  The Court 
considered consent by omission to be sufficient grounds for demonstrating that this arrangement was 
the preference of the parents. 
60
 There is some promise in bilingual education programs as well as vocational schools, at least when 




participate fully in their communities.”  In D.H., the Grand Chamber 
acknowledged—and rightly so—“that a waiver of rights can only be given, if at all, 
‘in full knowledge of the facts’ and… without constraint” (Hobcraft 2008, 257); 
Sampanis followed this “informed consent” logic.  The Court went on to say that it 
did not find sufficient evidence that “[T]he parents of Romani children, who were 
members of a disadvantaged community… were capable of weighing up all the 
aspects of the situation and the consequences of giving their consent” (D.H. v. Czech 
Republic, 2007).  In Sampanis, the Court repeated this argument almost verbatim 
(EHRLR [a], 2008).   
 
The danger here lies in something the 2004 Human Development Report calls 
“participation exclusion”:  when a person or group is prohibited from participating in 
society in the way that others are allowed and encouraged to do (United Nations 
Development Programme 2004, 16).  Ignoring or proscribing the role of Romani 
parents in making decisions about their children's education because they are viewed, 
as a group, as too uninformed or uneducated (or worse, too irresponsible) to make 
such decisions is a form of participation exclusion.  The idea of participation 
exclusion, a partially pragmatic (or consequentialist) critique, is normatively rooted in 
respect for the agency and dignity of individuals, as exercised through the choices 
they make.  It is both practically and ethically imperative that no group should suffer 




communities and society as a whole.
61
  Being involved in decisions pertaining to a 
child’s education is one important form of participation.   
 
Participation is not just “important,” however; Rory O’Connell argues that 
there is a “right” to democratic “participation” protected in the European Convention.  
Though the Convention has been traditionally viewed as protecting only a right to 
participation in the institutions of representative democracy, O’Connell says there is a 
case for pushing the Convention right beyond this limited scope.  More importantly, 
she argues that the Court has already begun moving in this direction (O'Connell 
2006).  According to O’Connell, the Convention clearly protects a right to a 
representative democracy but she argues that the Court has also defended a right to 
meaningful “consultation” democracy, understood in recent years to include 
involving individuals in legal decisions that affect them (expressed as “a right to be 
heard”).  O’Connell also finds three ways in which the Court could go further to 
encourage, through its adjudication of human rights cases, a fuller conception of 
participation, the strongest of which is to insist on effective and even-handed 
consultation (O'Connell 2006, 4).   
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 Where “intentional communities” such as the Amish are concerned, what counts as an opportunity 
varies according to the type of education a child receives but not in the way we expect with 
mainstream society.  An Amish child who wishes to remain within the conservative part of the group 
might not have the opportunity to do so if she receives a conventional liberal education.  For this paper, 
however, I will leave out the discussion of special cases such as intentional communities which state 
explicitly that they do not wish to participate in mainstream society.  Here, I am concerned with groups 
that do wish to have opportunities for such participation, even if they wish it to be so in a way that 
respects their cultural norms and values.  For a fuller discussion of participation, see Crocker 2008, 
Sen 1999, Drèze and Sen 2002, United Nations Development Programme 2004, and any part of the 
substantial literature on development and participation.  For a critical discussion on deliberate 




Insistence on such provisions does not, of course, guarantee effective 
participation.  Members of the majority population might simply refuse to “participate 
with” Roma or other marginalized peoples.  But O’Connell’s propositions are aimed 
at government, not individuals, thus providing some level of accountability for 
upholding domestic and international law.  A strong role for the European Court 
would be, as O’Connell hopes, to use its powers of adjudication to expand the 
currently vague interpretation of the European Convention’s right to participation to 
include this fuller sense of participation as informed, consultative, even-handed, and 
most of all, effective.  Recognition and enforcement of a right to democratic 
participation understood in this way could, in time, go a long way to mitigating the 
danger, as described above, in forcing authorities to balance a test of “informed 
consent” with protecting against participation exclusion.  It also opens the door for 
Roma and other marginalized individuals to insist on meaningful and effective 
participation in decisions affecting them and their children. 
 
4. The Case Against Parental Consent 
 
Just as there is a powerful case to be made that we must respect the will of 
parents in decisions about their children’s education—a case grounded in 
international law, cultural liberty and respect for the dignity of individual parents, and 
the importance of encouraging minority participation in policy decisions—there is 
also a strong (I will argue stronger) case against it.  First, I will consider what forms 
of consent might reasonably be called “meaningful” and second, I will argue that 




as a legal or normative one—to a quality education directed toward the full 
development of her potential. 
 
4.1. Meaningful Consent:   Asymmetry, Critical Agency, and Adaptive 
Preference 
  
Many Roma face incredible structural disadvantages that limit the extent to 
which they are able to fully participate in policy decisions that affect them, even on 
the most local level.  Numerous recent reports underscore the extent of these 
disadvantages.  In 2005, the UNDP found that in the large majority of poor Roma 
families the head of the household is unemployed (United Nations Development 
Programme 2004).  The UNDP reported in 2003 that, on average, 15 percent of 
Central and Eastern European Roma are “constantly starving” (United Nations 
Development Programme 2002).  In the area of education, while little data exist to 
show changes of school attendance or literacy rates over time, there is evidence that 
literacy and education levels are falling among the population as a whole (Ringold 
2005).  And these figures say nothing of the rampant racism and discrimination many 
Roma continue to face.  Such evidence points to massive structural disadvantages that 
can compromise an individual’s ability to give “meaningful” or “informed” consent 
regarding the level and type of education her children receive.  These disadvantages 
include asymmetries—vis-à-vis the relevant authorities—in education and 





First, asymmetries in education arise from the fact that Roma—like many 
minorities and members of disadvantaged groups—consistently receive less 
(quantity) and poorer (quality) education than non-Roma.  Dramatic discrepancies 
between the educational levels of Roma and the (nearly always non-Roma) 
authorities with whom they must negotiate their children’s education, combined with 
many Romani adults’ experiences with prejudice, can result in asymmetries in 
confidence that can lead parents to feel they have little choice but to give their 
consent to (others’) decisions affecting their child.  Second, these asymmetries in 
education correlate closely with asymmetries in specific kinds of information.  A 
Romani parent may be less likely to have full information about the type and quality 
of education her child will receive.  Even if that parent is aware of the discrepancies 
in education quality, she is not likely to be aware of the civil and human rights both 
she and her child possess let alone how to demand recourse to their violation.   
 
A third disadvantage is a basic asymmetry in bargaining power, and is 
powerfully reinforced by daily interactions between Roma people and non-Roma 
authorities in the form of school administrators, police, government officials, and 
even health care providers (Center for Reproductive Rights 2003).  Without the 
education, information, and confidence to stand up to local authorities and demand 
that her child receive the same quality education as other children, a Romani parent 
faces a daunting power imbalance.  She may be at an extreme disadvantage when 




she has little background information, and recourse to which she is unaware of or 
unsure how to access.     
 
The combined force of these asymmetries—which, though they certainly do 
not exist between all Roma individuals and non-Roma authorities, are nevertheless 
very real and very widespread—leads us to ask:  Are the parents in these situations 
truly able to make fully informed and meaningful decisions?  Is their consent truly an 
exercise of their agency?  Better yet, do they possess what Jean Drèze and Amartya 
Sen have called “critical agency,” “not merely freedom and power to act, but also the 
freedom and power to question and reassess the prevailing norms and values” (Drèze 
and Sen 2002, 258)?  An important basis for such “freedom and power” is education, 
a luxury many Romani parents today were not themselves afforded, a fact that in 
itself constitutes a powerful argument for ensuring quality education for Romani 
youth.   
 
“Adaptive preferences” can also impact the content and limits of 
“meaningful” consent.  These refer to certain types of mental conditioning in which 
“the deprived people tend to come to terms with their deprivation because of the sheer 
necessity of survival, and they may, as a result, lack the courage to demand any 
radical change, and may even adjust their desires and expectations to what they 
unambitiously see as feasible” (Sen 1999, 63).  If a Romani parent agrees to her 
child’s being removed to a separate school for children with disabilities not because 




from the education system or because she feels she can demand less, then there are no 
circumstances under which that concession might be deemed “consent.”  (In Chapter 
IV I discuss in detail adaptive preference formation in education decisions.) 
 
4.2. Parental Prerogatives and Cultural Liberty 
 
There remains yet another argument against allowing governments to use 
parental consent to justify segregating minority students, an argument that applies not 
only to Roma but to minorities and marginalized groups everywhere.  This argument 
arises from what Feinberg formulates as a child’s “right to an open future.”  We must 
ask:  given the importance of recognizing the cultural rights of a parent, and assuming 
that the conditions for meaningful consent are satisfied, does a parent’s right to decide 
what's best for her children trump a child's right to a quality education, an “education 
[that] shall be directed to the full development of the human personality” (United 
Nations 1966[c], Article 13)?  I argue that it does not.  First, the whole idea of 
“cultural liberty” of all peoples—minority and otherwise—is to expand, not contract, 
choices and a limited or inferior education contracts the life choices of the recipient.
62
  
Second, for both pragmatic and normative reasons, rights against discrimination and 
to education are too important to be waived, for cultural or any other reason. 
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 As discussed in note 61 above, “intentional communities” that rely on limiting certain opportunities 
of their members in order to preserve their culture may be a special case, as there is a difference 
between marginalized minorities and those communities that express a collective will not to integrate 
into mainstream society.  This does not negate the rights of child members nor does it assume that they 
share the views of the community in this respect, but suffice to say that additional arguments are 




While international law recognizes “respect for the liberty of parents… to 
choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public 
authorities,” (United Nations 1966[c], Article 13) and asserts that “[w]ithin the 
framework of their education systems, the Parties shall recognise that persons 
belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their own 
private educational and training establishments” (Council of Europe 1995, Article 
13), these rights are limited.  Education is still subject to “such minimum educational 
standards as may be laid down or approved by the State” (United Nations 1966[c], 
Article 13).  Even where the state has implicitly “approved” (by not interfering with 
their continuation) the deliberate provision of dramatically sub-standard education to 
minority groups, international law still insists that real educational opportunities be 
offered that aim at a higher purpose than the mere provision of education, however 
thin.  The General Comment on Article 13 of the ICESCR reads: 
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means 
of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment right, education 
is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially 
marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and 
obtain the means to participate fully in their communities… But the 
importance of education is not just practical: a well-educated, 
enlightened and active mind, able to wander freely and widely, is one 
of the joys and rewards of human existence…  States parties agree that 
all education, whether public or private, formal or non-formal, shall be 
directed towards [these] aims... [E]ducation shall be directed to the 
human personality's "sense of dignity", it shall "enable all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society", and it shall promote 
understanding among all "ethnic" groups, as well as nations and racial 
and religious groups. (Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights 1999) 
 
While Article 13 does also protect the “liberty of parents” (see 13.3 and 13.4, quoted 




“subject always” to the provisions set out above.  An education so restrictive in scope, 
depth, or quality as to rob the student of the means to realize these goals (and, by 
extension, rob society of a means to achieve its larger objectives) can, in at least one 
important sense, be said to be contrary to the spirit and in many cases letter of 
international law.   
 
The concept of “cultural liberty” articulated by Sen, Kymlicka, and others in 
the 2004 Human Development Report (HDR), attempts to balance the idea of 
(multi)cultural rights with long-standing liberal conceptions of individual rights.  
Defending the right of individuals to make choices in line with their traditions and 
beliefs, and drawing heavily on Sen’s work in the Capability Approach, they explain 
cultural liberty as “the capability of people to live and be what they choose” (United 
Nations Development Programme 2004, 4).  But cultural liberty is not cultural 
determinism.  The report argues that “[p]eople want the freedom to participate in 
society without having to slip off their chosen cultural moorings” (United Nations 
Development Programme 2004, 10), but at the same time, “[c]ultural liberty is about 
expanding individual choices, not about preserving values and practices as an end in 
itself with blind allegiance to tradition” (United Nations Development Programme 
2004, 4).  One principal reason for this position, Kymlicka argues, is that human 
beings are constituted by more than a single, narrow cultural identity marker, and too 
often one identity might be expected to trump another at the expense of important 





The idea of cultural liberty which Kymlicka and the UNDP articulate, while 
stressing its case for “respecting diversity and building more inclusive societies” 
(United Nations Development Programme 2004, 2), is also uncompromising in its 
commitment to human rights.  Mark Malloch Brown makes this point explicit in his 
Foreword to the 2004 HDR:  “a girl’s right to an education will always trump her 
father’s claim to a cultural right to forbid her schooling for religious or other reasons” 
(United Nations Development Programme 2004, 3).  The same should be said of a 
parent who, probably with the best interests of the child in mind, exercises her right to 
place that child in a Roma-only school with the full knowledge that the education her 
child will receive may be so poor as to condemn her to a life of poverty and 
exclusion, as is almost always the case with graduates of these “special” schools 
(Greenberg 2010, Kosko 2004, United Nations Development Programme 2002, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2000).  “Cultural liberty” is 
meant to protect and expand individual choice and freedom, in part by protecting the 
rights of individuals to practice their traditions and preserve their cultures, but it 
should not be understood to protect an exercise of “cultural rights” that limit other 




More broadly, there is a strong argument for the principle that rights against 
discrimination and to education are too important to be waived.  The Court upheld 
this principle in D.H., siding with the applicants’ assertion that “there can be no 
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 Such a limit may or may not also apply to the self, as when an individual, in full knowledge of the 
consequences, chooses to limit her own freedom, but here I emphasize “others.” This concept does not 
allow, for example, a parent to permanently limit the freedoms of her child.  One idea I have tried to 
advance elsewhere is that agency must be sustainable.  Applied here, limiting a child’s education is a 




waiver of a child's right not to be racially discriminated against in education" 
(Hobcraft 2008, 253).  Education and anti-discrimination rights protect the laying of a 
foundation for the child's intellectual and personal development, ability and 
inclination to participate in public affairs and democratic decision making, and 
options in the labor and marriage markets.  At the same time, these rights can help 
create the conditions for a society that is tolerant, educated, democratic, able to 
compete in a global economy, and, importantly, just. 
  
But don’t parents also have rights?  Despite the side constraint mentioned 
above, Article 13 of the ICESCR does hold that States Parties must ensure “respect 
for the liberty of parents… to choose for their children schools, other than those 
established by the public authorities” (United Nations 1966[c], Article 13).  If all 
rights are inalienable, though, where does that leave us?  James Nickel argues that 
rights are not, in fact, all inalienable (Nickel 2006).  Clearly prisoners can lose their 
right to freedom of movement, for example.  This type of exception aside, isn’t it 
dangerous to dilute the “inalienable” quality of human rights as absolute side-
constraints?  And what of the argument that rights to education and freedom from 
discrimination are too important to be waived or trumped?  Nickel (2006) addresses 
this problem in detail but suffice to say here that we may be able to find a 
compromise.  No one can waive a right on your behalf, including your parents, so 
perhaps ensuring a child's right to education is inalienable means proscribing—or 
redefining—certain “rights” typically conferred upon parents.  How do we justify 





It is widely accepted that a parent does not ever have the right to kill, maim, 
torture, or otherwise seriously harm her child.  Diminishing the quality of a child's 
education so much that it does irreparable damage to that child's life prospects, 
limiting her future agency and possibly condemning her to a life of grinding poverty 
or humiliation, similarly should be seen a form of harm, or at the very least, risk of 
harm.
64
  Joel Feinberg refers to this as a violation of the child’s “right to an open 
future,” which he sees as a kind of “anticipatory autonomy right.”  This right insists 
that the valuable options between which the child might, as an adult, one day choose, 
must be kept open until such a time as she is “a fully formed self-determining adult 
capable of choosing among them” (Feinberg 1980, 126).  She must be “permitted to 
reach maturity with as many open options, opportunities and advantages as possible” 
(Feinberg 1980, 130), or, at least, as reasonably possible.  There are limits, then, on 
the restrictions (and, in Feinberg's view, even influence) under which a parent should 
be permitted to place a child.  An overly restrictive upbringing—or more specifically, 
in this case, restrictive education—constitutes a real harm and a violation of that 
child’s right to an open future or, put another way, to the preconditions for autonomy.  
There is no comparable harm done to the parent by limiting her right to make 
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 While there is some debate about what constitutes “serious harm,” such as exposing a child to the 
risk of bodily harm by allowing her to ride a dirt bike, even such an exception is not without 
limitations.  Parents are still often required to ensure that the child wears a helmet in order to limit the 
risk.  Similarly with education, a parent might home-school a child and perhaps that education will 
carry greater risk of limiting that child’s opportunities than other forms of education, but there are 
limits to what that education might comprise.  In European countries, where the quality of education is 
otherwise fairly high, there is substantial evidence (Greenberg 2010, United Nations Development 
Programme 2002, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2000) that the limited 
curriculum and poor teaching quality found in many “special schools” for the Roma constitute 
similarly serious harm.  Of course, an upbringing free from any parental constraints or protections 
might also compromise future autonomy, but for now I will leave aside the empirical question—What 
are the best ways to nurture future autonomy?— and say only that objectively poor quality education is 




decisions about her child’s education, for cultural or practical reasons.  A “trade-off” 
might therefore be necessary, though it is a trade-off between two very different types 
of rights, a “fundamental” right to education, on the one hand, and a weaker 
“stewardship” right, on the other.
65
  (While future research might canvass the 
arguments for and against the presumptive superiority of fundamental individual 
rights over stewardship rights, and consider also the possibility of their equal moral 
urgency, I am working here from the strong intuition that a right that one possesses by 
virtue of being a unique individual is stronger than a right that one might possess by 
virtue of having some responsibility for the well-being of another human being.) 
 
A final point should be made regarding the possibility that state intervention 
against a parent’s wishes might, if the child remains in the home, in the end do more 
harm than good if it sufficiently disrupts the parent-child relationship.
66
  We might 
also reasonably assume that a parent who is willing to limit her child's future agency 
in a way that does irreparable damage might also, even if unintentionally, bring about 
such harm through means other than just limiting the child's education. Such a 
situation should trigger an intervention from social services, but not a waiver of the 
child's fundamental rights.  We should uphold a general principle of protection with 
contingencies—if the harms or anticipated harms are modest—for exceptional cases 
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 This said, the cultural survival of certain insular peoples (including both intentional communities and 
many indigenous groups) may depend in part on the parental right to control a child’s education and 
other aspects of her upbringing.  Though Roma are not considered “indigenous peoples” and few 
Roma communities would be considered “intentional” or “insular” in the sense of not desiring 
integration, in future research I will consider the consequences of my argument for such groups and 
argue that the applicable international laws can help us to navigate the limits of parental control of 
education more generally. 
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  Clearly in cases of physical abuse, for example, state intervention might harm the parent-child 




in which it might result in a harmful home environment that would in other ways 
compromise the welfare, and possibly future life prospects, of the child.  But it would 
be very dangerous to allow the exceptional cases to negate the fundamental rights.  
Determining the need for, and type of, intervention in such cases is a matter for social 
policy. 
 
5. The Case for a Threshold 
 
I have so far made a case both for and against the role of parental consent (or 
prerogative) in educational decisions affecting their children.  The three European 
Court of Human Rights cases examined here show that this problem is not just 
philosophical, but legal and practical.  Pivotal in all three decisions was the role of 
parental consent in a finding of discrimination in the provision of education, yet these 
decisions, at least until Oršuš 2008 was overturned in 2010, are contradictory.  Even 
with the Court’s reconsideration in the third case, local implementation of the Court’s 
orders remain largely unfulfilled and there is still no clear sense of when parental 
decisions should be overridden.  There is a need, therefore, for clarification of the role 
of parental consent in education decisions.  I will argue that there is a delicate balance 
that must be struck:  parental consent is important and should be sought, but below a 
certain threshold of harm, it neither trumps the child's right to education nor justifies 
discrimination in the provision of that education.  The precise location of such a 
threshold should be discovered locally through broad-based public deliberation, 




albeit with meaningful consultation with the affected parties as well as substantial 
information, information the Court sought and used in D.H. but baldly ignored in 
Oršuš 2008.  There are two justifications for identifying such a threshold:  normative 
and pragmatic.  We might also classify these as deontological and consequentialist. 
 
5.1. The Deontological Justification for a Threshold 
 
Henry Shue argues that human rights, or “basic rights,” do not delimit the 
heights to which human beings might aspire, but rather the depths below which we 
must not (or must not be allowed to) fall.  This “moral minimum” is the foundation of 
a minimally just society (Shue 1980, ix).  Martha Nussbaum articulates a similar 
concept.  She endorses Sen’s Capability Approach, but takes it a step further, 
proposing “a definite list of the most central capabilities,” as the only way “to 
elaborate a partial account of social justice, a set of basic entitlements without which 
no society can lay claim to justice” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 36).  She emphasizes that 
her list of basic capabilities is “tentative and revisable” yet she warns that none can be 
dispensed with entirely, as “some human matters are too important to be left to whim 
and caprice, or even to the dictates of a cultural tradition” (Nussbaum 2003, 47), or to 
majority rule.   
  
I propose that the “threshold” for consent be conceived in a similar way, as 
demarcating a minimum standard of protection for the child (understood as rights or 
capabilities) that must be satisfied no matter the objection of the parents, teachers, or 




restrictive, or insufficient education, for example) outweighs the harm done to the 
overridden authority.  An education, even one consented to by a parent, that will 
foreseeably confine a child to a life of poverty and deprivation (including agency 
deprivation) is a violation of that child's right to education as well as an affront to her 
human dignity.  A certain level of educational quality, one that would afford the real 
opportunity for the child to develop her agency freedom and capabilities to their 
fullest, must be satisfied.  This insistence is grounded partly in the importance of 
sustainable agency, which requires a minimum standard of education for its 
development.  Applied here, limiting a child’s education is a limit on her future 
agency and a violation of this principle. 
 
Above this threshold, however, respect for the agency of the parents is a 
matter of human dignity.  Moreover, parents have a cultural right—“cultural liberty,” 
in Kymlicka’s sense—to choose the type of education their children receive.  This is 
not a tossing aside of rights or capabilities, rather an acknowledgment that once the 
threshold conditions are met, there is an important role for parental consent.  First, it 
can help protect the rights of minorities, as laid out in various ways in international 
laws.
67
  Second, the assumption that any individual is unfit to make essential 
parenting decisions (in the absence of strong evidence) is arrogant and insulting.  This 
is an especially dangerous assumption if it is based largely on the individual’s 
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 These include, to name but a few, the rights of minorities (indeed of all human beings) to “freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations 1966[b], 1966[c], 2007), to 
“freedom of thought, conscience and religion,… to freedom of opinion and expression” (United 
Nations 1966[b], 1966[c]), “to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential 
elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage” (Council of 
Europe 1995), and to be protected “from policies or practices aimed at assimilation… against their will 




membership in a demographic group.  Overriding the will of a Romani parent, with or 
without doubts about her ability to make meaningful decisions, is difficult to justify 
except in the event that failing to do so would expose the child to a ghettoized 
education that would permanently limit her freedom and well-being, and reduce the 
quality of her life.  This in no way means that it is easy to demarcate where exactly 
that threshold of “harm” would be.  It may be different in different cases, and a 
variety of factors will have to be considered before any judgment can be made.  This 
is a good thing, as it may force public discussion where previously there had been 
none. 
5.2. The Consequentialist Justification for a Threshold 
 
Concern for the welfare and fundamental rights of all children is the strongest 
justification for articulating a threshold to protect them against harm, but, to the 
extent that the authorities from Strasbourg down to the local municipality value 
democracy and human development, there is a secondary, pragmatic (by which I here 
mean consequentialist) argument for clarifying the role and limits of parental consent.  
If the authorities are legally compelled to develop a strong case demonstrating that 
their decision has met the threshold conditions before justifiably separating a child 
from the mainstream school, then there is strong likelihood that they will be forced to 
engage the parents and possibly the whole community in order to justify their 
decision.  While far from perfect in the presence of such asymmetries mentioned 
above (in education and confidence, information, and bargaining power), such 
engagement engenders public discussion and deliberation and can in time be one of 




favor of clarifying—with a kind of legal threshold—the role and limits of parental 
consent is in part grounded in the importance of public discussion, minority 
participation in governance decisions, democracy, and development objectives. 
 
Regardless of whether the child's right to education ultimately trumps a 
parent's or school official's authority to make a decision on that child’s behalf, there is 
an especially important role for public discussion (with the parents or anyone else 
concerned) in identifying where that threshold might be and how the specifics of the 
situation will affect it.  David A. Crocker argues that (non-elite) deliberative 
participation, is the “thickest” form of democratic decision-making, both inherently 
valuable and an important tool for development.  “Authentic development occurs 
when groups at whatever level become subjects who deliberate, decide, and act in the 
world rather than being either victims of circumstance or objects of someone else’s 
decisions, the tool of someone else’s designs” (Crocker 2008, 339).  Crocker credits 
development ethicist Denis Goulet with defending such deliberative participation on 
instrumental grounds.  He argues that “[t]he right kind of participation, at least its 
‘upstream’ variety, is likely to have good consequences in reducing poverty, 
expanding solidarity, and strengthening self-reliance” (Crocker 2008, 340).  These are 
desirable consequences that should be of interest not only to the marginalized parents 






Minority participation in governance decisions can not only have agency- and 
wellbeing-enhancing consequences, it is also argued to be an important element in 
policy transformation, which in turn helps to build stronger, more democratic 
societies.
68
  In the case where a minority group is not well organized or is only 
minimally politically active, there are less likely to be policy changes in their favor.  
Melanie Ram, in her detailed case study of post-transition policy changes in the 
Czech Republic and Romania, found that “the Roma… have not been very organized 
or politically active as a cohesive minority group, and thus were less effective at 
pressing their concerns with their government or with the EU” (Ram 2003, 47).  
Roma involvement in deliberation about parental consent for “special schools” can 
challenge a government’s view that such consent is a defense against discrimination, 
and may one day help to bring an end to the practice of separating Romani students 





The process of articulating the role and limits of consent can also instigate a 
virtuous cycle of participation and education.  Just as political participation and 
public discussion have been shown to have positive democratic and development 
outcomes, education has been shown to have an impact on political participation.  
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 For now, we can take for granted that democracy should be a goal in and of itself, since European 
institutions are firmly and explicitly committed to democracy. 
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 For the purpose of this chapter, I assume that appropriate (or at least acceptable) venues for such 
deliberation can be identified.  Town hall meetings, parent-teacher associations, and other fora that 
bring together various stakeholders at a local level are good candidates.  Clearly, however, more needs 
to be said about the most appropriate mechanisms and venues for the kinds of participation I am 
suggesting.  The extensive literature on deliberative democracy and participatory development (see 
Crocker 2008 and references therein), as well as recent empirical studies, are good starting points.  I 




This makes the case for open deliberation about parental consent doubly important:  
not only does it deepen democracy, it plays an important role in ensuring quality 
education, which in turn reinforces the public participation and further deepens 
democracy. 
 
Political participation, research has consistently shown, increases 
monotonically with education (though perhaps this correlation depends upon the kind 
of education).  Education is the one socioeconomic characteristic most closely 
associated with likelihood to vote (Blais 2000); it has been shown to help citizens 
develop the skills of civic participation (Verba, Brady and Schlozman 1995); and it 
engenders a sense of civic duty (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980).  Meredith Rolfe 
also argues that individuals with more years of education are more likely to be 
politically tolerant and support racial and gender equality (Rolfe 2004).  All of these 
outcomes help set the basic conditions for poverty alleviation, the protection of 
human rights, and the realization of a more vibrant democracy, outcomes that 
authorities should be interested in on consequentialist (and practical!) grounds, even 
if they are not interested in whether Romani children receive a quality education or 
whether their parents play a meaningful role in the decisions. 
 
Until now, I have been arguing that a legal obligation on the part of local 
authorities to respect some kind of threshold for parental consent will engender a 
dialogue between parents and school authorities (as well as parent-teacher 




governments, and hopefully between Roma and non-Roma families in local 
communities. These changes in the scope and depth of “public discussion” are micro 
in scale and these processes will take time to gather speed and strength.  In the shorter 
term, however, the European Court itself has a role to play.  James Goldston argues 
that the very taking up of a controversial issue by the Court can help spark public 
discussion on a large scale, with benefits such as awareness of issues affecting 
minorities (Goldston 1999).   
 
Here I am referring to a kind of virtuous cycle, where the Court—seeing a 
need for clarification on the role of parental consent, as it is starting to do—takes up 
the case and hands down what is likely to be a controversial verdict insisting that 
school authorities respect the right of a child to a rich education.  The state and local 
government either acts or fails to act to identify locally-appropriate policies that 
ensure compliance.  Local activists, advocates, and the press begin to monitor the 
progress for evidence of that compliance (as is now happening in the Czech Republic 
and elsewhere).  Governments and schools now find themselves under the 
microscope.  A discussion begins.
70
  Such discussion, as I argue above, may have 
additional beneficial effects not only in terms of awareness of issues affecting the 
Roma (and other minorities) but also in terms of participation and democracy 
(Goldston 1999).  If no such discussion begins, or if it fails to identify a locally-
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 Of course, courts can err, but such a process might still be instigated by a “bad” judgment.  A court 
decision that is perceived as manifestly unjust by even some segment of society might still stir up 
public debate which might in time change public opinion and later result in “better” judgments.  The 
point is that courts can be catalysts for social change.  The trick, of course, is to ensure that that 
ensuing discussion includes the voices of those affected, especially the most marginalized members of 
the communities.  Describing the contours of effective, inclusive local deliberation, however, is a 




appropriate threshold for parental consent that meets the criteria I have discussed 
here, additional cases will inevitably make their way back through the courts, starting 
with local and state courts and working their way up to the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Evidence of exactly such a cycle is already apparent in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
 
Let me be clear, though, that public deliberation is not a substitute for Court 
action.  While public deliberation decides the precise contours of law, the rule of law 
sets boundaries on the outcomes of that deliberation, much in the way that Martha 
Nussbaum hopes that state constitutions will embrace her basic capabilities as 
minimum requirements for a life fully human (Nussbaum 2000).  While such 
limitations on the outcomes of public deliberation would fail to satisfy the robustly 
liberal demands of deliberative democrats such as Crocker, the state of Roma 
education in Europe today fails to satisfy even the most basic demands of justice.  In 
the long run, more democracy—not less—might indeed be the most just solution, but 
in the short run, as the virtuous cycle I have described above gradually takes its 
course, immediate action is required lest another “lost generation” of Roma youth 




Meanwhile, even if truly inclusive public deliberation concerning the exact 
location of the threshold takes immediate root, and results in robust protections for 
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 To be fair, Crocker agrees that deliberation, while in his view an intrinsic good, is not appropriate for 
all situations, such as when an elite uses it as a means of manipulating others.  In Ethics and Global 
Development he suggests four “enabling conditions” for effective and just deliberative decision-
making:  equal political liberty, equality before the law, economic justice (especially important in this 




both children and minority parents, the three Court cases cited here demonstrate the 
need for the Court to clarify its own position, which so far has been inconsistent.  I 
argue that that position should be to require demonstrated respect for a threshold 
below which the harm a child would suffer is so great that it cancels out a parent’s 
consent (informed or otherwise) to that harm.  This threshold helps us to strike a 
much-needed balance between the welfare and “future” agency rights of the child and 




Almost a decade into the twenty-first century, within the jurisdiction of the 
world’s most active human rights court, powerlessness, poverty, lack of participation, 
and lack of access to education continue to ensure that European Roma remain a 
people on the edge.  Despite two Court rulings defending the right to freedom from 
discrimination in education, a subsequent third ruling has demonstrated the pressing 
need for clarification on the role and limits of parental consent in ensuring that that 
freedom is protected.  Although the Grand Chamber has since over-turned this third 
ruling, bringing it in line with the other two, the ongoing controversy, and the lack of 
action on the part of governments charged with remedying the injustices of 
segregated schooling, reveal that the debate is hardly settled.  
 
Defending parental consent, I have made the case for why government 




rests 1) on legal arguments that parents have a right to control their children’s 
education and that “democratic participation” (in this case on the part of parents) is 
protected in the European Convention; 2) on the “cultural liberty” of all individuals; 
3) on respect for the human dignity and agency of parents; and 4) on the social 
importance of democratic participation and the need to guard against participation 
exclusion. 
 
Defending a limit on the reach of that consent, I have made the case for why 
parents might not have a right to impose on their children decisions that would 
proscribe their basic rights and that would contract rather than expand their future 
agency and well-being freedoms (that is, their capabilities).  I appeal to 1) the 
structural and informational disadvantages that limit certain individual's ability to 
give meaningful consent (disadvantages that lead us to ask whether the parent 
possesses “critical agency” or might perhaps be exhibiting adaptive preferences); 2) 
the human rights and capabilities of the child, arguing that cultural liberty is grounded 
in human rights and that certain rights are too important to be waived; and 3) a 
concept of “basic rights” or “central capabilities” that form a moral minimum below 
which we must not fall, such that a parent’s cultural and stewardship rights to decide 
what's best for her children do not trump, but in fact are trumped by, a child's basic 
right to education and to the full development of her capabilities. 
 
In light of these arguments, and given the inconsistent responses of the Court 




establish basic guidelines for a legal threshold for the use of the “parental consent” 
defense, and to demand that state and local governments—following and informed by 
inclusive and deep deliberation—enact laws and policies fleshing out and setting in 
place those guidelines in practice.  Its decision to overturn the 2008 Oršuš decision is 
encouraging in this respect.  An education—even one blessed with parental consent—
that will predictably confine a child to a life of poverty, powerlessness, and 
deprivation is not only a violation of that child's right to an education but also an 
affront to her human dignity.  Thus, the importance of human rights and the dignity 
and sustainable agency of the child delimit the lower side of the threshold:  below a 
certain level of educational quality, these concerns trump all others, including claims 
of the parent or school or religious officials to the contrary.  The importance of a 
parent’s agency delimits the upper side of the threshold:  above a certain level of 
educational quality, respect for the agency of the parent in making her own decisions 
is a cultural right and a matter of human dignity.   
 
In practice, the Court’s affirmation of the need to identify and respect such a 
threshold should press state and local officials to take seriously the effects of 
separating a child from a mainstream school.  In cases where this seems not to have 
been done, the Court remains a powerful arbiter, only with a clearer standard for 
evaluating the adequacy of the parental consent justification, a standard that more 
explicitly balances two important sets of concerns.  Determining where, in any given 
case, this threshold lies will be normatively and practically complex and must be 






  In the end, if that complexity forces school authorities, private 
citizens (especially minorities), and government officials at all levels to engage with 
one another in some form of public discussion, then the Court will have indirectly 
done at least part of its job in pushing member states towards the principles 
articulated in the founding statements of the Council of Europe:  “individual freedom, 
political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine 
democracy” (Council of Europe 1949, Preamble). 
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decision in protecting human rights.  As with the doctrine of margin of appreciation, the Court must 




IV. Educational Attainment and School-to-Work Conversion of 




Observing and reporting on the abysmally low education levels of European 
Roma has become a central concern of numerous European institutions and civil 
society groups, especially since the recent eastward expansion of the European Union 
has put the issue onto the accession states’ reform agendas.  Neither advanced 
statistical analysis nor a robust theoretical framework is needed to state conclusively 
that Roma are, on average, less educated than non-Roma.  Plausible explanations 
abound:  formal schooling is too expensive even when nominally “free;” 
discrimination in schools drives Roma children away; Roma “culture” does not value 
formal education; job prospects for educated Roma are poor. However, very little 
rigorous analytical work has been done to test these hypotheses and to try to 
disentangle the drivers of low educational attainment among Roma.
74
  Even less 
theoretical work has sought to understand the possible motivations and constraints 
Roma face in pursuing education.  Observing an obvious outcome and merely 
postulating its root causes are poor foundations for policy making.  What happens to 
Roma educational attainment when we control for poverty, for example?  Equally 
important, is formal schooling something that Roma value and have reason to value? 
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 This chapter is a revised version of a paper that is forthcoming in the Journal of Human 
Development and Capabilities, Routledge. 
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 “Educational attainment” denotes the highest grade level completed.  This is distinct from 





Both Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2000) argue, in their 
respective versions of the Capability Approach, that education is vitally important, 
intrinsically and instrumentally.  It builds the skills and knowledge necessary to 
choose a wider range of functionings and to perceive the scope of possible choices.  It 
can also be a good in itself, whether or not it results in satisfaction or other good 
consequences.  However, educational preferences, like other preferences, can be 
“adaptive.”  Sen describes adaptive preference as a type of mental conditioning in 
which “the deprived people tend to come to terms with their deprivation because of 
the sheer necessity of survival, and they may, as a result, lack the courage to demand 
any radical change, and may even adjust their desires and expectations to what they 
unambitiously see as feasible” (Sen 1999, 63).   
 
Some scholars (Bridges 2005, Bridges 2006, Watts 2009) have argued that 
individuals from certain backgrounds might see secondary or higher education as 
unfeasible for them, and thus might come to “prefer” not to pursue further education 
even when it is technically available to them.  David Bridges clarifies that, “[t]hey 
may experience their decision as a free choice, but it is one which has been adapted to 
the limited options set by their circumstances:  it is, in this sense, an ‘adaptive 
preference’” (Bridges 2006, 15).  Bridges also cautions that we ought not to assume 
that all choices not to pursue further education are necessarily evidence of adaptation, 
at least not of the type that might provoke intervention (Bridges 2005).  Moreover, 
Donald Bruckner argues, even adaptive preferences can be worthy of our respect, as 




contingent causal genesis of a preference does not automatically make it irrational” 
(Bruckner 2009, 323).  A choice to become, for example, a bricklayer, may be 
“rational” in Bruckner’s sense, still “adaptive” in Bridges’s, and yet not 
“inappropriately adaptive” in Serene Khader’s sense, in which such preferences run 
counter to our basic human flourishing and might be candidates for preference 
transformation interventions (Khader 2011). 
 
Michael Watts argues that, when evaluating the education choices of lower-
income individuals, we should not assume that the choice to forego higher education 
is evidence of significant adaptation; rather we should ask whether those individuals 
nevertheless exercised their own agency and pursued their own well-being ends but 
through different means.  We should fetishize higher education no more than we 
should commodities.  “The capability approach is not simply concerned with the 
acquisition of more and more (educational) resources but with the freedoms 
individuals have to use the resources they have to choose and lead lives they value 
and have reason to value” (Watts 2009, 434-5).  While an educated mind is certainly 
intrinsically valuable, most individuals—including Sen and Nussbaum—seem to 
value education more for its instrumental ability to enhance our well-being and 
expand other aspects of our capability sets, valuable “ends” of their own.  If we can 
achieve these ends in a less costly way, we may have good reason to prefer that.  
Moreover, if our expectations for our feasible level of future well-being are 
dampened by adaptive preferences, we may be even less inclined to invest in extra 




might adapt their preferences according not only to what they see as feasible means 
for improving their lives (How much education can I afford?), but also as feasible 
ends of education (How will it benefit me?  How comfortable can I hope to be?). 
 
Turning this perspective to the case of the European Roma, collectively and 
more pejoratively known as “Gypsies,” we might address the question that for so long 
dominated the Roma education policy debate:  Do Roma value education?  Decades 
of policies aimed at helping Roma parents to “appreciate” the value of education 
might have missed the point.  Perhaps the question is not whether Roma—or any 
others—value education, or even whether they can afford it, but whether they have 
reason to value it.  Much analysis focuses on the adaptive preference among lower-
income individuals to consume less education because it is seen as unfeasible, but my 
analysis asks whether some individuals might revise downward not only their 
perception of the feasibility of further education, but of its instrumental value based 
on an anticipated best-case future.  If one is not rewarded by more choices and 
improved well-being, then the adaptation is not just to the perceived feasibility of the 
investment, but to the expected returns, regardless of whether one would, in fact, 
value those expanded choices and enhanced well-being if they were attainable.  
Policies, then, might focus less on patronizingly encouraging Roma to “value” 
education, and more on giving them a reason to do so.  While policy has indeed 






1.1. The Roma 
 
Europe’s largest ethnic minority (conservative estimates range from 10 to 12 
million),
75
 Roma are also among its poorest and fastest growing populations.  Having 
suffered centuries of discrimination and marginalization, many Roma now find 
themselves trapped by cycles of poverty and unemployment, which in turn further 
their social and economic exclusion.  The expansion of the European Union into some 
of the more heavily Roma-populated countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE)—most recently Romania, boasting Europe’s largest Roma population—has 
forced the status of the Roma to the forefront of the development, human rights, and 
anti-discrimination policies required for accession.  Their exclusion is increasingly a 
focus of economic concern as well.  A 2010 World Bank study estimated the would-
be gains of Roma economic inclusion in Romania to range from 887 million Euro to 
2.9 billion Euro annually, depending on the size of the Roma population estimate 
used (World Bank 2010, 17).  The situation, however, remains grim. 
 
In the large majority of poor Roma families in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
head of the household is unemployed (United Nations Development Programme 
2005[a]), and in countries surveyed for a 2004 UN health report, more than 50 
percent of Roma respondents admitted that there was “never” enough food for the 
entire family, and 15 percent responded that they “are constantly struggling with 
starvation” (United Nations Development Programme: Romania 2004).  Roma life 
expectancy, in comparison to non-Roma living in the same area, can be as much as 17 
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years lower (United Nations Development Programme: Romania 2004).
76
   Though 
little data exist to show changes in school attendance or literacy rates over time, there 
is evidence that literacy and education levels are falling (Ringold 2005).  Educational 
attainment is considerably lower within Roma populations than non-Roma, and 
regular reports by governments and NGOs reveal that, despite comprehensive 
national-level strategies such as Romania’s Governmental Strategy for Improvement 
of the Condition of Roma, educational outcomes for Roma are not improving or, 
according to some, are improving at an abysmally slow rate measured mostly in terms 
of declining failure rates rather than actual learning outcomes (Open Society Institute, 
2007).  Meanwhile, widespread segregation of Romani children into separate schools, 
or schools for the learning disabled, continues despite European court rulings and, in 
some places, national legislation prohibiting it (Greenberg 2010, Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 2000, Kosko 2004). 
 
Slight improvements in Roma educational attainment are hardly heartening, 
given their very low starting point.  In 2007, just 0.8 percent of Romania’s non-Roma 
population under the age of 40 had no education at all, compared with 20.9 percent of 
the Roma population.  Figures for those with only a fifth grade education were two 
percent and 23.1 percent, respectively.   The gap closes only slightly for individuals 
with an eighth grade education: 18.7 percent of non-Roma and 38.2 percent of Roma.  
Meanwhile, the compulsory school abandonment rate
77
 for the whole population 
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 Figure for Roma women in Slovakia, compared to non-Roma women in the same area (United 
Nations Development Programme: Romania 2004) 
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tripled in the decade between 1993/94 and 2004/05, rising from 0.6 percent to 1.7 
percent (Open Society Institute 2007). 
 
Existing reports, though, while descriptively thorough and often well 
researched, rely for their analysis on observed and intuitive associations between 
Roma status and human development outcomes such as educational attainment and 
poverty.  For example, the 2007 OSI report, citing the cost of keeping a child in 
school, makes a strong case that “a clear connection exists between the economic 
status of Roma and the educational attainment of their children” (Open Society 
Institute 2007, 332).  To my knowledge, however, only one published work to date 
has investigated whether the raw difference in educational attainment between Roma 
and non-Roma remains once differences in economic status—and other factors that 
also might be correlated with education—are accounted for, and this work only 
covered individuals educated entirely or partially before the transitions from 
communism in Southeastern Europe.
78
  Moreover, this analysis again assumes that 
one’s preference is adapted according only to the affordability of education now, and 
not according to the expected enhancement of capabilities and well-being later. 
 
There is also little systematic research on the attitudes of individual Roma and 
how these might impact life choices.  One survey, however, does investigate attitudes 
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 In a recent paper in the International Journal of Manpower, Niall O'Higgins (2010) explores 
determinants of educational attainment among Roma but restricts his sample to individuals who were 
born between 1940 and 1979, so most received their entire education in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II or (at least partially) under communism, making it difficult to apply the study to today’s 
education systems.  In order to make this paper as policy-relevant as possible, I examine only 




(though it does not try to connect them to actual outcomes).  In 2002, the UNDP and 
ILO jointly surveyed 5,034 Roma, and collected the findings into the report The 
Roma in Central and Eastern Europe:  Avoiding the Dependency Trap.
79
  The 
collected data point to substantial perceived discrimination and an overall sense of 
hopelessness about the future as well as a perception that education, while perhaps 
valuable in its own right, is not among the most important factors in one’s success 
(United Nations Development Programme 2002).  The reported attitudes are 
consistent with Watt’s argument that when looking at adaptive preferences, the 
relevant evaluative space is what one seeks to achieve (“success”), and not how one 
seeks to achieve it (“education” versus “hard work”).  The 2002 UNDP/ILO survey 
found that only 27 percent of Roma in Romania felt that a good education was among 
“the three major conditions in order to succeed in life.”  Even fewer (11 percent) 
placed professional skills in this basket.  Hard work (54 percent) and good luck (61 
percent), together with good health (67 percent), were perceived to be most 
important.  When asked “What are your children's life chances in comparison with 
the majority of children in the country?” across six life dimensions where 1 is 
“higher,” 2 is “the same,” and 3 is “lower,” mean responses were most pessimistic in 
response to “to find a job” (mean of 2.6), though all means were above 2 (United 
Nations Development Programme 2002).  
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 During the research phase of this essay, the complete data from the UNDP/ILO survey could be 
accessed on http://roma.undp.sk, but access is now restricted.  I have therefore cited the resulting 
report in which the aggregated, analyzed results were ultimately published, although my own figures 




When asked “What could be the main three justifiable reasons for a boy from 
your household not to attend school?” the answers of the Romanian Roma in the 
UNDP/ILO survey strongly supported the hypothesis that poverty is at least one 
related factor, while also refuting the suggestion that many Roma parents wish to 
keep their children out of school for cultural or other reasons.  Of the 15 possible 
reasons given for keeping a boy child home, only two were given by more than 20 
percent of respondents:  “he does not have decent clothes” (52 percent) and “I would 
not stop my child from going to school under any conditions” (31 percent).  These 
were followed by "even if he attends, he will be unemployed anyway" (17 percent) 
and “the teachers treat him badly at school” (16 percent).  Only six percent answered 
“He has already learned what is necessary to progress in life” and only five percent 
responded that “children do not learn the really important things at school.”  The 
results were similar for girls, except that 16 percent also responded that “she has to 
help in raising the younger children,” an indication of the influence of poverty as well 
as gender roles in girl child education decisions.  Finally, of those who reported 
having difficulty finding a job, 56 percent attributed this to their “ethnic affiliation” 
compared to 43 percent who attributed it to “insufficient qualification,” pointing to 
substantial perceived discrimination in the job market (United Nations Development 
Programme 2002).   Together these survey responses reveal a population the majority 
of which, on the one hand, do not feel that good education is as important to succeed 
in life as hard work, good luck, and good health, but on the other hand, still want to 
send their children to school (at least provided they have “decent clothes”), puzzling 
findings for those in the “Roma culture does not value education” camp.
80
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What, then, is the real story behind Romania’s quest to meet the second 
Millennium Development Goal:  “to ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling,” Roma 
children included (United Nations 2008)?  Using 2002 data from Romania’s most 
recent census, this chapter examines and seeks to explain the educational attainment 
of Roma in Romania.
81
  I focus on completion of primary education, defined as 
through eighth grade.
82
  I hypothesize that the high immediate opportunity cost of 
education (due to the extreme poverty many Roma face) combined with perceptions 
of low returns to education (due to high unemployment levels and low average 
wages) decrease the incentive to stay in school and can result in a rational calculus to 
drop out.
83
  Put in Capability terms, I hypothesize that the adaptive preferences of 
Roma—preferences not only about the immediate feasibility of additional education 
                                                                                                                                                                     
succeed in life.”  It may well be that what many readers of this survey understand as economic or 
professional success is not how some respondents understand a successful life, further underscoring the 
need for caution in assigning meaning to Roma individuals’ idea of what constitutes the “good life.”  
Although it is very possible that two thirds of Romanian Roma do not believe that good education is 
one of the three main constituents of economic success, particularly given the employment analysis 
conducted later in this paper, it may also be that if the question asked explicitly about economic or 
professional success, the responses would have differed. 
81
 Census of Romanian Population and Households from 2002. 
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 The Romanian government considers grades 1-8 to consist of “elementary school” (I-IV) and “junior 
secondary education” (V-VIII).  Here, “primary school” is grades 1-8, which, at the time I extracted 
the data (October, 2008), the compilers of this data set (IPUMSI) used for the purposes of international 
standardization.  In Romania in 2002, education was compulsory through grade eight, or 
approximately 14 years of age, though data reveal that many students are closer to 17 when they 
complete eighth grade.  While it is impossible to know the age at which each individual completed 
primary school, age group analysis shows that no one who was 13 at census time had completed 
primary school; for 14-year-olds, this figure is 7.9 percent, 64.3 for 15-year-olds, and 86.4 for 16-year-
olds; the percentages level off at around 90 percent for ages 17-20.  Thus, many students complete 
primary school at 15 or 16, but few finish who have not done so by then. 
83
 This is, of course, only part of the story.  There is much anecdotal evidence of other barriers Roma 
face in enrolling and remaining in school, including being turned away at registration, incorrect 
assumptions about a child’s eligibility for school or the cost of school, mistreatment or neglect by 
teachers and other students, and sometimes parents’ preferences.  All of these barriers, however, would 




(adaptation to the available means for achieving the good life) but also about the 
long-term benefits available to them (adaptation to the available ends)—might lead 
them to perceive less of a reason to value education, whatever else they might value. 
 
2. Predicting Educational Attainment: Previous Work 
 
What does the literature suggest might be the main predictors of educational 
attainment for Roma?  I have not been able to find any systematic attempts to isolate 
the variables contributing to Romani educational attainment in Romania, though 
sociological research in the United States and recent education research in the 
developing world offer good starting points.  Evidence from the United States 
suggests race as an important factor in explaining disparities between the attainment 
rates of different ethnic groups (Porter 1974), although several studies show that race 
gaps disappear or even reverse if endowments (family income and family 
background, including parents’ education and number of siblings, among others) and 
scholastic ability are accounted for (Portes and Wilson 1976, Cameron and Heckman 
2001).  Findings from developing countries echo the importance of household 
income
84
 (Tansel 1998, Filmer and Pritchett 1999, Behrman and Knowles 1999) and 
of parental education (Tansel 1998, Mani, Hoddinott, and Strauss 2009). 
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Aspirations can also play an important role, particularly for disadvantaged 
groups.  Amartya Sen argues that we make education decisions according to the 
extent to which we have reason to value that education, both in terms of its costs and 
benefits now, and its ability to expand our capability set and enhance our well-being 
later. This cost-benefit analysis underlies the influential human capital model 
according to which individuals will evaluate the direct and indirect costs (such as 
income foregone) of education against its expected return (Schultz 1960, Becker 
1964, Mincer 1974).  Sen links this theory to aspirations:  if our expected best-case 
future is dampened by adaptation to what we “unambitiously see as feasible” (Sen 
1999, 63), this has serious implications for our cost-benefit analysis and highlights the 
importance of recognizing possible preference adaptation both to the means and ends 
of achievement. Existing empirical evidence supports this view.  Portes and Wilson 
(1976) find self-esteem and educational aspirations to be important determinants of 
attainment among African American students (whereas parental status, measured 
ability, and school grades dominate among whites).  Gill and Reynolds (1999) find 
teacher expectations to have a strong effect on African American students’ reading 
and math outcomes through sixth grade. 
 
While the existing literature provides useful guides for understanding trends in 
Roma education, we cannot assume that existing research will be directly applicable 
to the Roma in Romania.  Their position is an uncommon one, as a desperately 
impoverished and marginalized population living within a relatively developed EU 




(2011) find that controlling for health, parenting, school fixed effects and family 
background all but eliminates the sizable Roma/non-Roma test score gaps in reading 
and math in Hungary.  Although this is in line with the above evidence, drivers of 
achievement differ from those of attainment, even as the former can be one driver of 
the latter.  Other studies investigate the role of Roma education as a predictor of 
employment or poverty or health, but, apart from O’Higgins, no published papers of 
which I am aware 1) uncover whether Roma, ceteris paribus, are less educated than 
non-Roma, and 2) examine what factors drive Roma educational attainment.  The 
implications for Romanian public policy—and development programs aimed at 
Romania—are very different depending on the source of the education gap, if it 
exists.  Language barriers, for example, require different policy solutions than lack of 
post-graduation employment opportunities. 
 
3. The Data 
 
The 2002 Population and Housing Census, conducted by the Romanian 
National Institute of Statistics, covers 99.83 percent of the population.  Collected 
through face-to-face interviews between March 18 and 27, 2002, all data are reported 
at the individual level.  The universe includes foreign citizens who had established 
“usual residence” more than a year before the census, and excludes Romanian 
citizens legally residing in Romania but who had left the country more than one year 




over was interviewed individually.  A single resident adult answered building, 
dwelling and household questions, including about any children under 14. 
 
The microdata used in this study are courtesy of the University of Minnesota’s 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International (IPUMSI).  The self-weighting 
IPUMSI sample was generated by selecting every tenth household in the census after 
a random start, yielding a total of 2,137,967 observations, of which 1,910,201 
individuals (89.35 percent) are categorized as Romanian, 141,659 (6.63 percent) as 
Hungarian, and 52,619 (2.46 percent) as Gypsy (here, “Roma”).
85
  The remaining 
33,488 individuals (1.57 percent) report their identity as belonging to one of a number 
of other minority groups.  The key variables used in this study are described in Annex 
1.  I also give summary statistics for each, for the entire sample and the restricted 
sample I use in Section 4. 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics:  education, employment, and poverty 
 
Evidence from numerous surveys, including the large-scale surveys that 
resulted in Faces of Poverty, Faces of Hope (United Nations Development 
Programme 2005[a]) and Avoiding the Dependency Trap (United Nations 
Development Programme 2002), points to stunning deprivation among European 
Roma and equally stunning levels of inequality between Roma and non-Roma.  Data 
                                                          
85
 Hungarians, followed by Roma, represent the largest ethnic minority in Romania.  Many estimates 
put the number of Roma at several times the census figure, closer to 5-10 percent.  Though the data set 
uses the term “Gypsy” (Romanian: Ţigan), I will use “Roma.”  There is much variation in the 
understanding of both terms and not all individuals embrace the term Roma (though far fewer embrace 
the Romanian Ţigan).  In using the Romani (“Gypsy” language) term, I am following both standard 




on key well-being and education variables from the 2002 Romanian census 
corroborate that evidence (Table 5).  The data show that Roma are on average 
younger than non-Roma (24 versus 38 years old), less likely to speak Romanian as a 
first language (51 percent versus 91 percent), and have more of their own children 
living at home (almost 2 to 1).
86
  They are also less likely to be married, separated, 
divorced or widowed, possibly due to the difference in the age profiles of the 
populations.  Roma are also more likely to live in rural areas. 
 
Regarding variables that proxy for long-term levels of wealth and income 
(which are not available in the census data), the data show that 98 percent of non-
Roma have electricity, compared to 84 percent of Roma.  Figures for sewage disposal 
fall to 53 and 16 percent, respectively.  Roma also live in much smaller homes; 
average living area per person is 16 square meters for non-Roma, but less than eight 
for Roma.  The figures for education are also dramatically different.  The census 
shows that non-Roma are far more likely to complete primary school than Roma (82 
to 37 percent); 55 and 9 percent, respectively, finish secondary school; and 98 percent 
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 It is likely that many more Romanian Roma speak Romanian as a first language than this figure 
suggests.  In all probability, those Roma who speak Romanian as a first language are more able to 
convincingly report that they are ethnically Romanian or some other ethnicity.  Thus, the large share of 
Roma who are recorded in the census as non-Roma very likely do not speak Romani as a first 
language. 
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Finally, though 52 percent of non-Roma are “employed” according to census 
calculations, only 27 percent of Roma are employed; for heads of household, these 
Table 5: Comparative Descriptive Statistics, Non-Roma and Roma (t-tests) 
 Non-Roma Roma Difference (SE) 
Age 37.78 24.20 13.58*** 
   (0.0960) 
Lang: Romanian 0.919 0.514 0.405*** 
   (0.00124) 
Female 0.515 0.499 0.0159*** 
   (0.00221) 
Single 0.381 0.723 -0.342*** 
   (0.00214) 
Married 0.492 0.224 0.268*** 
   (0.00220) 
Separated 0.0381 0.0142 0.0238*** 
   (0.000838) 
Widowed 0.0890 0.0391 0.0499*** 
   (0.00125) 
Num. Children 0.97 1.72 -.754*** 
   (0.0070515) 
Urban 0.525 0.382 0.143*** 
   (0.00220) 
Electricity 0.982 0.840 0.142*** 
   (0.000636) 
Sewage 0.532 0.157 0.375*** 
   (0.00219) 
PP Living Area 15.96 7.739 8.226*** 
   (0.0487) 
Literate†† 0.977 0.724 0 .254*** 
   (0.0008817) 
Edu:  NIU 0.101 0.240 -0.139*** 
   (0.00135) 
Edu:  < Primary 0.183 0.634 -0.452*** 
(age >16)   (0.0022382) 
Edu:  Primary††† 0.817 0.366 0.4516*** 
(age > 16)   (0.0022382) 
Edu:  Secondary 0.549 0.091 0.4587*** 
(age > 19)   (0.0030174) 
Edu:  University 0.086 0.022 0.0840*** 
(age > 22)   (0.0018067) 
Edu:  Unknown 0.0130 0.0260 -0.0130*** 
   (0.000506) 
Employed‡ 0.518 0.273 0.245*** 
   (0.00283) 
Unemployed 0.0694 0.113 -0.0433*** 
   (0.00145) 
Inactive 0.413 0.614 -0.202*** 
   (0.00279) 
Unemployed‡‡ 0.118 0.292 -0.174*** 
     (excl. inactive)   (0.00296) 
Head Employed 0.5401 0.3776 0.1311*** 
   (0.0022052) 
***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1  
†The t-test for this variable, “number of own children living at home,” was run only for individuals ages 16-50. 
††T-test restricted to individuals age 15 and up; †††Figure indicates individuals with only this level of education; ‡ All five 
employment variables are for individuals ages 15-65; ‡‡This is the conventional definition of “unemployed”: the ratio of 




figures rise to 54 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
88
  However, though the 
employment rate can be understood as the percent of individuals who were “working” 
at the time of the census, its complement is not the unemployment rate, since these 
means are calculated across the population and, while they do exclude children under 
15 and seniors over 65, they do not exclude housewives, the disabled, discouraged 
workers or other groups who are not active in the labor market.89  More telling is the 
unemployment (excluding inactive) rate and the inactive rate itself:  12 percent of 
non-Roma are unemployed by the conventional definition, compared to 29 percent of 
Roma.  Meanwhile, 41 percent of non-Roma between 15 and 65 are not in the labor 
market at all, compared to 61 percent of Roma.  This may be in part due to the fact 
that Roma between the ages of 15 and 50 have almost twice as many of their own 
children living at home as do non-Roma.  This means that large families who might 
otherwise pay for childcare could be unable to do so, requiring a parent or older 
sibling to give up paid labor to care for young children.90 
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 The employments tests were restricted to individuals ages 15-65.  A 2010 World Bank report found 
that 69 percent of Roma men in Romania now work, the same share as in the majority population and a 
heartening sign of progress.  However, only 31 percent of Roma women are now employed, 24 
percentage points below the rate for majority women.  But Roma still earn far less. “Labor earnings for 
individual employed Roma in Romania are a mere 39 percent of the labor earnings for employed non-
Roma” (World Bank, 2010, 7-8).  It will be useful to repeat the present analysis with 2012 census data. 
89
 The “inactive” observations were not excluded from the calculation of the “employed” variable 
because Roma between 15 and 65 have 2.3 times the odds of non-Roma of being “inactive,” so 
excluding this group would bias the sample.  A description of the employment variable can be found in 
the census enumeration text, available from IPUMSI:  https://international.ipums.org/international-
action/variables/173939/enumeration_text#ro2002a. 
90
 The differences between all of the means in Table I are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Chi-square tests for each of these variables (results not reported) reinforce the implications of the 
figures discussed above by confirming that these variables are not independent of Roma status.  Every 




4. Educational Attainment 
 
Here I test primary education completion rates for Roma and non-Roma to try 
to determine whether, ceteris paribus, they are equal.  I have limited the sample to 
respondents ages 17 to 20, before which they are much less likely to have completed 
primary school (though still might).
91
  Setting an upper bound on age, while shrinking 
my sample to a fairly narrow age group, has three benefits.  First, it allows me to 
capture as many respondents as possible who were living with their mother at the 
time of the census, most importantly allowing me to control for the powerful effect of 
mother’s education but roughly also to account for endogeneity concerns due to 
unobserved ability.
92
 Second, it allows me to control for family socio-economic status 
(through wealth proxies), without generating a problem of endogeneity whereby the 
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 About 64 percent of 15-year-olds had completed primary school by 2002; the figure rises to 86 
percent for 16-year-olds and levels off at 90-91 percent for ages 17-20.  Thus, some older teens still 
finish 8
th
 grade, but the data seems to show that by age 17—the age at which school attendance is no 
longer compulsory—all who will complete primary school already have.  By leaving out students 16 
and under, I capture only those who either have or never will finish primary school, rather than 
including some who have not yet but still might.  I leave out students ages 21 and up because of 
problems with income endogeneity and the likelihood that they no longer live with their mothers.  
Also, those 20 and under had a maximum of one year of school, if any, under communism, making the 
results more relevant for current education policy.  The Roma figures are the same as for the 
population as a whole.  Eliminating individuals over 20 does not affect the overall primary school 
completion rate.  Those aged 21-60 (post WWII cohorts) have the same completion rate as 17-20 year-
olds:  90 percent.  Those aged 21-40 have a higher rate:  95 percent.  This is consistent with 
government and NGO reports that the primary drop-out rate has been on the rise since the fall of 
communism, affecting Roma more dramatically.  Roma age 21-60 had a 40 percent completion rate, 
compared to 33 percent for the 17-20 age group.  This is also consistent with arguments that many 
protections for Roma and other minorities ended with the transition, deepening the inequality. 
92
 The census defines the mother as a “social,” not necessarily “biological,” mother, making the 
assumption of ability similarity a very rough one, however ability is not necessarily genetic but can 
also be “nurtured.”  At least one study has questioned the effectiveness of mother’s education as a 
control for ability (Card 1999), but a 2011 study of the Roma/non-Roma education gap in Hungary 
(Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011) found parents’ education (together with family income and poverty) to be 
one of several “family background” variables that have an important effect not only on the test score 
gap itself but also on other “parenting” measures that themselves impact ability through cognitive and 
skill development.  Note: I only have data on mother’s education if she was co-resident at the time of 





respondent’s wealth might be affected by her education level, rather than the other 
way around.  Third, those children who were 20 at the time of the census were seven 
or eight in December 1989, meaning they would have started school the year of (or at 
most the year before) the collapse of communism in Romania.
93
  Restricting the 
sample allows me to exclude those children who attended school under the 
communist system, when the educational system differed in many respects.  Though 
there was almost certainly a lag in impact, this nevertheless allows me to examine 
several cohorts of children whose education was shaped only by the post-communist 
education system, thus making the results more relevant to current education policy in 
Romania.  In the general population, the completion rate is the same for this cohort of 
individuals as it was for the post-war to transition cohorts (ages 21-60):  90 percent.  
For Roma, the completion rate is lower:  33 percent for this group, compared to 40 
percent for older Roma. 
 
Although I do lose a significant number of observations this way (my total 
sample size drops to 98,938), it is important that I am able to exclude the communist 
years and be able to control for wealth and mother’s education.  Teenagers with a 
mother at home are 2.7 percentage points more likely to have finished primary school 
than those without, which means that by restricting my sample size I am estimating 
an upper bound on educational attainment for this age group.  This effect appears to 
be even larger for Roma than for non-Roma—Roma children with their mothers at 
home are 6.1 percentage points more likely to complete primary school, compared to 
2.6 points for non-Roma.  This means I am estimating a lower bound on the 
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difference between the groups.  Thus, the results that follow tend to overestimate 
Roma educational attainment relative to non-Roma, and slightly overestimate 
educational attainment as a whole, a problem that arises in several other places as 
well.
94
  However, this chapter is concerned with the relative, not absolute, 
performance of Roma and non-Roma.  The differences are likely diminished by 
several systematic biases, addressed in the discussion. 
 
To predict educational attainment, I use logistic regressions to estimate the 
odds of completing primary education.  Model 1 estimates the raw effect of Roma 
ethnicity where Yi is a binary variable for primary school completion (Column 1, 
Table 6).  This unconditional test reveals that the odds that a Roma individual will 
complete primary school are 96 percent lower than for a non-Roma.  Of course, there 
are a number of factors—such as whether or not one is a native speaker of the 
language of instruction—that can compromise both academic achievement and 
attainment.  Model 2 adds controls for individual characteristics.  These are age, a 
female/male dummy, and a mother tongue dummy for the Romanian language. 
 
Once I account for these individual characteristics, the change in the odds of 
completing primary school for Roma is negligible (Column 2, Table 6).  Age and 
speaking Romanian both have the expected positive impact, and being female—
surprisingly—also increases the likelihood of completion.  Other factors that might 
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 Summary statistics (mean values) reveal that among children ages 17-20 whose mother is present in 
the home, 26 percent of Roma and 67 percent of non-Roma have completed primary school, a 41 
percent gap.  Among those whose mother is not at home, 22 percent of Roma and 69 percent of non-
Roma have finished 8
th
 grade, a 47 percent gap.  (The differences between the means are statistically 




impact the likelihood of completing any given level of education include 
geographical location and urban or rural status.  These can contribute to the quality of 
the school and instruction, the distance of a school from one’s home, its safety, and 
the relative education levels of others around you.  While I would ideally control for 
these factors directly, I can only add in an urban dummy and seven dummies for the 
eight regions of Romania, holding the most populous region as the reference point.  I 
find that living in an urban area is associated with almost three times the odds of 
completing primary school (Column 3, Table 6).  Again, these additions absorb very 
little of the “Roma effect” on the odds of primary school completion. 
 
In addition to individual and regional characteristics, there are reasons to 
suspect that lower socio-economic status of students, particularly over the long-term, 
corresponds to lower educational attainment (Tansel 1998, Behrman and Knowles 
1999, Filmer and Pritchett 1999, Holmes 1999), a hypothesis that has been shown to 
hold in 35 different countries (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999).  This correlation is due to 
a variety of factors, not the least of which is the pressure on older children to 
contribute to family income, through work in or outside the family or through 
begging.  Because neither income nor wages are included in the Romanian census, I 
rely on proxies as described above.  This substitution has some benefits. Such 
variables have been shown to be better predictors of long-term family wealth than 
current income or expenditure reports (Filmer and Pritchett 2001); they are also less 
susceptible to reporting distortions than income.  Moreover, education may be less 




1998).  This is not only because families may attempt to smooth consumption in the 
face of short-term fluctuations, but because more permanent features of home life 
such as the availability of electric light and study spaces removed from the main 
living area can substantially impact the effectiveness of education, and thus 
promotion and retention.   
 
Therefore, in Model 4, I proxy for long-term family wealth using per capita 
living area in square meters, the presence of electricity in the home (Mani, Hoddinott 
and Strauss 2009), and the availability of sewage disposal (either sewage or septic 
system), a factor that also has implications for health outcomes and in turn education.  
I also add a dummy for whether the head-of-household is employed.  Economic 
factors turn out to absorb a significant proportion of the “Roma effect,” though Roma 
still have 89 percent lower odds of completing eighth grade, compared to non-Roma 
(Column 4, Table 6).  Having the head-of-household employed is associated with 
increased odds of finishing eighth grade, as is the presence of basic utilities and 
increased living area per person, as we would expect.  Finally, there is wide 
agreement in the education literature that the education levels of a child’s parents—in 
particular her mother—are in many cases the single best predictor of her own 
educational attainment (Tansel 1999, Mani, Hoddinott, and Strauss 2009).  Model 5 
thus includes four dummies for the (resident) mother’s highest level of education 
completed.  The full model is: 




i + β4emp_emp_head + β5X
3
i + β6-






 is a vector of predictors for individual characteristics (age, female, 
Romanian mother tongue), X
2
 is a vector of predictors for geographical 
characteristics (urban, seven regional dummies), and X
3
 is a vector of proxies for 
long-term family wealth (living area per person, and electricity and sewage in the  
 
 
home).  This model reinforces the importance of the education of the respondent’s 
mother.  For every additional level of education attained by the mother, the odds of an 
Table 6:  Explaining Primary School Completion (individuals ages 17-20 with mother in household at census 
time).   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Roma 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.114*** 0.232*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.012] 
Age  1.052*** 1.057*** 1.043*** 1.101*** 
  [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] 
Female  1.630*** 1.552*** 1.539*** 1.535*** 
  [0.041] [0.040] [0.041] [0.043] 
Lang. Romanian  1.441*** 1.465*** 1.554*** 1.399*** 
  [0.053] [0.064] [0.069] [0.064] 
Urban   2.867*** 1.136*** 0.941 
   [0.075] [0.041] [0.036] 
Head Employed    1.262*** 1.058** 
    [0.033] [0.029] 
PP Living Area    1.145*** 1.111*** 
    [0.005] [0.004] 
Electricity    3.298*** 2.614*** 
    [0.210] [0.176] 
Sewage    3.402*** 2.246*** 
    [0.138] [0.095] 
MO:  Primary     4.591*** 
     [0.141] 
MO:  Secondary     11.083*** 
     [0.492] 
MO:  University     11.876*** 
     [1.572] 
MO:  Unknown     1.039 
     [0.361] 
Region   Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.763*** 3.185*** 1.411 0.132*** 0.030*** 
 [0.177] [0.658] [0.300] [0.030] [0.007] 
      
Observations 98938 98938 98938 98938 98938 
pseudo r2 0.0991 0.108 0.146 0.233 0.3 
† Region includes dummies for 7 of the 8 regions of Romania, with the most populous omitted. The dependent 
variable evaluates to 1 if the individual completed primary school, and to zero otherwise. Omitted Category for 
mother’s educational attainment is “less than primary.” Odds ratios reported.  Robust standard errors in 





individual’s completing primary school go up dramatically.  The “Roma effect” is 
also reduced.  Nevertheless, the odds for Roma remain 77 percent lower than those 
for non-Roma (Column 5, Table 6). 
 
These five models reveal a disturbing trend in Romani education in Romania.  
Most discouraging is the fact that a Roma individual, compared to a non-Roma, has 
96 percent lower odds of finishing eighth grade, signaling a dramatic inequality in 
educational outcomes, whatever the background reasons for this inequality.  After 
controlling for a variety of factors, the odds remain 77 percent lower.  On the one 
hand, it is encouraging that we can identify some of the most powerful factors that 
predict educational attainment among Roma—and that these factors, such as long-
term family wealth and mother’s education, to some extent lend themselves to policy 
interventions—but on the other hand, it is discouraging that, despite conventional 
controls, there remains a significant difference between the primary school 
completion rates of Roma and other ethnic groups. 
 
So, why the difference?  I hypothesize that perceived returns to education 
vary between groups, thus contributing to differences in adolescents’ preferences to 
pursue secondary education, and in their parents’ support of that pursuit.  Particularly 
for families facing extreme economic hardship, the opportunity costs of education 
grow as the child’s immediate earning potential grows upon her reaching working (or 




families to pay school-related costs in the present.
95
  This disincentive also goes 
above and beyond the disadvantages that poor children face from long-term economic 
factors discussed above.   
 
Thus, short-term costs and long-term disadvantage aside, a child in poverty 
faces a difficult trade-off between income forgone in the present and possible income 
forgone in the future.  The expected future returns to education must be sufficiently 
high to outweigh the immediate needs of the family.  If education offers little in the 
way of well-being enhancement now, it must do much to expand one’s anticipated 
ways of being and doing in the future.  This we can test.  Although I do not have data 
on the direct cost of education with respect to local labor conditions in areas with 
high concentrations of Roma or among the Roma as a group, I am nevertheless able 
to determine the odds that a Roma individual will be employed compared to a non-
Roma, ceteris paribus.  In Section 5 I attempt to use employment to measure and 
compare the returns to education for Roma and non-Roma in Romania. 
 
One limitation of these regressions is the absence of information about other 
possible intervening variables in the education models.  For one, parent and teacher 
expectations of children in their care as well as early educational achievement (grades 
and test scores, for example), have been shown to affect grade completion rates (Gill 
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 Though public education from kindergarten is free for all children in Romania, there remain 
numerous costs associated with sending a child to school.  These range from the cost of clothing, 
shoes, and school supplies, to “fees” levied by individual schools or teachers.  Information 
asymmetries mean that many poor families are unaware of the illegality of some fees, or of the 
existence of programs such as school lunch vouchers.  School administrators do not always encourage 




and Reynolds, 1999; Portes and Wilson, 1976).  Self-esteem has also been 
demonstrated to be an important factor in minority education (Portes and Wilson 
1976), but there is no way to test for this using census data.  Lack of a control for 
ability is of course a problem, but I attempt partially to control for it by including 
mother’s education, something that has itself been a strong determinant of educational 
attainment in other studies (Mani, Hoddinott and Strauss 2009, Tansel 1998) and 
most recently of Roma educational achievement (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011).
96
  I am 
unable to use this strategy in the employment models, however, where unobserved 
ability causes education to be endogenous.  See Card (1999) for a discussion of the 
unreliability of using mother’s education to account for ability.  Next I consider 
whether perceived returns could impact educational decisions. 
 
5. Returns to Education 
 
Employment can be a motivating factor in educational decisions in one of two 
ways:  1) the need for employment now (which can motivate a student to drop out of 
school to work) or 2) the hope of better employment later (which can motivate a 
student to remain in school in order to improve her employment prospects in the 
future).  One would expect that these two needs could conflict, particularly within 
marginalized or low-income groups for whom immediate need can be acute.  Thus, I 
attempt to test whether there are differences between expected returns to education 
between Roma and non-Roma that could lead students and their parents to weigh one 
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option over the other.  Can Roma youths, if they stay in school, expect to be rewarded 
with employment?  If so, is the probability of their being employed, at each level of 
education, the same as for the rest of the population?  And are they likely to be 
rewarded with an occupation befitting their education?  Put another way, what set of 
possible futures are Roma youths likely to see as feasible and to what extent are they 
likely to see education as a means to achieve one of those ends?  Moreover, is there 
evidence that their expectations, and thus preferences, might differ from those of the 
rest of the population? 
 
Before attempting to measure the employment returns to education for Roma 
and non-Roma, I use logistic regressions to estimate the impact of Roma status on the 
odds of being employed.  I find that, regardless of education and a variety of other 
variables, Roma are far less likely to be employed.  I next turn to returns to education.  
Conventionally, returns to education are measured by wages.  The Romanian census, 
however, does not include information for either wage or income, so I use a dummy 
variable for employment to try to capture the employment returns to education, which 
here I will refer to as the school-to-work conversion rate in order to avoid confusion 
with the conventional understanding of the term “returns to education” in wage 
regressions.  Using logistic models, I compare Roma to ethnic Romanians and 
Hungarians (the largest minority group, followed by the Roma) as well as to the 
population as a whole and find that the school-to-work conversion rate is higher for 
Roma at all levels of schooling, a finding consistent with other studies that show that 




especially at low levels—than do their better-off peers (Card 1999).
97
  In short, Roma 
are less likely to be employed, regardless of education level, but education, once 
obtained, has greater impact on a Roma individual’s chances of employment. 
 
Attempting to estimate returns to education in this way is not without 
problems, however, as educational attainment is notoriously endogenous due to 
possible covariance with other individual characteristics, like family background and 
ability.  While I use mother’s education as a rough ability control in the educational 
attainment models, I only have this variable for individuals who live with their 
mothers, a group that is not likely to be representative of the entire working-age 
population. Thus, I do not use it in the employment models. 
 
Another shortcoming of this method is that measuring returns to education 
with an “employed” dummy variable, rather than with wage, does not speak to 
whether individuals—once employed—are finding employment commensurate with 
their education.  I therefore estimate another set of logistic models examining the 
odds of falling into a high-skill or unskilled occupation and find that, regardless of 
education, Roma are far more likely to be in unskilled jobs.  I argue that this fact, and 
the overall low employment levels among the Roma population, could be driving low 
perceived returns to education among Roma children and their families, and thus 
dampening the desire to consume higher levels of education given the already high 
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opportunity cost of education for poor families.  (Recall that 17 percent of the Roma 
respondents in the UNDP/ILO survey, when asked why they would keep their son 
home from school, reported "even if he attends, he will be unemployed anyway” 
(United Nations Development Programme 2002).)  To return to Sen’s terms, families 
may “adjust their desires and expectations to what they unambitiously see as feasible” 




As we saw from the t-tests in Table I, on average just 27 percent of working-
age Roma are employed compared to 52 percent of non-Roma.  The difference is 
statistically significant at 1 percent.  This statistic isn’t particularly helpful, however, 
since it does not follow that 73 percent of Roma are unemployed; many are simply 
 
 
Table 7:  T-tests for Employment by Roma Status 
 non-Roma Roma Difference [SE] 
Employed 0.518 0.273 0.245*** 
   (0.00283) 
Unemployed† 0.118 0.292 -0.174*** 
   (0.00296) 
Inactive 0.413 0.614 -0.202*** 
   (0.00279) 
Head of Household Employed 0.504 0.373 0 .131*** 
   [0.00221] 
***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, Robust standard errors in brackets. 
The t-tests for the first three employment variables were run only for individuals ages 15-65. 
†This is the conventional definition of “unemployed”: the ratio of unemployed to total employed-plus-




inactive, far more than in the non-Roma population of the same age (Table 7).
98
  In 
Model 7, I find that number of children at home and female have a negative effect on 
employment, as we might expect.  It is unclear why being married should have such a 
substantial effect, since we are controlling for gender and the presence of children.  
Model 8 adds controls for region and urbanicity, which will also help to control for 
variables like distance to school.  School quality is more difficult to control for, as 
segregated Roma schools have been shown to be dramatically inferior to integrated 
schools, but the census does not track the type of school a child attended.  Living in 
an urban area has a negative effect on employment, consistent with expectations for 
an economy with a large agricultural sector.  Model 9 adds the individual’s level of 
education.  The full model is therefore: 




i + β4-8edattani +εi      (9) 
where X
1
 is again a vector of predictors for individual characteristics (age, age
2
, 
female, and Romanian mother tongue, marital status) and X
2
 is the vector of 
geographical predictors (urban, and the seven regional dummies).  The effects of 
education are also as expected:  secondary and university education (compared to 
less-than-primary) make one substantially more likely to be employed.  The negative 
effect of primary school completion is probably due to the large number of 
individuals employed in agriculture for whom even primary education might be 
perceived as unnecessary.  With this full set of controls, Roma still have 56.7 percent 
lower odds of being employed (Table 8). 
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percent.  This is reversed for women, with a rate of 37 to 58 percent, respectively (World Bank, 2010, 
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Table 8:  Effects of Roma Status on Employment 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Roma 0.349*** 0.373*** 0.370*** 0.433*** 
 [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] 
Age  1.532*** 1.546*** 1.486*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Age2  0.994*** 0.994*** 0.995*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female  0.508*** 0.511*** 0.532*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Num. Children  0.852*** 0.837*** 0.889*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Married  1.718*** 1.729*** 1.672*** 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Separated  1.285*** 1.309*** 1.298*** 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Widowed  1.422*** 1.417*** 1.509*** 
  [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] 
Lang. Romanian  1.144*** 1.173*** 1.145*** 
  [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
Urban   0.786*** 0.618*** 
   [0.003] [0.003] 
Edu:  Primary    0.814*** 
    [0.006] 
Edu:  Secondary    1.400*** 
    [0.010] 
Edu:  University    5.286*** 
    [0.057] 
Edu:  Unknown    0.270*** 
    [0.025] 
Region†   Yes Yes 
     
Constant 1.075*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 1478865 1478865 1478865 1478865 
pseudo r2 0.00377 0.181 0.185 0.208 
***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, Robust standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent 
is employed, and zero otherwise. Sample includes  individuals ages 15-65. 




5.2. School-to-Work Conversion by Ethnic Group 
 
Having identified a significant difference in the odds that a Roma individual, 
regardless of education, will be employed, I next attempt to isolate—for Roma and 
non-Roma separately—the “employment returns to education,” that is, the returns to 
the investment in education that come in the form of employment.  Using the same 
controls as Model 9, minus the Roma dummy, I estimate a series of logits for four 
different population groups aged 15-65 to try to determine the degree to which 
education levels seem to impact employability for each group.
99
  The four groups for 
which I run Model 10 are the Romanian population as a whole, ethnic Romanians, 
ethnic Hungarians, and Roma.  Yi is once again the dummy for employment. 
 
Interestingly, the results (Table 9) reveal that completing primary school has a 
different impact on employment for different groups:  it benefits Roma and 
Hungarians while appearing to have a negative effect for Romanians.  The baseline is 
“less than primary,” so for Romanians, there is a higher correlation between being 
employed and having less than primary education than there is between being 
employed and having primary education.  A few tests indicate that this may be due to 
the effect of employment in skilled agriculture and fisheries—including occasional 
work and work on family or subsistence farms—which tends to discourage school 
attendance while also offering comparatively stable employment.
100
  Within the 
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 Ideally, I would have a wage variable in order to control for the effect of the reservation wage, but 
since I do not, and since the wealth “proxies” I have—electricity, per person living area, etc.—are for 
the household and not the individual, I do not attempt to control for wage. 
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 The data show that 66.4 percent of those with "less than primary" education live in rural areas and 
76.4 percent work in skilled agriculture or fishing, compared to 40.3 percent and 18.8 percent of those 




Roma population, completing primary school increases one’s odds of employment by 
30 percent.  There is a substantial jump in the impact of secondary school for all 
groups, particularly for Hungarians and Roma.  University education has the greatest 
impact, again, especially so for Romania’s two largest minority groups. 
 
While these school-to-work conversion tests do tell us something about the 
odds of being employed, they say nothing of the type of employment.  Are educated 
Roma finding well-paid work, commensurate to their level of education, at least at a 
rate similar to the rest of the population?  While we cannot directly test for wage 
returns to education, we can extend the tests for odds of employment by 
disaggregating by occupation type, which for the census was reported both for 
employed and unemployed individuals (but not for inactive individuals).  Do Roma, 
for a given level education, have equal odds as non-Roma of being employed in a 
given occupation type?  Though we cannot account for possible wage discrepancies 
between Roma and non-Roma in a specific job (O’Higgins, 2010, finds evidence of 
wage discrimination within occupations), we can draw broad conclusions about the 
general wage bracket associated with different occupation types, such as high-skill 
“professional” or “managerial,” and unskilled “elementary” employment.  In a very 
indirect, and admittedly rough, way this can approximate wage returns to education. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
fishermen.  In all likelihood, this group—both very likely to drop out of school young and to be 
employed, even occasionally—is driving the primary education coefficient for Romanians.  While 37.4 
percent of Roma are also farmers or fishermen, the baselines for both educational attainment and 
employment are much lower:  so few Roma complete primary school to begin with that those who do 
stand a better chance than less-educated Roma of being employed.  This of course says nothing of their 





To test the odds that a Roma individual will end up in either the top or the 
bottom occupational category (thus, presumably, the top or the bottom wage bracket), 
I run two logistic models, controlling for the same characteristics as in Model 9.  The 
Table 9:  Employment Predictors by Ethnic Group (Model 10) 
 Population Romanians Hungarians Roma 
     
Age 1.482*** 1.495*** 1.477*** 1.227*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.009] 
Age2 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.997*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female 0.535*** 0.533*** 0.590*** 0.328*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.009] [0.009] 
Num. Children 0.876*** 0.887*** 0.900*** 0.935*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.009] 
Lang. Romanian 1.239*** 1.396*** 0.885** 0.949* 
 [0.009] [0.089] [0.046] [0.027] 
Married 1.717*** 1.685*** 1.678*** 1.205*** 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.039] [0.041] 
Separated 1.325*** 1.295*** 1.337*** 1.297*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.053] [0.122] 
Widowed 1.550*** 1.516*** 1.568*** 1.271*** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.073] [0.109] 
Urban 0.615*** 0.605*** 0.926*** 0.394*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.015] [0.012] 
Edu: Primary 0.888*** 0.768*** 1.299*** 1.296*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.042] [0.040] 
Edu: Secondary 1.551*** 1.301*** 2.607*** 2.135*** 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.082] [0.110] 
Edu: University 5.815*** 4.958*** 9.703*** 6.566*** 
 [0.061] [0.056] [0.491] [1.989] 
Edu:  Unknown 0.273*** 0.264*** 0.164*** 0.430*** 
 [0.025] [0.027] [0.088] [0.110] 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.039*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] 
Observations 1478865 1325180 99078 31785 
Pseudo R2 0.2067 0.2077 0.2304 0.1244 
***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, Robust standard errors in brackets.  Sample comprised of individuals ages 15-65. 




two dependent variables are a composite of the top three occupation types in the 
census—senior officials and managers, professionals, and technicians and associate 
professionals—and a variable for the bottom type, unskilled “elementary 
employment.”  I restrict the sample, as above, to individuals ages 15 to 65 and I 
exclude not-in-universe, military (a small fraction of the population), those whose 
responses are unknown or suppressed, and the unemployed or inactive.  I run the 
same pair of logits twice:  controlling for education the first time, but not the second 
(Table 10). 
 
Interestingly, the tests reveal that Roma have 1.15 times the odds of being in 
one of the “highest” occupational categories, when we control for education.  Of 
course, only one half of one percent of Roma fall into this category, compared to just 
over nine percent of non-Roma—in this set, that is 280 and 191,277 individuals, 
respectively—and education is, unsurprisingly, a powerful determinant of achieving 
this status.  Given the extremely low rate of completion of secondary or tertiary 
education among Roma (nine and 0.2 percent, respectively),
101
 it is not surprising that 
the very few highly educated Roma individuals would find their way into high-skill 
jobs.  This assumption is confirmed by the second set of logits, which show that, 
when not controlling for education, Roma have 0.207 times the odds (or 79.3 percent 
lower odds) of landing in a high-skill occupation than non-Roma.  In contrast, Roma 
have more than 2.5 times the odds of ending up in unskilled “elementary” 
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employment than non-Roma, even controlling for level of education.  (This odds ratio 
goes up to 4.1 when we remove the education control.)  We can conclude from these  
 
tests that, regardless of their level of education, not only are Roma less likely to be 
employed than non-Roma, they are also far more likely to end up in unskilled, low-
wage employment.  These figures make a powerful statement about both the 
employment and wage returns to education for Roma individuals in Romania and, by 
extension, their degree of labor market marginalization.  These results call into 
Table 10:  Effects of Roma Status on Occupation Type 









Roma 1.154* 2.537*** 0.207*** 4.093*** 
 [0.093] [0.068] [0.013] [0.107] 
Age 1.008*** 1.067*** 1.163*** 0.988*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Age2 1.000*** 0.999*** 0.998*** 1 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female 2.319*** 0.936*** 1.584*** 0.998 
 [0.018] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Num. Children 0.773*** 1.119*** 0.648*** 1.237*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005] 
Married 1.195*** 0.706*** 1.184*** 0.637*** 
 [0.014] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] 
Separated 0.939*** 0.950** 0.891*** 0.918*** 
 [0.017] [0.021] [0.013] [0.020] 
Widowed 0.871*** 1.072** 0.628*** 1.172*** 
 [0.025] [0.030] [0.014] [0.033] 
Lang. Romanian 0.939*** 0.98 1.064*** 0.951*** 
 [0.014] [0.016] [0.013] [0.016] 
Urban 2.040*** 1.449*** 5.035*** 0.885*** 
 [0.018] [0.017] [0.039] [0.009] 
Edu: Primary 0.288* 0.396***   
 [0.198] [0.065]   
Edu: Secondary 1.316 0.323***   
 [0.899] [0.053]   
Edu: University 26.486*** 0.116***   
 [18.098] [0.019]   
Edu: Unknown 1,143.627*** 0.005***   
 [781.587] [0.001]   
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.002*** 0.152*** 0.004*** 0.117*** 
 [0.001] [0.026] [0.000] [0.007] 
     
Observations 753504 753504 753504 753504 
pseudo r2 0.415 0.0813 0.141 0.0257 




question the extent to which Roma might have reason to value education beyond its 
intrinsic benefits. 
 
One might argue that Roma opt out of traditional or high-skill employment 
rather than being excluded from it, perhaps having instead access to sources of 
unearned income, for example from remittances or black-market activity.  Were this 
to be the case, we could expect Roma to have similar standards of living as non-
Roma, or at least to be similarly able to meet their basic needs, yet this is not so.  The 
inability of this analysis to account for the large differences in Roma employment 
outcomes means that there is another factor, or set of factors, for which I have not 
been able to control that limits the labor market success of this group. That is to say, 
there is something going on here that makes Roma less likely to employed, or 
employed in well-paying jobs.  I have accounted for education and a host of other 
possible variables that could reasonably impact the chances for employment, but there 
is still something missing, some other factor for which I have not controlled.  One 
possibility is discrimination, evidence for which O’Higgins (2010) and the World 
Bank (2010) find using decomposition techniques and which is backed up by 
countless governmental and non-governmental reports. 
 
5.3. Discrimination in the Job Market? 
 
In order to tease out the contributions of various measureable characteristics 
to the inter-group (non-Roma and Roma) difference in employment and employment 




1999). The standard Oaxaca-Blinder technique (Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 1973) 
decomposes the difference in the outcome probability to that portion which we are 
able to explain by inter-group differences in determining characteristics (the 
“endowment effect”) and that which we are not able to explain by these differences.  
In studies of the gender or race wage gap this unexplained portion is often attributed 
to discrimination (though it in fact absorbs all unobserved differences so a 
determination of discrimination must be justified by an exhaustive set of explanatory 
variables).  The technique accomplishes this by attributing the “endowments” of one 
group (here, non-Roma) to the group of interest (here, Roma) and examining the 
resulting change in outcome for the second group.  For example, it attributes the 
education, marital, regional, and language characteristics of non-Roma to Roma and 
recalculates the outcome. The Fairlie extension addresses the fact that the standard 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is intended for continuous dependent variables and 
does not produce easily interpretable (or always accurate) results for binary outcomes 
estimated with non-linear models such as logit and probit.   
 
Table 11 reports the results of these decompositions.  First, taking the results 
of the employment decomposition, which uses the same independent variables as the 
employment logits above, I find that the probability that a non-Roma individual aged 
15 to 65 is employed is 51.8 percent while the probability for a Roma individual is 
27.3 percent.  Of the 24.5 percentage point difference, however, only 8.6 percentage 
points are explained by the independent variables.  The largest contributor to the 




primary school education.  The results tell us that if Roma (as a group) had the less-
than-primary education incidence of non-Roma, then the explained employment gap 
between the two groups would be 12.7 percentage points smaller (of course this 
figure alone is larger than the total explained difference but that is due to the 
counterbalancing effects of other variables).  The binary variable for completion of 
secondary school also has a sizeable impact but, interestingly, it works in the opposite 
direction:  if Roma had the same high school completion rate as non-Roma, then the 
gap between them would be larger.  The reasons for this result, however, are unclear. 
Table 11:  Non-linear decompositions of employment gaps (employed and employment type) 
 Employed Elementary Employment 
Age 0.097 0.028 
 [0.000] [0.004] 
Age2 -0.092 -0.026 
 [0.000] [0.003] 
Urban -0.012 0.010 
 [0.000] [0.001] 
Edu: Less than Primary 0.127 0.064 
 [0.001] [0.013] 
Edu: Primary 0.004 0.006 
 [0.000] [0.006] 
Edu: Secondary -0.081 -0.117 
 [0.000] [0.014] 
Edu: University Dropped -0.028 
  [0.003] 
Edu: Unknown 0.001 Dropped 
 [0.000]  
Total Observations 1478865 753504 
Non-Roma 1447080 744860 
Roma 31785 8644 
Probability non-Roma 0.518 0.071 
Probability Roma 0.273 0.315 
Difference 0.245 -0.243 
Explained difference 0.086 -0.087 
Robust standard errors in brackets; ages 15-65; Order of independent variables randomized across 100 Fairlie 
decomposition iterations. 
 Independent variables included but not reported:  Gender female, Number of own children living at home, 




Second, examining the results of the decomposition for elementary (no- or 
low-skill) employment, I find the probability that a non-Roma individual will wind up 
in elementary employment is 7.1 percent, but the probability jumps to 31.5 percent 
for Roma, controlling for other relevant characteristics.  The difference between the 
two groups is 24.3 percentage points, only 8.7 of which are explained.  Here, the 
secondary education variable contributes 11.7 percentage points to the explained gap 
(again, the size of this contribution is counterbalanced by other variables, though this 
fact does not diminish its weight). 
 
Most important in both decompositions—for group-specific probability of 
employment and of ending up in elementary employment—is the size of the 
unexplained inter-group difference, as a proportion of the total difference.  In 
standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, it is the unexplained share of the gap that is 
often attributed to discrimination.  Of course, this attribution assumes that there are 
no important omitted variables.  In this case, the standard predictors for employment 
returns to education have been accounted for, with the exception of native ability.  
However, for us to assume that the dramatic unexplained differences in probability of 
employment and of ending up in elementary employment (15.9 and 15.6 percentage 
points, respectively) are due to ability, we would have to be willing to accept that 
Roma, as a group, are simply less able than non-Roma, an assumption we have no 
reason to accept and many plain reasons to reject.
102
  Likewise with the other possible 
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 Kertsi and Kézdi (2011), in their study of the Roma/non-Roma test score gap in Hungary, found 
that once health, parenting, school fixed effects and family background are controlled for, the 
substantial gap in both reading and mathematics disappears for reading and becomes very small for 




explanation: lack of proclivity for work, or, in plainer terms, laziness.  It is difficult to 
argue that an entire ethnic group is prone to sloth, particularly if we can demonstrate 
(see Section 3) that that group’s wellbeing is already substantially compromised by 
poverty (nevermind that individuals engaged in “elementary” employment often work 
harder, longer hours than those in more skilled trades).  World Bank data further 
argue against the laziness argument.
103
  Although we cannot say with absolute 
certainty that these decompositions reveal “anti-Gypsy” discrimination in the job 
market, they do, ultimately, reveal a stunningly high level of unexplained difference 




In economic terms, the results presented above may very well reveal the basis 
for reduced incentives for Roma to invest in education beyond the most basic level; in 
Capability terms, they may reveal the basis for adaptive preferences that lead Roma to 
privilege current well-being over a seemingly unrealistic future in which education 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is also possible that poor education quality in segregated or Roma-dominated schools simply result in 
low-skill graduates unable to compete on the job market, a form of “ability” that is neither native nor 
accounted for here. This hypothesis is borne out by Kertsi and Kézdi’s finding that controlling for 
school and class fixed effects substantially decreases the test score gap.  Be that as it may, a 
prospective employer very well may not know the quality, only the quantity, of basic education an 
applicant has received.  Thus, the assumption on the part of that employer that a Roma applicant has 
lower ability or skill-level than a non-Roma applicant with the same education level nevertheless 
amounts to discrimination, regardless of whether that assumption is based on racial prejudice or on 
generalizations about the quality of education a Roma applicant has received.   
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 According to the World Bank study (2010), in Romania “Roma labor force participation rates 
strongly contradict laziness and welfare dependency perceptions, especially among men. Measuring 
the proportion of the working age population either employed or unemployed but willing and looking 
to work, the labor force participation rate for working-age Roma men exceeds the rate for men from 
the majority populations... Hence, while Roma are willing to work, often they cannot find jobs.” 




only hypothetically leads to better employment.  These results also force us to ask 
other important questions.  In the Romanian context, why are Roma so much less 
likely to be employed than non-Roma and so much more likely to be employed in 
unskilled labor (controlling for education and other factors)?  Why is such a large 
share of the difference in probability of employment unexplained?  There are a 
number of possible answers to these questions. 
 
First, we must recognize that one unobserved variable is ability.  
Overrepresentation of Roma children in schools for the mentally handicapped and 
learning disabled is evidence that policy makers and school administrators all too 
often conclude that lower levels of mental ability among Roma account for their 
poorer performance in school (Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe 2000, 
Kosko 2004, Greenberg 2010).  However, such a conclusion would require hard 
evidence that childhood development is being compromised by poor nutrition across 
the whole of the Romanian Roma population.  While this reply does not account for 
environmental determinants of ability, it answers at least part of the concern.  (See 
footnotes 92 and 102 for a further, brief discussion of this problem).    
 
Second, we could conclude that Roma are more likely to have access to 
sources of unearned or informal income and thus have less need to bother with formal 
education.  (The widespread view in Europe that many Roma are thieves makes this 
hypothesis particularly relevant.)  However, long-term income and wealth proxies 




non-Roma and are in fact less able to meet their basic needs, as evidenced in the 
UNDP’s assertion that 15 percent of European Roma are “constantly struggling with 
starvation” (United Nations Development Programme 2002).  It is unlikely, therefore, 
that they are earning sufficient informal income to compensate for a lack of formal 
employment and render schooling unnecessary. 
 
Third, we could suggest, as many do, that Roma simply prefer not to work.  
“Laziness” is, in fact, one of the most persistent public stereotypes about Roma.  A 
2010 World Bank survey in four countries revealed that “according to the vast 
majority of [those interviewed], there is… a widespread perception among the general 
public that Roma do not have jobs because ‘they prefer to live off social assistance’ 
and even because ‘they are lazy and lack willpower,’” assertions made by 81 and 66 
percent, respectively, of Romanians surveyed (World Bank 2010, 12-13).
104
  
However, we can again refer to their staggeringly low capabilities, or opportunities to 
fulfill their basic needs; it is unlikely that Roma sacrifice their own—and their 
children’s—well-being out of laziness.  Moreover, the same World Bank study finds 
that “Roma labor force participation rates strongly contradict laziness and welfare 
dependency perceptions,” and reports that only 12 percent of working-age Roma in 
Romania (2008 figure) receives guaranteed minimum income support, contradicting 
the perception that they simply “live off social assistance” (World Bank 2010, 14). 
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 I coordinated this survey for the World Bank in the summer of 2010 with support from four in-
country consultants.  Those interviewed were asked what they believed the average person from the 
majority sees as the reasons for low Roma employment. The question provided five possible non-
mutually exclusive responses: (1) unlucky – not enough jobs; (2) lazy and lack of willpower; (3) face 
discrimination; (4) lack sufficient education or qualification; (5) prefer to live off social assistance. The 






Fourth, we arrive at the most probable—if notoriously difficult to prove—
explanation: discrimination in hiring.  This phenomenon, for which I find evidence 
here, is borne out by countless studies and anecdotal evidence but only measured in 
two published reports:  O’Higgins and the 2010 World Bank study.  Building on the 
finding that low education levels in part drive low employment rates, the World Bank 
policy note uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method and finds that “around 
one-third of the wage gap between Roma and majority populations can be attributed 
to discrimination and other factors beyond differences in education, experience, and 
locality” (World Bank 2010, 11).  In the present chapter, the Fairlie extension of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition reveals that nearly 16 percentage points of the 
differences between Roma and non-Roma in employment and employment type 
(elementary) go unexplained by the standard predictors, strongly pointing toward 
discrimination in the job market. 
 
The present study does have several limitations that should be flagged.  One 
limitation is the omitted variables in the education models—factors such as parental 
expectation, school quality, and of course ability—discussed in Section 4.  The other 
four limitations all introduce a bias into the results.  These are:  1) the ambiguity of 
the quality and frequency of employment and education, 2) differential effects of 
resident mothers, 3) underreporting of Roma ethnicity, and 4) underestimation of the 
Roma/non-Roma employment gap arising from the differential likelihood of young 




continued education.  Each of these has the potential to bias this study in a direction 
that makes Roma appear better off than they really are relative to non-Roma.  That is, 
these estimates represent a generous picture of the probable reality.  The other 
limitations of this study, the omitted variables, do not necessarily result in a patterned 




Putting statistical analysis aside, a Roma child and her family are not likely to 
consider the results of multivariate logistic regressions when weighing her 
employment prospects.  Chances are better that she will observe the low absolute 
employment rate and high likelihood of that employment’s wage being low—
regardless of education—and perceive that schooling isn’t worth the cost.  Compound 
that discouragement with the very real possibility that her family might need her to 
help support the family by working—or at least helping to care for younger siblings 
while they work—and the opportunity costs of remaining in school go up 
considerably.  While my tests (and those of O’Higgins and the World Bank) show 
that Roma actually have higher returns to education than non-Roma, the extremely 
low baseline means the absolute gains are not likely to be very high, increasing the 
possibility that the opportunity cost will outweigh those gains.  If the degree to which 
one values education is directly proportional to the expected return to that investment, 
and inversely proportional to present income forgone, these findings tell a compelling 
story of why Roma are so much less likely than non-Roma to finish primary school, 
let alone go on to secondary.  They tell a story of a rational economic calculus to 
consume less education. 
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None of this is to say that Roma do not “value” education, intrinsically or 
even instrumentally; the UNDP/ILO survey and countless cases illustrate that they do.  
Nor does any of this lend itself to simplistic conclusions that Roma inhabit a “culture 
of low aspirations” or that “it’s the poverty, stupid.”  Rather, it forces us to ask where 
pursuing a formal education falls in a ranking of possible ways of being or doing, a 
ranking that also includes meeting a variety of basic immediate needs.  One need not 
fail to value education, or even the well-being enhancement it might bring, in order to 
decide that the costs outweigh the expected benefits.  There is disagreement, or at 
least ambiguity, in the literature about whether such a decision constitutes an 
“adaptive preference.”  Bridges, in distinguishing certain rational choices from 
adaptive preferences argues that in some cases the choices “may be clearly perceived 
as external constraints… which the individual is aware of as external constraints and 
which remain a focus of discontent.  They are not internalised.  To this extent this is 
not a case of adaptive preference, simply because the individual has not made the 
adaptation” (Bridges 2006, 22). 
 
Serene Khader further problematizes the analysis of such choices, contending 
that one might maintain an adaptive preference of a lower-order while remaining 
unhappy that her circumstances limit the vectors of capabilities from which she might 
choose, thus imposing limitations on her flourishing.  She argues that adaptive 
preferences, even those she deems “inappropriate,” or inconsistent with basic human 




fail to flourish, or even a failure to value the “good” in question (Khader 2011).  
Deprived people, she points out, are quite capable of formulating and acting on the 
basis of rational conceptions of the good and a person may rank her existing (lower-
order) preferences, while still maintaining the (higher-order) preference to have more 
choices in life, unattainable though that preference may seem.  In the case of Roma 
education, a Roma teenager may rank a slew of lower-order preferences (help feed 
her family, learn a skill, abide by her parents’ wishes that she marry) well above 
continuing her education while still wishing that she had more options.  Such 
preferences may be adaptations to actual or perceived reality.  Moreover, ranking her 
preference for education lower than her preference for work might nevertheless be 
consistent with the higher-order preference to flourish along at least one important 
dimension, such as being well-nourished, in the short-term.  If she is consciously 
unhappy about these limitations, however, Bridges argues that these are not adaptive 
preferences but basic trade-offs.  Whatever terminology you use, the difficulty of 
determining whether educational preferences of individual Roma are or are not 
“inappropriately adaptive,” or perhaps simply reveal rational trade-offs, is 
problematic for policy solutions that rely primarily on individual preference 
transformation, that is, on getting Roma to “understand the value of education.”  
 
So far, however, this discussion speaks only to the immediate constraints to 
pursuing education, but this teenager might not be convinced that education is the 
best means to a desired end in the first place.  “[A]n understanding of adaptation… 




achieving wellbeing and adaptations to ends of well-being must be made clear” 
(Watts 2009, 436).  If experiences have led one to believe that success beyond just 
“getting by” is out of reach, then it may make sense to rely on hard work or other, less 
costly, means to achieve that end.  Even if Bridges is right, then, that an individual 
might rationally and consciously choose not to attend high school, and still be 
unhappy about having to make that choice (rendering this preference not “adaptive” 
by his understanding), that same individual might nevertheless exhibit adaptation to 
the ends of education if she believes it is unlikely to result in greater success in life.  
Such discrepancy might arise, for example, where one values education for some of 
the benefits it can bring (and would thus prefer it under different circumstances) but 
does not feel it has enough practical value to make it a priority (and will thus prefer 
not to pursue it).  This hypothetical would be consistent with some of the attitudes 







Roma face numerous disadvantages compared to non-Roma.  They are 
considerably less likely to have access to basic utilities such as electricity and sewage 
disposal.  They have less living space per person, are less likely to complete 
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 For example, when asked about justifiable reasons for keeping a son home from school, only five 
percent of Roma surveyed reported that “children do not learn the really important things at school,” 
implying that the vast majority of Roma feel that education has some value in life.  At the same time, 
however, 17 percent said that “even if he attends, he will be unemployed anyway,” implying that 





education at any level, and are considerably more likely to live in a home where the 
head of the household is not employed.  The education models in Section 4 of this 
study indicate that Roma are also significantly less likely than non-Roma to complete 
a full course of compulsory education.  Adding a series of controls only marginally 
diminishes this difference in educational attainment.      
 
Following the insights of Schultz, Becker, and Mincer, I have attempted to 
explain these differences by testing the impact of Roma status on employment 
(controlling for education) as well as employment returns to education for Roma.  I 
have done this using employment status and occupation type.  I found that the impact 
of education on employment is higher for Roma than for non-Roma yet, at all levels 
of education and controlling for a variety of factors, Roma still have lower odds of 
being employed.  Also, when employed, the odds are 2.5 times higher that they will 
find themselves in unskilled, low-wage jobs regardless of education level.  The World 
Bank finds that “[t]he poor labor market outcomes can in large part be explained by 
the very large education gap between Roma and non-Roma” (World Bank 2010, 9), 
but the insights of this chapter question whether the inverse might also be true.  Can 
the education gap in part be explained by the poor—relative and absolute—labor 
market outcomes of Roma? 
 
From a policy perspective, then, interventions designed to transform Roma 
individuals’ (adaptive?) preferences about education as a feasible means for achieving 




individuals’ (adaptive?) preferences toward the feasible ends of that education.  If 
“success” is understood as “just getting by,” then rational individuals might not view 
the investment as worth the gamble.  Such preference transformation, directed at both 
the feasible means and ends of education, would require both individual and 
structural interventions.  At this time, I will leave aside any discussion of either the 
normative or practical implications of individual preference transformation and will 
not argue in its favor with the exception of the clear need to correct misinformation 




If the goal is to increase not only the accessibility but the appeal of formal 
education to the wider Roma population, as this chapter suggests, then further 
research is needed into the precise structural barriers to education that help form 
education preferences (“adaptive” or otherwise).  What must change, I argue, is not 
only the perceptions of Roma about the returns to that education, but the everyday 
reality of a society in which, regardless of schooling and a variety of other factors, a 
Roma individual has two and a half times the odds of being in a low-paying job.  
Such structural interventions, once identified, could help address possible adaptation 
to the feasible “ends” of education.   
 
Of course, education must also be made more beneficial to a family than 
immediate work.  One option could be to offer vocational education that includes 
some work experience and income generation.  This might still seem insufficient to a 
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 Despite the fact that that most Roma are among the poorest members of the Romanian population, 
only 12 percent of working age Roma individuals receive guaranteed minimum income support (World 




struggling family, however, and might be inappropriate or pre-mature for the very 
young children vulnerable to being put to “work” begging at an age when instruction 
in basic skills is still an important part of any education.  Responding to the larger 
problem of child labor, Kaushik Basu advocates for “collaborative interventions, that 
is, public action which alters the economic environment such that parents of their own 
accord prefer to withdraw the children from the labor force” and can thus more easily 
send them to school.  “The availability of good schools, the provision of free meals, 
and efforts to bolster adult wages are examples of collaborative interventions” (Basu 
1999, 1115).  Although more research is needed to identify precisely what types and 
sets of interventions might work best in the Romanian context, such structural 
interventions as these could help address possible adaptation to education as a 
feasible “means” of achieving the good life. 
 
By identifying some of the barriers to educational attainment (such as 
poverty) and finding some evidence for others (such as discrimination in the job 
market), this chapter seeks to lay the empirical foundation for further research into 
precisely what types and sets of collaborative interventions might prove most 
effective in expanding Roma education.  Until then, the problem of Romani 





Annex 1:  Variables & Summary Statistics 
 
 
Table 1.  Definitions of main variables 
Individual characteristics  
     Roma =1 if ethnicity is Roma 
     Age Continuous variables 
     Lang. Romanian =1 if mother tongue is Romanian 
     Female =1 if female 
     Single =1 if single or never married 
     Married =1 if married or in union 
     Separated =1 if separated, divorced, or spouse absent 
     Widowed =1 if widowed 
     Num. Child Continuous, number of own children living at home at time of census 
Area of Residence  
     Urban =1 if urbanicity, 0 if anything else 
     Region Categorical, 8 regions of Romania 
Income and wealth proxies  
     Employed =1 if employed, 0 if unemployed or inactive 
     Occupation Type =Categorical, 10 categories for the person's primary occupation
108
 
     Head Emp =1 if the head of household is employed 
     Sewage =1 if dwelling has sewage or a septic tank, 0 if there is no sewage 
disposal available 
     Electricity =1 if dwelling has electricity 
     PP Living Area Continuous, in m
2
 per person, includes only rooms, not hallways, 
storage, or outdoor spaces 
Education variables  
     NIU =1 if individual is “not in universe” (under age 10) 
< Prim =1 if individual has not completed primary school (grade 8) 
     Primary =1 if individual has completed primary school (grade 8) 
     Secondary =1 if individual has completed secondary school (grade 12) 
     University =1 if individual has received a university degree 
     Unknown =1 if individual’s education is not known 
     MO < Prim, MO Prim, 
           MO Second, MO Uni 
=1 if individual’s resident mother has not completed primary school, 
has completed primary school, has completed secondary school, has 
received a university degree 
     FA < Prim, FA Prim, 
           MO Second, MO Uni 
=1 if individual’s resident father has not completed primary school, 
has completed primary school, has completed secondary school, has 
received a university degree 
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 The occupation variables used in the models are a composite variable of the three highest-skill 
categories plus a variable for the lowest-skill category.  They were created from a categorical 
occupation variable using the 1988 International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) of the 
ILO. If someone has more than one job, the “primary occupation” is the one in which the person had 




Table 2.  Summary statistics: Full Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mi
n 
Max 
Roma 2137967 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Age 2137967 37.44 21.86 0 98 
Lang. Romanian 2137967 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Female 2137967 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Single 2137967 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Married 2137967 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Separated 2137967 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Widowed 2137967 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Num. Children 2137967 0.67 1.00 0 9 
Urban 2137967 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Employed 2137967 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Unemployed 2137967 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Unemployed (excluding inactive) 882379 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Inactive (employment) 2137967 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Head employed 2137967 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Occupation:  High skill‡ 778438 0.23 0.43 0 1 
Occupation:  Elementary‡ 1359529 0.07 0.08  0 1 
Electricity 778438 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Central Heat 2137967 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Sewage 2137967 0.52 0.50 0 1 
PP Living Area, m
2
 2137967 15.76 11.12 0.5 220 
Edu Attainment: NIU* 2137967 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Edu Attainment: <Primary 2137967 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  Primary** 2137967 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  Secondary** 2137967 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  University** 2137967 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  Unknown** 2137967 0.01 0.11 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.: < Primary† 775687 0.18 0.39 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  Primary† 775687 0.35 0.48 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  Secondary† 775687 0.41 0.49 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  University† 775687 0.05 0.21 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  Unknown† 775687 0.00 0.03 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:<Primary† 656939 0.13 0.33 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  Primary† 656939 0.24 0.43 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  Secondary† 656939 0.56 0.50 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  University† 656939 0.07 0.26 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  Unknown† 656939 0.00 0.02 0 1 
* NIU = Not in Universe (too young); ** Indicates level completed; ‡ only for individuals who are 






Table 3.  Summary statistics: Sample restricted by age (17-20) and mother-in-household 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Roma 99046 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Age 99046 18.41 1.13 17 20 
Lang. Romanian 99046 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Female 99046 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Single 99046 0.99 0.10 0 1 
Married 99046 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Separated 99046 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Widowed 99046 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Num. Children 99046 0.02 0.15 0 5 
Urban 99046 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Employed 99046 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Unemployed 99046 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Unemployed (excluding inactive) 35809 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Inactive (employment) 99046 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Head employed 99046 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Occupation:  High Skill‡ 22966 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Occupation:  Elementary‡ 22966 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Electricity 99046 0.98 0.13 0 1 
Central Heat 99046 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Sewage 99046 0.60 0.49 0 1 
PP Living Area, m
2
 99046 11.97 6.27 0.5 110 
Edu Attainment: NIU* 99046 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Edu Attainment: < Primary 99046 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  Primary** 99046 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  Secondary** 99046 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Edu Attainment:  University** 99046 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Edu Attainment:  Unknown** 99046 0.00 0.03 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.: < Primary† 99046 0.11 0.31 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  < Primary† 99046 0.36 0.48 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  Secondary† 99046 0.47 0.50 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  University† 99046 0.06 0.23 0 1 
MO’s Edu Attain.:  Unknown† 99046 0.00 0.02 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.: < Primary† 85056 0.09 0.29 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  Primary† 85056 0.22 0.41 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  Secondary† 85056 0.60 0.49 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  University† 85056 0.08 0.28 0 1 
FA’s Edu Attain.:  Unknown† 85056 0.00 0.02 0 1 
* NIU = Not in Universe (too young); ** Indicates level completed;, † only available for resident 






The three essays that I have presented in this dissertation each tackle a 
different aspect of decision-making in minority education.
109
  The first essay began 
with the broadest, most far-reaching kinds of decisions, those made by groups (or 
representatives of groups) during the process of education policy formation.  The 
second and third essays moved closer to home (and school), to the narrower kinds of 
decisions made by individual parents, school officials, and school-age children.  
These two essays investigated, respectively, the right of these individuals to make 
certain kinds of decisions, and the “mechanisms” by which—or contexts in which—
those individual decisions are made.  Although each of the three essays directly 
addressed some aspect of education policy, and the public and private decision-
making processes that drive it, the chief investigative spaces of this dissertation are 
multiculturalism (in particular its liberal incarnation: cultural liberty) and human 
rights.  The big normative questions challenge us to wrestle with the tensions that 
arise in trying to accommodate ethno-cultural minorities in the public education 
systems of liberal democracies. 
 
Although I deployed both in this project, the concepts of (minority) human 
rights and multiculturalism are by no means coterminous and, in Europe, recent 
political engagements with each of them have been dramatically different.  The 
readiness with which some European politicians are prepared to throw the 
multiculturalist project to the dogs stands in sharp contrast to the lengths to which 
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others will go to defend their reputations as stalwart protectors of human rights.  In 
Germany, political leaders have proclaimed “multiculturalism is dead!”
110
 and 
Chancellor Angela Merkel announced last year that “[T]he approach [to build] a 
multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other...  has failed, 
utterly failed.”
111
  Meanwhile, on the other side of the Rhine, the French European 
Affairs Minister, bristling at accusations that France was violating human rights by 
targeting Roma communities for mass deportations, chastised the European Justice 
Commissioner for addressing France in a tone unfit for “a great state like France, 




Although it is true that the multiculturalist and human rights camps have not 
always come down on the same sides of the normative or political fence, especially 
with regard to women’s rights (see Okin 1999), they do share at least one 
fundamental interest:  protecting the vulnerable.  This dissertation has struggled with 
several dilemmas that public policy makers run into in their efforts to reduce that 
vulnerability in a way that respects the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples to 
define, develop, protect and promote their cultures, while also protecting the universal 
human rights of the individuals that make up both the minority and majority 
populations.  The primary focus of these three essays has been on the rights of 
individuals and groups to make decisions for themselves—in this case, education 
decisions—and the normative, legal, and political questions that arise in the process. 
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This process of individual (or group) decision-making comes down to agency:  
are we to be the authors of our own lives?  Moreover, do we always have the 
information, the skills, the resources, and the freedom to be so?  Numerous 
international and regional treaties, conventions, conferences, and bodies are dedicated 
to protecting the necessary human rights and promoting development opportunities 
that can help ensure that we do.  Yet a full half of the human family continues to live 
in poverty and human rights abuses, including violations of cultural rights, continue 
in every country in the world.  Minority groups are all too often the focus of such 
abuse.  When they are not, grinding poverty and social and political marginalization 
contribute to a standard of living that is frequently well below that of majority 
populations living in the same areas.  These realities interfere with the ability of 
individuals (and the groups with which they affiliate themselves) to exercise agency 
in even the most basic day-to-day situations, including, but not limited to, decisions 
about the type, content, duration, and purpose of education. 
 
There are, most importantly, normative reasons to care about the ability of 
minorities to exercise agency, over educational or any other decisions.  These include 
the promotion of human rights, development, democracy, and dignity, to name a few. 
There are pragmatic policy concerns as well.  The countries of Europe—countries 
that see themselves not only as belonging to an economic but also to a “values” 
community—are members of a variety of international institutions, programs, and 
organizations through which they have committed themselves to protecting their 




seen as making a sincere effort toward achieving these goals (and given the reliance 
of the newer and aspiring EU Member States on foreign and EU aid, that desire is not 
insignificant), they have a reason to enact and try to enforce appropriate laws (a 
necessary if not sufficient part of the solution) and to establish state practices that 
make enjoyment of the spirit of those laws a reality, not merely an aspiration.   
 
Meanwhile, recent events and continued levels of extraordinary deprivation 
demonstrate that the fundamental freedoms of Europe’s minorities are under fire.  It is 
becoming painfully clear that existing minority rights protections (in law and policy), 
including but not limited to protections of cultural identity and freedom, are either 
insufficient or insufficiently enforced, with human, economic, and even 
environmental consequences.  This is true of those more robust protections that 
pertain to indigenous peoples as well as those aimed primarily at national minorities, 





One possible solution is to rethink the minority protection regime to include 
stronger multicultural provisions—something more like the cultural and group rights 
accorded to indigenous peoples.  However, such rights—like the right of indigenous 
groups to self-determination in education—if insufficiently elaborated on paper, can 
result in limited enjoyment of that right in practice.  And we still run into the problem 
that multiculturalism and human rights make an uneasy marriage.  Allowing a parent 
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the “cultural freedom” to put a child into what amounts to a sub-standard school can 
violate that child’s right to a robust education.  To complicate the matter further, 
provisions that seek to protect and promote cultural rights will not necessarily guard 
against violations of civil and political or social and economic rights, violations of the 
kind that restrict labor-market access for even educated minorities, potentially leading 
them to make educational decisions for themselves or their children that only serve to 
perpetuate their social and economic exclusion. With this dissertation, I have tried to 
address each of these problems in turn.  But, of course, as with any research, this 





VI. Areas for Future Research 
 
David A. Crocker has more than once shared the wisdom of Nelson Mandela 
with his students.  Crocker closes graduation ceremonies, and Mandela closes his 
autobiography, by telling us “I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great 
hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb” (Mandela 1995).  Here 
are four places where I might begin to climb. 
1. On “Typologies” of Rights 
 
Does the current typology of minority rights adequately protect vulnerable 
groups?  James W. Nickel makes a compelling case for both minority and group 
rights that rests not on one’s identification with a certain category of minority group 
but rather on the existence of a certain need that is not met or cannot be met by 
existing (universal) (individual) rights.  A typology of rights that responds to 
vulnerability and need as well as to historical protection gaps—as Nickel, Shue, 
Kymlicka and others persuasively argue human rights should do—does not 
correspond neatly to the international typology of vulnerable groups as it is currently 
divided (with respect to indigenous peoples and national minorities, with significant 
overlaps and gaps).  The result is what is often referred to as a “protection gap.”  I 
will argue, and will substantiate through future research, that this term is actually 
comprised of two different kinds of protection gaps.  First, where international laws 
and norms exist to address the vulnerability of certain groups, but those laws are not 
enforced or the norms are not implemented in domestic policies, then there is what 




academic literature and in policy and advocacy circles and is the kind of problem that 
most have in mind when referring to a “human rights protection gap.”   
 
The second type of protection gap, which I call a Relevancy Gap, can actually 
be broken into two distinct parts:  a Group Relevancy Gap and a Vulnerability 
Relevancy Gap.  Imagine a Group X with Vulnerability Y.  In some cases, protections 
exist to address Y, but they don’t pertain to Group X.  For example, this can happen 
when a group (such as a “national minority”) that is the target of a particular set of 
protections is delimited in such a way as to exclude other groups that share those 
same vulnerabilities.  I call this the Group Relevancy Gap, a problem that has yet to 
be clearly articulated in the literature.  In other cases, protections exist that pertain to 
Group X, but they don’t address Vulnerability Y.  This gap arises because the 
broadly-stated, highly inclusive nature of most human rights laws is not finely tuned 
enough to the very particular vulnerabilities that certain sub-groups might face.  I call 
this the Vulnerability Relevancy Gap.  Compared to the Implementation Gap, the 
Relevancy Gap of either type—which arise in part from the current system of 
categorizing different “types” of minorities and applying different protections 
accordingly—receives considerably less attention outside of advocacy circles.  These 
are concepts that I have been in the process of fleshing out and hope to give more 
attention to in the near future. 
 
In my future research, I hope not only to investigate this problem, but to 




vulnerability (including those vulnerabilities that can only be addressed through 
group rights protections similar to those found in the Indigenous Declaration) without 
having to invoke the language of either group rights or multiculturalism.  These 
policies will need to be justified solely on the grounds of individual protection (of 
both well-being and agency), something that I believe is possible.  In this way, I hope 
to arrive at an approach that is viable along three crucial dimensions:  1) adequacy 
and ethical defensibility of coverage, 2) political feasibility, and 3) rhetorical and 
persuasive power.   
 
Also on the topic of typologies of minorities, a related, but more narrowly 
formulated question is:  What does the distinction between the two main “types” of 
homeland minorities—groups commonly referred to as national minorities and 
indigenous peoples—mean for public policy design?  Related to this topic is an 
empirical question:  Does legal recognition of indigenous status have any discernable 
impact on the agency and wellbeing of the group in question? 
2. On Advocacy Strategies 
 
Is the pursuit of indigenous status by minority groups likely to be an effective 
strategy for securing broader rights and enhancing their wellbeing and/or agency?  
Abstracting from the cases of the Sámi or Roma, it is worth asking whether the 
pursuit of ethnocultural recognition through the achievement of indigenous status 
nevertheless could be the “best” way for minority groups to seek legal protection.  I 




“indigenous” to include national minorities and others could have a negative impact 
not only on the current state of indigenous protection but on the status of minorities 
more broadly.  Because of the perceived risks that indigenous claims pose to 
territorial integrity and state sovereignty, such a trend might backfire, resulting in the 
narrowing of indigenous rights protection and re-securitizing of state-minority 
relations.  Kymlicka argues that “[t]he tendency of national minorities to adopt the 
label of indigenous peoples, if it continues, may well lead to the total collapse of the 
international system of indigenous rights” (Kymlicka 2007, 287).  As more and more 
minority groups seek to redefine themselves on the international stage as 
“indigenous” groups, this is a topic that is worth exploring. 
3. On Participation 
 
What is the most appropriate framework for evaluating group participation in 
public policy decision-making?  This question extends my exploration in chapter 2 of 
the usefulness of the evaluative framework that I constructed using Goulet’s and 
Crocker’s work.  So far, I have put together and tested out a framework for evaluating 
the quality of participation according to the point of non-elite entry into the process 
and the mode of participation at work.  As I suggested in chapter 2, this framework 
might be extended to include other dimensions of participation such as breadth and 
control/influence.  However, even if I could work out a way to assign (symbolic) 
numerical values to other dimensions such as these, doing so would quickly render 
the framework too unwieldy to be useful.  Rather than adding additional, siloed 




index.  Future research on this subject would need to explore whether this is possible 
and, for that matter, would be useful.   
 
A second question on the topic of participation comes from comments I 
received on my presentation of chapter 2 at the 2011 conference of the Human 
Development and Capability Association:  How might we best arrive at a culturally 
appropriate understanding of ‘participation’ for indigenous peoples, one that reflects 
their distinct traditions of governance?  This question has both normative and 
empirical dimensions and poses a critical challenge for anyone claiming to offer a 
framework for evaluating any aspect of indigenous self-determination.  Possibly 
carrying the largest research burden of any of the questions I have thus far posed for 
future work, this topic will require substantial engagement with the literatures on 
participation, agency, democracy, and social contract theory, as well as significant 
field work undertaken with indigenous peoples themselves, peoples whose voices are 
for the most part not represented in any of these bodies of literature. 
 
A third participation-related question, which was adumbrated above, arises 
from this dissertation but is beyond its scope:  What are the most effective and 
justifiable forms of and venues for public discussion and deliberation in the presence 
of asymmetries of power?  In particular I have in mind those asymmetries that 
frequently accompany interactions between a powerful majority population and a 
vulnerable, marginalized, or despised minority.  Answering this question will be an 




location of an appropriate threshold for parental consent in education decisions 
affecting their children, a solution that relied heavily on public deliberation and 
legislative action but left open the specific forms or venues most appropriate for such 
deliberation.   
 
Goulet has highlighted the importance for development of finding ways to 
extend “micro” participation to venues of “macro” decision-making, referring to this 
as “the upscaling of participation from micro to macro arenas” (Goulet 2005).  
Engaging in this project is an important—and natural—next step for my own 
research.  In particular, more research is needed to identify the precise types of 
mechanisms and venues least likely to reproduce power asymmetries and most likely 
to include otherwise marginalized members of the community.  It might very well be 
that different venues are most appropriate in different localities, for example, 
depending on the breadth and depth of a “contestatory” civil society.  While 
important, I’ve left this (partially empirical) question aside for future work.   
 
When I do take this question up, I will start by reviewing the extensive 
theoretical literature on deliberative democracy and participatory development 
(including Crocker 2008 and references therein).  As for empirical work, Alkire 
(2002), Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011), Fung and Wright (2003), Goulet (2005), 
and Van Cott (2008) have analyzed case studies from Latin America, Southeast Asia, 
and the United States.  Alkire focuses on women’s income generation projects.  




of civil society.  Fung and Wright’s discussion of Empowered Participatory 
Governance is particularly instructive in its focus on the institutional design of 
different sorts of participatory venues.  Goulet (2005), in discussing the promise of 
“micro” participation on “macro” issues and projects, looks specifically at damn 
construction.  Van Cott turns the lens on indigenous participation, examining the 
possibilities for local innovations by Andean indigenous groups to inform the 
literature on radical democracy.  All of these works promise important insights. 
4. On Agency 
 
While many of the research questions outlined above require substantial 
empirical research, in my immediate post-doctoral research, I hope to tackle a more 
in-depth exploration of two of the normative concepts that I have sketched in this 
dissertation and in other recent research:  the idea of agency vulnerability and the 
connected idea of (critical and) sustainable agency.  I feel that both have something 
important to add to the current discussions of individual and collective agency, the 
latter most especially so in the context of children’s rights.  It will also be worth 
exploring the relationships between—and relative advantages, disadvantages, and 
justifications of—the related concepts of agency, autonomy, and self-determination.  
Turning to the practical application of these concepts, and very much related to the 
participation questions I highlighted above, I might also investigate the mechanisms 
and venues—in civil society, government, and public life more generally—that would 
be most effective and appropriate for the individual and collective exercise of critical 




thinking on the concept of agency to several additional questions, each of which will 
be relevant for my own research:  Why is agency a good thing? How might agency be 
“incentivized” in a way appropriate for the ideal of agency?  How could agency 
achievement and agency freedom be “operationalized” in a way that would allow us 
to compare the agency freedom/achievement at two different times or at the same 
time in two different societies? 
5. On Self-Determination 
 
In many respects, this dissertation does not do justice to the wide-ranging 
theoretical debate about self-determination.  One important respect in which these 
essays come up short is in the lack of attention to the often-discussed tension between 
the interests and aims of individuals and those of groups.  Many individuals might 
support the attainment of self-determination or autonomy for a political, national, 
ethnic or other group with which they identify, while some of their individual 
interests or ends remain at odds with those of the group. Moreover, self-determination 
might be a fundamentally individual pursuit.  Anaya argues that “the characterization 
of self-determination as a right of ‘peoples,’ however, does not deny the individual as 
an important beneficiary of the norm.”  He goes on to cite Dov Ronen in arguing 
“that it is ultimately the individual that matters in the realization of self-determination 
values” (Anaya 1993, 137).  Balancing these individual interests with those of a 
heterogeneous group, however, is not simple.  Although an adequate discussion of 




tried to address some of these tensions as they apply to specific cases, there is much 
work that remains to be done on this subject. 
6. Final remarks 
 
I began this work with a quotation:  “It is the integrity of the inner worlds of 
peoples—their rectitude systems or their sense of spirituality—that is their distinctive 
humanity. Without an opportunity to determine, sustain, and develop that integrity, 
their humanity—and ours—is denied” (Steiner 1992, in Wiessner 2008, 1171).  I 
have attempted in these pages to make the case for the importance of education in the 
development, evolution, preservation, and deconstruction of precisely those inner 
worlds, by those to whom they matter most.  I have also attempted to engage with 
several pressing challenges that arise in the efforts of states to offer such education in 
diverse democratic societies, challenges that often come down to questions of 
decision-making, private or public, individual or collective.  Though much research 
remains to be done in order to answer these questions, I have begun this task here.  I 
look forward in my future work to starting up some of the “hills” I have identified 
above, chipping away at these burning questions, the aim of which, ultimately, is to 
identify those policies and practices most likely to contribute to the larger project of 





Appendix A:  Crocker’s Typology of Participation 
(Crocker 2008, 343-4, footnotes omitted) 
(i) Nominal participation: The weakest way in which someone 
participates in group decision-making is when someone is a 
member of a group but does not attend its meetings. Some people 
are group members but are unable to attend or unwilling to attend 
because, for instance, they are harassed or unwelcome. 
(ii) Passive participation: In passive participation, people are group 
members and attend the group’s or officials’ decision-making 
meetings, but passively listen to reports about the decisions that 
others already have made. The elite tells the nonelite what the elite 
is going to do or has done, and nonelite persons participate, like the 
White House press corps, by listening and, at best, asking questions 
(iii) Consultative participation: Nonelites participate by giving 
information and their opinions (“input,” “preferences,” and even 
“proposals”) to the elite. The nonelite neither deliberate among 
themselves nor make decisions. It is the elite who are the 
“deciders,” and while they may deign to listen to the nonelite, they 
have no obligation to do so. 
(iv) Petitionary participation: Nonelites petition16 authorities to make 
certain decisions and do certain things, usually to remedy 
grievances. Although it is the prerogative of the elite to decide, the 




listen, and consider if not to heed. This participatory model, like 
that of consultative participation, is often used in traditional 
decision-making. 
(v) Participatory implementation: Elites determine the goals and 
main means, and nonelites implement the goals and decide, if at all, 
only tactics. In this mode nonelites do more than listen,  comment, 
and express. Like soccer players they also make and enact decision, 
but the overall plan and marching orders belongs to the coach. 
(vi) Bargaining. On the basis of whatever individual or collective 
power they have, nonelites bargain with elites. Those bargaining are 
more adversaries than partners. Self-interest largely if not 
exclusively motivates each side, and nonelite influence on the final 
“deal” depends on what nonelites are willing to give up and what 
concessions they are able to extract. The greater the power 
imbalances between an elite and nonelite, the less influence the 
noneltite has on the final outcome. An elite may settle for some loss 
now in order to make likely a larger future gain. Alliances with and 
support from actors outside and above tend to enhance nonelite 
bargaining power.  
(vii) Deliberative participation: Nonelites (sometimes among 
themselves and sometimes with elites) deliberate together, sifting 
proposals and reasons to forge agreements on policies that at least a 
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